On 2/13/2012 12:11 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
I think you should probably read Maudlin's paper <http://www.finney.org/%7Ehal/maudlin.pdf> for specifics. I don't think thermodynamics will have much to do with the conclusions, whatever they may be (and I don't think it's obvious what /exactly /Maudlin showed).

Hi Joseph,

Thank you for the new link to Maudlin''s paper. I was having a hard time finding my copy... As to your comment: Would you consider exactly what a "computational structure" means in a universe that allows for perpetual motion <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perpetual_motion>? (We are going to run a reductio argument <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum>...)

One thing that I see is that in such a universe we would have a huge White Rabbit problem because all brains in it would only be those of the Boltzmann type <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain>. There could not be any invariant form of sequencing that we could run a UD on. How so? Becasue in a universe without thermodynamics there is no such a thing as a sequence of events that is invariant with respect to transitions from one observer to another, i.e. there would be no such thing as time definable in a 'dimensional' sense. All sequences would be at best Markov <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markov_property>. With such a restriction to Markov processes, how to you define a UD? Without a UD, how do we get COMP to work?



On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 7:21 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:

    Hi Folks,

        I have been mulling over my conversations with Bruno, Joseph
    and ACW in the EVERYTHING list and have a question. In SANE04 we
    read the following:

"For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is
    arbitrarily  low, and even null  for dreaming experience which has
    no  inputs and no outputs.
Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running computation, the
    machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only
    for that precise computation,
    with unchanged environment.   If  it is changed a  little bit,  it
    will make  the machine  running
computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously showed that
    counterfactual  correctness  can be  recovered, by  adding  non
    active devices  which  will  be
triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the environment. Now this
    shows that any inner experience can be associated with an
    arbitrary low (even null) physical
activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd with the
    conjunction of both comp and materialism."

        Setting aside the problem of concurrency for now, how is it
    that we are jumping over the difference between infinitely slow or
    even "adiabatic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adiabatic_process>"
    physical process and "null" physical process?

    I may be not even wrong here, but in math isn't it true that there
    is a big difference between a quantity being arbitrarily small and
    a quantity being zero? I suspect that the folks in FOAR List that
    have been discussing information and entropy might have a thought
    on this.

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