On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 7:12 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:

> An agent in possession of free will is able to perform an action that was
> possible to predict by nobody but the agent itself.

There are a number of things wrong with this:

1) In theory there is no reason to think that the agent would be better at
predicting its own actions than a outsider, and indeed its easy to imagine
circumstances where the exact opposite is true.

2) In practice the subjective meaning of the word "free" would seem to be
incompatible with the ability to predict that you would do X tomorrow for
certain and nothing can change that fact, its certain, it's just the way
things are, you're on a path to X and there is no way to get off, you're
stuck. In other words "freedom" and "no choice" don't fit. If you want a
definition try the opposite:

 "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a
outsider can make such a prediction";

 That's the only definition of free will that isn't gibberish or circular
but unfortunately nobody except me uses it.

3) If you can always predict your actions then you must be deterministic
and have had a reason for doing so, because otherwise it was random and if
you can predict randomness then its not random. And if you did it for a
reason it's deterministic. I mean, if you weren't deterministic you
couldn't determine what you would do next.

 John K Clark

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