# Re: Qualia and mathematics

```On Jan 30, 5:09 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 29 Jan 2012, at 03:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > How do you know that they 'occur' in the computations rather than in
> > the eye of the beholder of the computations?
>
> The beholder of the computations is supported by the computations.
> Those exist independently of me, in the same way numbers are prime or
> not independently of me.```
```
How would you know that they exist at all? Many people feel the same

>
>
>
> >>>>> There is nothing in the universe
>
> >>>> The term universe is ambiguous.
>
> >>> Only in theory. I use it in a literal, absolutist way.
>
> >> This does not help to understand what you mean by "universe".
>
> > Universe means 'all that is' in every context.
>
> But "all that is" is what we are searching, testing, studying.  The
> word "is" is very useful in everyday life, but very ambiguous per.
> "is" or "exist" depends on the theory chosen. Something can exist
> ontologically, or epistemologically.

As long as it is something to something, then it 'is'. There is
nothing that it is not, as long as sense is respected. Unicorns are
not part of the universe as far as we know, but the idea of unicorns
is certainly part of the human universe and therefore the universe.

>
>
>
> >>>> You confuse proving p, which can be explained in arithmetic, and
> >>>> "proving p & p is true", which can happen to be true for a machine,
> >>>> but escapes necessarily its language.
> >>>> The same for consciousness. It cannot be explained in *any* third
> >>>> person terms. But it can be proved that self-observing machine
> >>>> cannot
> >>>> avoid the discovery of many things concerning them which are beyond
> >>>> language.
>
> >>> I think that are confusing p with a reality rather than a logical
> >>> idea
>
> >> p refers to reality by definition. "p" alone is for "it is the case
> >> that p".
>
> > But it isn't the case, it's the idea of it being the case.
>
> It is the case that 17 is prime, independently of of it is the case
> that such or such human has the idea that it is the case that 17 is
> prime. You are confusing levels.

17 is only prime in a symbolic system that defines primeness,
enumeration, and division of whole integers that way. Internal
consistency of the rules a game, even a universal game, does not make
the game independent of players. The rules arise from the players
interactions with each other, and that interaction is the game. Comp
says that there are disembodied rules that assemble themselves
mechanically as games which then dreams it is separate players.

>
> > You're just
> > saying 'Let p ='. It doesn't mean proposition that has any causal
> > efficacy.
>
> The fact that 17 is prime has causal efficacy. It entails many facts.

It entails only arithmetic facts, but there is nothing to say that
arithmetic by itself causes anything outside of arithmetic. Even
within arithmetic, it is the execution of a program or function by a
mind or body, that is through energy exerted within matter, which
produces causes.

>
>
>
> >>> I have no reason to believe that a machine can observe
> >>> itself in anything more than a trivial sense.
>
> >> It needs a diagonalization. It can't be completely trivial.
>
> > Something is aware of something, but it's just electronic components
> > or bricks on springs or whatever being aware of the low level physical
> > interactions.
>
> A machine/program/number can be aware of itself (1-person) without
> knowing anything about its 3p lower level.

We don't really know that machine/program/number can be aware of
anything. It may only be material interpreters which are aware of
anything and the degree to which they are aware of 1p and 3p may be
inversely proportional to their complexity. Being fantastically
complex, we are aware of only some of our 1p and 3p self. Simpler
organisms or particles may in fact have awareness of 100% of their 1p
and 3p selves.
>
>
>
> >>> It is not a conscious
> >>> experience, I would guess that it is something like an accounting of
> >>> unaccounted-for function terminations. Proximal boundaries. A
> >>> silhouette of the self offering no interiority but an
> >>> extrapolation of
> >>> incomplete 3p data. That isn't consciousness.
>
> >> Consciousness is not just self-reference. It is true self-reference.
> >> It belongs to the intersection of truth and self-reference.
>
> > It's more than that too though. Many senses can be derived from
> > consciousness, true self-reference is neither necessary nor
> > sufficient. I think that the big deal about consciousness is not that
> > it has true self-reference but that it is able to care about itself
> > its world that a non-trivial, open ended, and creative way. We can
> > watch a movie or have a dream and lose self-awareness without being
> > unconscious. Deep consciousness is often characterized by
> > unselfconscious awareness.
>
> This is not excluded by the definition I gave.

How does caring and creating follow from true self-reference? A camera
that recognizes itself in a mirror would not automatically care about
something or become conscious.

>
>
>
> >>>>> "But I’ll venture an axiom
> >>>>> of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system
> >>>>> that
> >>>>> are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system.
> >>>>> There
> >>>>> is nothing mystical about emergent properties. When the emergent
> >>>>> property of ‘pumping blood’ arises out of collections of heart
> >>>>> cells,
> >>>>> that property is a logical extension of the properties of the
> >>>>> parts -
> >>>>> physical properties such as elasticity, electrical conductivity,
> >>>>> volume and so on that belong to the individual cells. But nobody
> >>>>> invoking ‘emergent properties’ to explain consciousness in the
> >>>>> brain
> >>>>> has yet explained how consciousness arises as a natural
> >>>>> extension of
> >>>>> the known properties of brain cells  - or indeed of matter at
> >>>>> all. "
>
> >>>> Pierz, Craig, I disagree. Consciousness can be explained as a non
> >>>> 3p
> >>>> describable fixed point when machine's observe themselves. This
> >>>> provides a key role to consciousness, including the ability to
> >>>> develop
> >>>> meanings, to speed decisions, to make decision in absence of
> >>>> information, etc.
>
> >>> I disagree. It provides a key role to the function of agency but it
> >>> has nothing to do with consciousness and qualia per se. A sleep
> >>> walker
> >>> can navigate to the kitchen for a snack without being conscious.
>
> >> Yes. But everyday life is more complex than looking for a snack.
>
> > Not as complex as doing what the immune system does.
>
> I am not sure. I don't see the relevance of that mechanist point.

I'm saying the complexity of the immune system suggests that complex
function does necessarily give rise to consciousness.

>
>
>
> >>> Consciousness does nothing to speed decisions, it would only cost
>
> >> That's why high animals have larger cortex.
>
> > Their decisions are no faster than simpler animals.
>
> Complex decision are made possible, and are done more faster.

That only requires more processing power, not consciousness.

>
>
>
> >>> and add nothing to the efficiency of unconscious
>
> >> So, why do you think we are conscious?
>
> > I think that humans have developed a greater sensorimotive capacity
>
> I still don't know what you mean by that. You can replace
> "sensorimotive" by "acquainted to the son of God" in all your argument
> without them having a different meaning or persuasive force.

Sensorimotive is the interior view of electromagnetism.
Electromagnetism is orderly dynamic changes in material objects across
space relative to each other, sensorimotivation is the perception of
change through time in subjective experience relative to one's self.
Like electromagnetism is electricity and magnetism, sensorimotivation
is sensation and motive. They correspond to receiving of sense
experience (sensation) and embodying and projecting an intention
(motive).

>
> > as
> > a virtuous cycle of evolutionary circumstance and subjective
> > investment. Just as hardware development drives software development
> > and vice versa. It's not that we are conscious as opposed to
> > unconscious, it's that our awareness is hypertrophied from particular
> > animal motives being supported by the environment and we have
> > transformed our environment to enable our motives. Our seemingly
> > unique category of consciousness can either be anthropic prejudice or
> > objective fact, but either way it exists in a context of many other
> > kinds of awareness. The question is not why we are conscious, it is
> > why is consciousness possible and/or why are we human.
>
> Why we are human is easily explained, or not-explainable, as an
> indexical geographical fact, by comp. It is like "why am I the one in
> W and not in M?". Comp explains why consciousness is necessary. It is
> the way we feel when integrating quickly huge amount of information in
> a personal scenario.

'the way we feel' doesn't relate to information though. Where is the
feeling located? In the information, in the informed, or somewhere
else? I say that there is literally no information, all of the
experience is located in the world of the informed  - which is a
concretely real world, even though it's realism is multivalent so that
it is literally real in some senses and and figuratively real in other
senses.

>
> > To the former,
> > the possibility is primordial, and the latter is a matter of
> > probability and intentional efforts.
>
> >>>> Consciousness is not explainable in term of any parts of something,
> >>>> but as an invariant in universal self-transformation.
> >>>> If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, then Peano
> >>>> Arithmetic
>
> >>> Why and how does universal self-transformation equate to
> >>> consciousness?
>
> >> I did not say that. I said that consciousness is a fixed point for a
> >> very peculiar form of self-transformation.
>
> > what makes it peculiar?
>
> The computer science details of its implementation (not of
> consciousness, but of the self-transformation, based on some
> application of Kleene's theorem).
>
>
>
> >>> Anything that is conscious can also be unconscious. Can
> >>> Peano Arithmetic be unconscious too?
>
> >> Yes. That's possible if you accept that consciousness is a logical
> >> descendent of consistency.
>
> > Aren't the moons of Saturn consistent?
>
> The material moons are not programs, nor theories. "consistent" cannot
> apply to it without stretching the words a lot.

Why aren't they programs? They undergo tremendous logical change over
time. Why discriminate against moons? I don't see any stretch at all
in calling them consistent. You could set a clock by their orbits.

>
> > Will consciousness logically
> > descend from their consistency?
>
> If ever the moon have to become conscious. Yes. No if this has not to
> happen. There is few chance moons becomes conscious, for they are not
> self-moving and have very few degrees of freedom.

Computers are 'solid state' though? Moons have all kinds of geological
changes going on over thousands of years.

>
>
>
> >> It follows then from the fact that
> >> consistency entails the consistency of inconsistency (Gödel II). Of
> >> course, the reality is more complex, for consciousness is only
> >> approximated by the instinctive unconscious) inductive inference of
> >> self-consistency.
>
> > You need some kind of awareness to begin with to tell the difference
> > between consistency and inconsistency.
>
> Not necessarily. Checking inconsistency does not require a lot of
> cognitive ability.

It does necessarily require awareness of some kind. Something has to
detect something and know how to expect and interpret a 'difference'
in that detection. Cognition has nothing to do with it. That's much
higher up the mountain, in true vs false land. Consistency is only
same v different.

>
>
>
> >>>>>>> My solution is that both views are correct on their own terms in
> >>>>>>> their
> >>>>>>> own sense and that we should not arbitrarily privilege one view
> >>>>>>> over
> >>>>>>> the other. Our vision is human vision. It is based on retina
> >>>>>>> vision,
> >>>>>>> which is based on cellular and molecular visual sense. It is not
> >>>>>>> just
> >>>>>>> a mechanism which pushes information around from one place to
> >>>>>>> another,
> >>>>>>> each place is a living organism which actively contributes to
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> top
> >>>>>>> level experience - it isn't a passive system.
>
> >>>>>> Living organisms - replicators,
>
> >>>>> Life replicates, but replication does not define life. Living
> >>>>> organisms feel alive and avoid death. Replication does not
> >>>>> necessitate
> >>>>> feeling alive.
>
> >>>> I am OK with this. Yet, replication + while-loop might be enough.
>
> >>> Should we mourn the untying of our shoelaces each time?
>
> >> ?
>
> > If we tie and untie our shoes many times, we replicate the knot
> > pattern and have a loop while it is tied within which subroutines of
> > changes to the laces occur with walking.
>
> I was just alluding to the fact that replication, although not
> providing Turing universality, do that in company of the while loop.

I was just saying that while loops and replication don't imply the
generation of feeling.

>
>
>
> >>>>>> are fine things, but I don't see why
> >>>>>> must one confuse replicators with perception. Perception can
> >>>>>> exist by
> >>>>>> itself merely on the virtue of passing information around and
> >>>>>> processing
> >>>>>> it. Replicators can also exist due similar reasons, but on a
> >>>>>> different
> >>>>>> level.
>
> >>>>> Perception has never existed 'by itself'. Perception only occurs
> >>>>> in
> >>>>> living organisms who are informed by their experience.
>
> >>>> The whole point is to explain terms like "living", "conscious",
> >>>> etc.
> >>>> You take them as primitive, so are escaping the issue.
>
> >>> They aren't primitive, the symmetry is primitive.
>
> >> ?
>
> > Conscious and unconscious are aspects of the inherent subject-object
> > symmetry of the universe.
>
> Which you assume.

What choice do I have? My only experience of the universe is 100%
definable by the subject-object symmetry.

>
>
>
> >>>>> There is no
> >>>>> independent disembodied 'information' out there. There detection
> >>>>> and
> >>>>> response, sense and motive of physical wholes.
>
> >>>> Same for "physical" (and that's not obvious!).
>
> >>> Do you doubt that if all life were exterminated that planets would
> >>> still exist? Where would information be though?
>
> >> In the arithmetical relation, which truth are independent of me.
> >> (I indulge in answering by staying in the frame of my working
> >> hypothesis without repeating this).
>
> > Why isn't arithmetic truth physical?
>
> Because it does not rely on any physical notion. You can do number
> theory without ever doing physics.

But you can't do number theory without a physical subject doing the
theorizing. It's coming out of a sugar burning skull monster...some
kind of horrible snotty giant blood-walnut that has taught itself to
make the monkey body do these odd scribbles on whiteboards. You don't
need to do physics, but something has to do physics (and chemistry,
biology, zoology, neurology, anthropology...) for you to do anything.

>
>
>
> >>>>> Sorry, but I think it's never going to happen. Consciousness is
> >>>>> not
> >>>>> digital.
>
> >>>> If you survive with a digital brain, then consciousness is
> >>>> necessarily
> >>>> not digital.
> >>>> A brain is not a maker of consciousness. It is only a stable
> >>>> pattern
> >>>> making it possible (or more probable) that a person can manifest
> >>>> itself relatively to some universal number(s).
>
> >>> Why not just use adipose tissue instead? That's a more stable
> >>> pattern.
> >>> Why have a vulnerable concentration of this pattern in the head? Our
> >>> skeleton would make a much safer place four a person to manifest
> >>> itself relatively to some universal number.
>
> >> Write a letter to nature for geographical reclamation.
>
> > Funny but avoiding a serious problem of comp. Why not have some
> > creatures with smart skulls or shells and stupid soft parts inside? It
> > seems to be a strong indicator of material properties consistently
> > determining mechanism and not the other way around.
>
> Seeming is deceptive.

What would be an explanation, or counterfactual?

>
>
>
> >>>> Keep in mind that comp makes materialism wrong.
>
> >>> That's not why it's wrong. I have no problem with materialism being
> >>> wrong, I have a problem with experience being reduced to non
> >>> experience or non sense.
>
> >> This does not happen in comp. On the contrary machines can already
> >> explain why that does not happen. Of course you need to believe that
> >> arithmetical truth makes sense. But your posts illustrate that you
> >> do.
>
> > Arithmetical truth does make sense, definitely, but so do other kinds
> > of experiences make sense and are not arithmetic truths.
>
> If they are conceptually rich enough, you can take them instead of
> arithmetic, without changing anything in the explanation of
> consciousness and matter. I use numbers because people are more
> familiar with them.

I use sense because it makes more sense.

>
>
>
> >>>> The big picture is
> >>>> completely different. I think that you confuse comp, with its
> >>>> Aristotelian version where computations seems to be incarnated by
> >>>> physical primitive materials. Comp + materialism leads to person-
> >>>> nihilism, so it is important to understand that comp should not be
> >>>> assumed together with materialism (even weak).
>
> >>> I don't think that I am confusing it. Comp is perfectly
> >>> illustrated as
> >>> modern investment banking. There is no material, in fact it
> >>> strangles
> >>> the life out of all materials, eviscerating culture and
> >>> architecture,
> >>> all in the name of consolidating digitally abstracted control of
> >>> control. This is machine intelligence. The idea of unexperienced
> >>> ownership as an end unto itself, forever concentrating data and
> >>> exporting debt.
>
> >> Only in your reductionist appraisal of comp. That is widespread and
> >> dangerous indeed, but you add to the grains of it, imo.
>
> > Investment banking is just an example, I'm not trying to reduce comp
> > to that, but the example is defensible. Investment banking is almost
> > pure comp, is it not?
>
> If you deposit your Gödel number code at the bank, or something like
> that. You stretch the meaning of comp, which is just the bet that our
> body is Turing emulable and that we can survive through any of its
> Turing emulation.

Isn't that what money is really all about now though? Instead of a
body, we have accounts. You can't get more Turing emulable that that.
It's practically Turing-maniacal.

>
> > All of those Wall Street quants... where is the
> > theology and creativity?
>
> It is buried by the materialists since 1500 years.

60% of the stock trades in the US markets are automated. I would say
that makes AI the dominant financial decision maker in the world.

>
>
>
> >>>>> We are able to extend and augment our neurological capacities (we
> >>>>> already are) with neuromorphic devices, but ultimately we need our
> >>>>> own
> >>>>> brain tissue to live in.
>
> >>>> Why? What does that mean?
>
> >>> It means that without our brain, there is no we.
>
> >> That's not correct.
>
> > What makes you think that?
>
> There is no ontological brain, yet we are.
>

Aren't we the ontological brain already?

>
> >>> We cannot be
> >>> simulated anymore than water or fire can be simulated.
>
> >> Why? That's a strong affirmation. We have not yet find a phenomenon
> >> in
> >> nature that cannot be simulated (except the collapse of the wave,
> >> which can still be Turing 1-person recoverable).
>
> > You can't water a real plant with simulated water or survive the
> > arctic burning virtual coal for heat.
>
> What is a real plant? A plant is epistemologically real relatively to
> you and your most probable computations. It is not an absolute notion.

It might be an absolute notion. At my level of description it is a
plant, at another it's tissues, cells, molecules, etc. Anything that
satisfies all of those descriptions within all of those perceptual
frames may be a real plant. If it only looks like a plant, then it's a
cartoon or a puppet.

>
> > If you look at substitution
> > level in reverse, you will see that it's not a matter of making a
> > plastic plant that acts so real we can't tell the difference, it's a
> > description level which digitizes a description of a plant rather than
> > an actual plant. Nothing has been simulated, only imitated. The
> > difference is that an imitation only reminds us of what is being
> > imitated but a simulation carries the presumption of replacement.
>
> This makes things more complex than they might be.

It makes more sense though. Otherwise we would have movies that we
could literally live inside of already.

>
>
>
> >>> Human
> >>> consciousness exists nowhere but through a human brain.
>
> >> Not at all. Brain is a construct of human consciousness, which has
> >> some local role.
> >> You are so much Aristotelian.
>
> > If you say that human consciousness exists independently of a human
> > brain, you have to give me an example of such a case.
>
> UDA shows that you are an example of this.

But drinking some scotch or smoking a cigar tells me that I am not
independent of my brain.

>
>
>
> >>>>> We, unfortunately cannot be digitized,
>
> >>>> You don't know that. But you don't derive it either from what you
> >>>> assume (which to be franc remains unclear)
>
> >>> I do derive it, because the brain and the self are two parts of a
> >>> whole. You cannot export the selfness into another form, because the
> >>> self has no form, it's only experiential content through the
> >>> interior
> >>> of a living brain.
>
> >> That's the 1-self, but it is just an interface between truth and
> >> relative bodies.
>
> > Truth is just an interface between all 1-self and all relative bodies.
>
> In which theory? This does not make sense.

It's an implication of multisense realism. Truth (a kind of Sense) is
an interface between all 1-self (sensorimotive experiences) and all 3-
p relative bodies (electromagnetic objects). It is the synchronization
of interior dreams and external bodies.

>
>
>
> >>>> .
> >>>> I think that you have a reductionist conception of machine, which
> >>>> was
> >>>> perhaps defensible before Gödel 1931 and Turing discovery of the
> >>>> universal machine, but is no more defensible after.
>
> >>> I know that you think that, but you don't take into account that I
> >>> started with with that. I read Gödel, Escher, Bach around 1980 I
> >>> think. Even though I couldn't get too much into the math, I was
> >>> quite
> >>> happy with the implications of it. For the next 25 years I believed
> >>> that the universe was made of 'patterns' - pretty close to what your
> >>> view is.
>
> >> Not really. The physical universe is not made of any patterns. Nor is
> >> it made of anything. It is a highly complex structure which appears
> >> in
> >> first person plural shared dreams.
>
> > That's what I'm saying. 'Structure' = pattern.
>
> >> You might, like many, confuse
> >> digital physics (which does not work) and comp.
> >> "I am a machine" makes it impossible for both my consciousness, and
> >> my
> >> material body to be Turing emulable.
>
> > But your material body is Turing emulable (or rather, Turing
> > imitatable).
>
> At the comp subst level: imitable is emulable. You seem to lower that
> level in the infinite.

The subst level is proportional to the distance (literal and
figurative) from the self. (You should like this actually?) The more
distant from the self - say looking at a map of the Earth, the higher
the subst level is. Any old substrate for the map will do. The closer
you get to the self, the subst level gets exponentially lower.

There may be a mirror image of the uncanny valley involved. A
'character spike' so to speak, where people enjoy watching a person
act like a robot, statue, mime, or other starchy, would-be dehumanized
character. There is certainly something comedic about it. Like when
the uncanny valley drops off, when the character is taken too far and
becomes too convincing for too long, the substitution level becomes
uncomfortably high and we begin to wonder if there is something really
wrong with them (the Andy Kauffman valley).

>
>
>
> >> I agree that this is counter-
> >> intuitive, and that's why I propose a reasoning, and I prefer that
> >> people grasp the reasoning than pondering at infinitum on the results
> >> without doing the needed (finite) work.
>
> >>> It's only been in the last 7 years that I have found a better
> >>> idea. My hypothesis is post-Gödelian symmetry.
>
> >> You have to elaborate a lot. You should study first order logical
> >> language to be sure no trace of metaphysical implicit baggage is put
> >> in your theory; in case you want scientists trying to understand what
> >> you say.
>
> > My whole point is revealing a universe description in which logic and
> > direct experience coexist in many ways. Limiting it to logical
> > language defeats the purpose,
>
> That's what the machine can already explain. You consider it as a
> zombie.

Not a zombie, a puppet.

>
> > although I would love to collaborate
> > with someone who was interested in formalizing the ideas.
>
> Convince people that there is an idea. But by insisting that your
> magic where the comp theories explains the appearance of the magic
> without introducing it at the start.

Comp introduces magic at the start. 'Arithmetic Truth' is very much a
digital Dreamtime. I don't add any magic and nothing appears except
different levels of sense recapitulation in inertial frames.
Everything in multisense realism works with a universe of only the
typical experiences that we live through every day, plus it explains
why extraordinary experiences are harder to ground in public
certainty.

>
> > Logic is a
> > 3p language - a mechanistic, involuntary form of reasoning which
> > denies the 1p subject any option but to accept it.
>
> This is false. The right side of the hypostases with "& p& are
> provably beyond language, at the level the machine can live.

You're making my point. The notion of anything being literally false
or true is just what I said: an involuntary form of reasoning. Then
you proceed to deny me, the 1p subject, any option to accept it.

>
> > The 1p experience
> > is exactly the opposite of that. It is a 'seems like' affair which
> > invites or discourages voluntary participation of the subject. Half of
> > the universe is made of this.
>
> With comp, it is the main part of the "universe".

That's why it's a little naive :)

Craig

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