On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 11:47 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

>  On 2/13/2012 12:11 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
>
> I think you should probably read Maudlin's 
> paper<http://www.finney.org/%7Ehal/maudlin.pdf>for specifics. I don't think 
> thermodynamics will have much to do with the
> conclusions, whatever they may be (and I don't think it's obvious what 
> *exactly
> *Maudlin showed).
>
>
> Hi Joseph,
>
>     Thank you for the new link to Maudlin''s paper. I was having a hard
> time finding my copy... As to your comment: Would you consider exactly what
> a "computational structure" means in a universe that allows for perpetual
> motion <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perpetual_motion>?
>

You should be aware that our universe allows for perpetual motion.


>
>
 (We are going to run a reductio
argument<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum>
> ...)
>
>     One thing that I see is that in such a universe we would have a huge
> White Rabbit problem because all brains in it would only be those of the 
> Boltzmann
> type <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain>. There could not be
> any invariant form of sequencing that we could run a UD on. How so? Becasue
> in a universe without thermodynamics
>

A Big universe "with thermodynamics" will still admit perpetual motion
machines (in fact, our Universe is such a universe). Are you aware that, in
the 19th century, classical thermodynamics was transformed into a
statistical theory? You made a huge (and incorrect) leap from "admits a
perpetual motion machine" to "no thermodynamics". If you can have Boltzmann
Brains you can have Universal Dovetailers run for arbitrary (even infinite)
amounts of time.

At any rate, the notion of a "sufficiently robust universe" is a
provisional premise that is dropped later in the UDA, so it's not
important.


> there is no such a thing as a sequence of events that is invariant with
> respect to transitions from one observer to another, i.e. there would be no
> such thing as time definable in a 'dimensional' sense. All sequences would
> be at best Markov <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markov_property>. With
> such a restriction to Markov processes, how to you define a UD? Without a
> UD, how do we get COMP to work?
>
>
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 7:21 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>
>>  Hi Folks,
>>
>>     I have been mulling over my conversations with Bruno, Joseph and ACW
>> in the EVERYTHING list and have a question. In SANE04 we read the following:
>>
>> "For any given precise  running computation associated  to some  inner
>> experience, you
>> can  modify  the  device  in  such  a  way  that the  amount  of
>> physical  activity  involved  is
>> arbitrarily  low, and even null  for dreaming experience which has no
>> inputs and no outputs.
>> Now, having  suppressed  that  physical  activity present in  the
>> running  computation,  the
>> machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for
>> that precise computation,
>> with unchanged environment.   If  it is changed a  little bit,  it will
>> make  the machine  running
>> computation no  more  relatively  correct.  But then,  Maudlin
>> ingenuously  showed  that
>> counterfactual  correctness  can be  recovered, by  adding  non active
>> devices  which  will  be
>> triggered only  if  some  (counterfactual)  change would  appear  in  the
>> environment. Now  this
>> shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low
>> (even null) physical
>> activity,  and  this  in  keeping  counterfactual  correctness.  And
>> that  is  absurd  with  the
>> conjunction of both comp and materialism."
>>
>>     Setting aside the problem of concurrency for now, how is it that we
>> are jumping over the difference between infinitely slow or even "
>> adiabatic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adiabatic_process>" physical
>> process and "null" physical process?
>>
>> I may be not even wrong here, but in math isn't it true that there is a
>> big difference between a quantity being arbitrarily small and a quantity
>> being zero? I suspect that the folks in FOAR List that have been discussing
>> information and entropy might have a thought on this.
>>
>
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-- 
Joseph Knight

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