On 2/13/2012 5:54 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/12/2012 17:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
I would like to bring the following to your attention. I think that we
do need to revisit this problem.
The Anthropic Trilemma
I gave a tentative (and likely wrong) possible solution to it in
another thread. The trillema is much lessened if one considers a
relative measure on histories (chains of OMs) and their length. That
is, if a branch has more OMs, it should be more likely.
The first horn doesn't apply because you'd have to keep the copies
running indefinitely (merging won't work).
The second horn, I'm not so sure if it's avoided: COMP-immortality
implies potentially infinite histories (although mergers may make them
finite), which makes formalizing my idea not trivial.
The third horn only applies to ASSA, not RSSA (implicit in COMP).
The fourth horn is acceptable to me, we can't really deny Boltzmann
brains, but they shouldn't be that important as the experience isn't
spatially located anyway(MGA). The white rabbit problem is more of a
worry in COMP than this horn.
The fifth horn is interesting, but also the most difficult to solve:
it would require deriving local physics from COMP.
My solution doesn't really solve the first horn though, it just makes
it more difficult: if you do happen to make 3^^^3 copies of yourself
in the future and they live very different and long lives, that might
make it more likely that you end up with a continuation in such a
future, however making copies and merging them shortly afterwards
This solution only will work for finite and very special versions
of infinite sets. For the infinities like that of the Integers, it will
not work because any proper subset of the infinite set is identical to
the complete set as we can demonstrated with a one-to-one map between
the odd integers and the integers.
Given that the number of computations that a universal TM can run
is at least the countable infinity of the integers, we cannot use a
comparison procedure to define the measure. (Maybe this is one of the
reasons many very smart people have tried, unsuccessfully, to ban
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