On Feb 12, 6:54 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 12 Feb 2012, at 01:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>>>> Dennett's Comp:
> >>>>> Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) -
> >>>> What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?
> >>> I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct
> >>> phenomenology or
> >>> third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/
> >>> holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication.
> >> ?
> > I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a
> > top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level
> > mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical
> > processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or
> > incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves.
> But how, precisely?

It doesn't translate as a how or what, it's a who and why. How do you
make your signature your own? How do you stay the same person even
thought your body changes? It doesn't work that way, it's a whole
other sense which is symmetrical but anomalous to the what and how
senses of 3p architecture.

> > I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual
> > nesting.
> Are you assuming quantum mechanics?

I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the

> > I think that what we measure at that level is literally the
> > most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is
> > the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail
> > really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are
> > anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as
> > a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity
> > is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes
> > unto themselves.
> With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means
> something.

Why not?

> >> I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I
> >> cannot
> >> ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example, you
> >> did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a
> >> complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be
> >> manifested in a consistent history.
> > I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not
> > need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed
> > it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions.
> This is a "don't ask" assumption.

No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want,
I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. No amount of whats
and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not
dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense
(making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy',
and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.)

> > The 3p quant
> > correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish
> > any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it
> > get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings
> > in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive
> > of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and
> > die with nothing but the 1p descriptions,
> We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no
> 1p-3p relation.
> The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat
> catch a mouse, also.

Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the
same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense.

> > therefore we cannot assume
> > the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power
> > to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on
> > their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the
> > universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete
> > understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their
> > own.
> This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still
> waiting for a list of what you assume and derive.

I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I
derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which
themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list
of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We
are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before
we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of
the world. Logic is always an a posteriori analysis and never precedes
or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense
experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the
history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in
emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily.
What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel
the wind? Nothing.

> >>>>> Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to
> >>>>> hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate
> >>>>> human 3p
> >>>>> quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.
> >>>> Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious.
> >>>> Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the
> >>>> existence of philosophical zombies,
> >>> I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia,
> >>> puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place.
> >> Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and
> >> philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent
> >> qualia and having no qualia, also.
> > A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by
> > the puppet master.
> Which means that the puppet is not autonomous, like a human, or its
> behaviorally equivalent zombie.

The human is it's own puppet master (to some extent), and so they are
potentially autonomous.

> > The difference between absent qualia and no qualia
> > is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already
> > know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well.
> OK. It is consciousness with a lacking qualia. Philosophical zombie
> lacks consciousness, and all qualia.

A P-zombie and a puppet both lack consciousness and all qualia, but a
puppet is an ordinary object which illustrates how we can project
consciousness onto something inanimate, while a P-zombie makes the
very same ordinary thing seem like a supernatural absurdity. It's
inverted because it assumes simulation and substitution level rather
than imitation and indexical persuasiveness.

> >>>> that is: the existence of
> >>>> unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all*
> >>>> circumstances.
> >>> Not perfectly imitating, no.
> >> Sorry but it is the definition.
> > That's why it's a theoretical/philosophical definition and not a
> > practical realism.
> But we reason about theory.

I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can.

> >>> That's what that whole business of
> >>> substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula
> >>> of
> >>> substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50
> >>> represents a
> >>> lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD
> >>> (Turing
> >>> Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet
> >>> with a
> >>> TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants
> >>> (even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be
> >>> used to detect the puppet strings).
> >> ?
> >> By definition, a philosophical zombie win all Turing test, (except if
> >> he imitates a human so awkward that people take him for a machine.
> >> (That happens!)).
> >> By definition philophical zombies behave identically to humans. The
> >> only difference is that they lack the 1p experience.
> > That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies.
> The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies
> have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the
> person having that body.

That's a loaded question fallacy. If we use puppet instead of zombie,
there is no confusion and it all makes sense without invoking infinite
complexity. The puppet isn't one thing. It's a bunch of parts. Besides
being a bunch of parts on the outside, we are also one simple 'I'
thing on the inside. The I side is opposite to the parts side, so it
is very different; an experiential flow instead of discrete
mechanisms. I can see myself in as simple or complex terms as I like.
The outside cannot be seen that way. It is not subject to a 'seems
like' shifting of attention - it is instead a fully explicated 'simply
is' which can be quantified in terms like finite or infinite. The I
side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both
finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It is
the sense maker itself.

> >> Not at all. The contrary happens. Matter becomes a first person
> >> plural
> >> appearance.
> > No, I don't think that it does. Matter becomes a 3p computational
> > feedback invariance - like a graphic avatar in a video game collides
> > with a wall of colored pixels and bounces back. There is no experience
> > involved at all. The wall could feel like marshmallows or solid steel,
> > but would it be the avatar feeling the wall or the wall feeling the
> > avatar, or the negative space feeling both, or the software feeling
> > graphic vectors, or hardware feeling the logical collisions on the
> > microprocessor? ...why not the pixels on the monitor themselves
> > feeling the event? None of it really makes sense to me. The experience
> > is orphaned in Platonia or otherwise generalized to a free floating
> > truth condition.
> You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs.

I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It doesn't
matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still no
sensation or experience there.

> >> There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
> >> the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.
> > I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
> > explain the experienced character of matter.
> Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia

That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic. If you conflate qualia
with it's capacity to represent, you amputate the significance of
qualia entirely.

> which
> has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the
> quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non
> provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.

Would you trade your eyesight for a technology which identified
optical patterns verbally? You would never have to squint or wonder
what something is, the computer would just present you with a list of
every object you would be seeing if you could see. Using this non-
visual interface you could 'prove' that you could see.

> > Again, it could be
> > sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but
> > since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather than
> > a reality.
> You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and
> proposing theories.

I don't know what reality isn't, but I do know that what we experience
directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality.

> >> Deriving the appearance of matter from arithmetic does not imply that
> >> matter is made of number. matter simply does not exist,
> > This is the mirror image of Dennett. I explain it in multisense
> > realism as the Logos position. Why wouldn't matter exist just as much
> > as anything else? As much as numbers?
> Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not
> human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a
> consequence of the theory we are working on.

Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that
matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a
function-product relation.

> Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has
> ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion.

Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use
notions. This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for
theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because logos
and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it
is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the
possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual thought.

> I have never
> seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive
> matter.

Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view.
The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely
instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition. What do you
assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or

> >> and the
> >> appearance of matter emerges
> > Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?
>  From the average minds of the average universal numbers.

Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds?

> > To where?
> To here and now.

Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W
> > Why is it
> > necessary?
> Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams, and
> their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first
> person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).

Why would they? Once you have numbers dreams, why would you need
anything else? Number dreams should be the alpha and omega of the
cosmos with no appearances, emergences, or coherences at all.

> > Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in
> > our world?
> This has no sense. I can only describe a reality (arithmetic) and
> explain why some numbers will have some physical feeling and beliefs
> in material thing. I have no evidence for actual matter. I have
> personal evidence for consciousness and qualia, and historical
> evidences for measurable numbers and plausible locally stable relations.

That's my point is that it makes no sense to jump from numbers to
appearances of matter.

> > Can you light a brick of charcoal on fire with an
> > arithmetic function alone?
> Yes.
> Shows me a charcoal brick which you could prove that it would not be a
> result of arithmetical function.
> That might be possible, for example if the material arithmetical
> hypostases were contradicting physics, but up to now, it fits nicely.

Show me a charcoal brick which you could prove that is could not be
anything else but the result of arithmetic function. I still don't
know how you burn it with an equation.

> > Why would arithmetic want to pretend to
> > materialize?
> Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc
> complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing,
> or to not assuming all what we want to explain.

That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't
true. Arithmetic isn't primitive, but rather it is the part of the
interior palette of sense which is most exterior facing. Substance
then becomes no more or less primitive than assumptions, theories,
feelings, consciousness, etc. All different categories of sense forms
and contents.

> Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made any
> progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both
> mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an
> explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like PA
> are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your
> feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that
> matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at all.

Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory
certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual
acceptance of uncertainty. My idea is to notice the symmetry between
the two approaches and understand that the symmetry itself is the true

> >> from the complex statistics and topology
> >> of the dreams of the universal numbers, entangled in deep
> >> computations.
> > I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of
> > intangible dreamy universal entanglement.
> It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual
> sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that  ExP(x) is true
> if it exists a number verifying the condition P.

See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there. The dreams are the
only reality but reality isn't really primitively real...and there
really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not... It's
a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that
matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care
about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no
distinction between dream and reality.

> >>> Even
> >>> the 1p would be a 3p de-presentation/description of what we know as
> >>> 1p, but the machine would not.
> >> No, it is the contrary. Read UDA, it will make you understand why.
> > I have tried, but it doesn't make sense to me.
> Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory made
> by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself
> from your assumption. I think.

I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only
interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the
implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't be a
primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me.

> You also find obvious that we are not machine,

We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts, but
we also have wholes.

> but clearly it is not.
> Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of
> consciousness to other entities.

In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young child
can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it says
THANK YOU on the lid.

> >>>> Subjectivity comes from
> >>>> self-reference + Truth.
> >>> I think that our experience shows us though that in human
> >>> development,
> >>> subjectivity is rooted in fantasy and idiosyncaratic interpretation
> >>> which is not directly self-referential. I would say truth is the
> >>> invariance between subjective and objective sense. Self-reference is
> >>> trivial compared to self-embodiment and self-identification. Self-
> >>> reference can be imitated by a machine, but I don't think that a
> >>> machine can use the word 'I' in the full range of senses that we
> >>> can.
> >> Trivially, because you assume non-comp.
> > I don't assume anything, I have only to observe the difference between
> > any person who has ever lived and any machine that has ever been
> > built.
> So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of
> observation.

I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt

>You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone
> who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a public
> solution to a problem.

If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a shared
solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution, as
long as it is true also.


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