I think you should probably read Maudlin's
paper<http://www.finney.org/~hal/maudlin.pdf>for specifics. I don't
think thermodynamics will have much to do with the
conclusions, whatever they may be (and I don't think it's obvious what *exactly
On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 7:21 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
> Hi Folks,
> I have been mulling over my conversations with Bruno, Joseph and ACW
> in the EVERYTHING list and have a question. In SANE04 we read the following:
> "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner
> experience, you
> can modify the device in such a way that the amount of
> physical activity involved is
> arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no
> inputs and no outputs.
> Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the
> running computation, the
> machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for
> that precise computation,
> with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will
> make the machine running
> computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin
> ingenuously showed that
> counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active
> devices which will be
> triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the
> environment. Now this
> shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low
> (even null) physical
> activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And
> that is absurd with the
> conjunction of both comp and materialism."
> Setting aside the problem of concurrency for now, how is it that we
> are jumping over the difference between infinitely slow or even
> physical process and "null" physical process?
> I may be not even wrong here, but in math isn't it true that there is a
> big difference between a quantity being arbitrarily small and a quantity
> being zero? I suspect that the folks in FOAR List that have been discussing
> information and entropy might have a thought on this.
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