On 12 Feb 2012, at 01:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 11, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Dennett's Comp:
Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) -

What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?

I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or
third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/
holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication.


I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a
top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level
mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical
processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or
incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves.

But how, precisely?

I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual

Are you assuming quantum mechanics?

I think that what we measure at that level is literally the
most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is
the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail
really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are
anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as
a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity
is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes
unto themselves.

With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something.

I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot
ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example, you
did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a
complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be
manifested in a consistent history.

I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not
need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed
it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions.

This is a "don't ask" assumption.

The 3p quant
correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish
any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it
get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings
in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive
of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and
die with nothing but the 1p descriptions,

We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also.

therefore we cannot assume
the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power
to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on
their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the
universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete
understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their

This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive.

Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to
hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate
human 3p
quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.

Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious.
Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the
existence of philosophical zombies,

I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia,
puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place.

Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and
philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent
qualia and having no qualia, also.

A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by
the puppet master.

Which means that the puppet is not autonomous, like a human, or its behaviorally equivalent zombie.

The difference between absent qualia and no qualia
is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already
know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well.

OK. It is consciousness with a lacking qualia. Philosophical zombie lacks consciousness, and all qualia.

that is: the existence of
unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all*

Not perfectly imitating, no.

Sorry but it is the definition.

That's why it's a theoretical/philosophical definition and not a
practical realism.

But we reason about theory.

That's what that whole business of
substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a
TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants
(even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be
used to detect the puppet strings).

By definition, a philosophical zombie win all Turing test, (except if
he imitates a human so awkward that people take him for a machine.
(That happens!)).
By definition philophical zombies behave identically to humans. The
only difference is that they lack the 1p experience.

That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies.

The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the person having that body.

Not at all. The contrary happens. Matter becomes a first person plural

No, I don't think that it does. Matter becomes a 3p computational
feedback invariance - like a graphic avatar in a video game collides
with a wall of colored pixels and bounces back. There is no experience
involved at all. The wall could feel like marshmallows or solid steel,
but would it be the avatar feeling the wall or the wall feeling the
avatar, or the negative space feeling both, or the software feeling
graphic vectors, or hardware feeling the logical collisions on the
microprocessor? ...why not the pixels on the monitor themselves
feeling the event? None of it really makes sense to me. The experience
is orphaned in Platonia or otherwise generalized to a free floating
truth condition.

You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs.

There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.

I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
explain the experienced character of matter.

Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia which has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.

Again, it could be
sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but
since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather than
a reality.

You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and proposing theories.

Deriving the appearance of matter from arithmetic does not imply that
matter is made of number. matter simply does not exist,

This is the mirror image of Dennett. I explain it in multisense
realism as the Logos position. Why wouldn't matter exist just as much
as anything else? As much as numbers?

Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a consequence of the theory we are working on. Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion. I have never seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive matter.

and the
appearance of matter emerges

Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?

From the average minds of the average universal numbers.

To where?

To here and now.

Why is it

Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams, and their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).

Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in
our world?

This has no sense. I can only describe a reality (arithmetic) and explain why some numbers will have some physical feeling and beliefs in material thing. I have no evidence for actual matter. I have personal evidence for consciousness and qualia, and historical evidences for measurable numbers and plausible locally stable relations.

Can you light a brick of charcoal on fire with an
arithmetic function alone?

Shows me a charcoal brick which you could prove that it would not be a result of arithmetical function. That might be possible, for example if the material arithmetical hypostases were contradicting physics, but up to now, it fits nicely.

Why would arithmetic want to pretend to

Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing, or to not assuming all what we want to explain.

Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made any progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like PA are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at all.

from the complex statistics and topology
of the dreams of the universal numbers, entangled in deep computations.

I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of
intangible dreamy universal entanglement.

It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that ExP(x) is true if it exists a number verifying the condition P.

the 1p would be a 3p de-presentation/description of what we know as
1p, but the machine would not.

No, it is the contrary. Read UDA, it will make you understand why.

I have tried, but it doesn't make sense to me.

Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory made by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself from your assumption. I think. You also find obvious that we are not machine, but clearly it is not. Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of consciousness to other entities.

Subjectivity comes from
self-reference + Truth.

I think that our experience shows us though that in human development,
subjectivity is rooted in fantasy and idiosyncaratic interpretation
which is not directly self-referential. I would say truth is the
invariance between subjective and objective sense. Self-reference is
trivial compared to self-embodiment and self-identification. Self-
reference can be imitated by a machine, but I don't think that a
machine can use the word 'I' in the full range of senses that we can.

Trivially, because you assume non-comp.

I don't assume anything, I have only to observe the difference between
any person who has ever lived and any machine that has ever been

So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of observation. You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a public solution to a problem.


"Truth about a weaker LUM" is definable by a stronger LUM, but no LUM can defined its own global notion of truth (which will play the role
of the first greek God, like Plotinus ONE). Weak and String are
defined in term of the set of provable (by the entity in question)
arithmetical (or equivalent) propositions.

Yes, from what I can understand, I agree. I have always thought that
you are on the right track with your insights into the incompleteness
of any given machine or person's understanding. Because of the way
that the interior of the monad is diffracted into spacetime
exteriority, it may very well be the case that our own limitations of
self-knowledge are in fact mechanical 3p limitations, which can be
modeled successfully by comp.

OK. But the 3p limitations have impact on the 1p too. And on the
physical, which is really 1p plural.

Sure, yes. All of the levels and modalities influence each other in
different ways.


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