On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the > > interpretations. > > So you assume QM?
I assume the observations, but not the interpretations. For example: I assume that the double slit experiment produces a particular pattern of illumination under the given conditions, but I think that pattern is really interfering waves of sensitivity spread across the target, rather than a literal wave of photons in space. I assume that bubble and cloud chambers produce trails under the given conditions, but I don't assume that means that a physical particle has penetrated the chamber - it could be an event within the chamber that has an external cause. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> I think that what we measure at that level is literally the > >>> most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. > >>> It is > >>> the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small > >>> detail > >>> really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are > >>> anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres > >>> as > >>> a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then > >>> authenticity > >>> is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary > >>> universes > >>> unto themselves. > > >> With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means > >> something. > > > Why not? > > Because matter are first person (plural) experiences emerging from > truth (not formalizable) and infinities of computations. It's not clear to me what the difference would really be between emerging from truth and embodying logic. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>> I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I > >>>> cannot > >>>> ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example, > >>>> you > >>>> did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a > >>>> complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be > >>>> manifested in a consistent history. > > >>> I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not > >>> need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed > >>> it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. > > >> This is a "don't ask" assumption. > > > No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want, > > I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. > > I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I > know it follows from comp. How does it really answer what blue is though? Comp can only point to a function that would match the function of qualia in general, but no specific characteristics. To comp, blue is no different from sour. It might specify *that* two qualia would have different values, but it has no way to describe in what way the experience differs. > > > No amount of whats > > and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not > > dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense > > (making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy', > > and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.) > > ? What and how are questions that can be asked about literal machines. Who and why are questions that can be asked about figurative stories. They don't mix, but they are symmetrical aspects of the same underlying when & where root sense. Actors (who and why) + Stage (what and how) = Show (when and where). > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> The 3p quant > >>> correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish > >>> any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it > >>> get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings > >>> in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even > >>> conceive > >>> of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and > >>> die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, > > >> We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no > >> 1p-3p relation. > >> The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat > >> catch a mouse, also. > > > Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the > > same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense. > > This makes brain mysterious. No more than the back side of a tapestry. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> therefore we cannot assume > >>> the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the > >>> power > >>> to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on > >>> their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the > >>> universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete > >>> understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on > >>> their > >>> own. > > >> This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still > >> waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. > > > I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I > > derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which > > themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list > > of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We > > are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before > > we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of > > the world. > > Sure, but those things are not as the same level. You are saying that > we cannot life science, because we have to alive for doing that. This > is incorrect. ? > > > Logic is always an a posteriori analysis > > No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic. What does it depend on? > Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings* attempting to > get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth. > > > and never precedes > > or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense > > experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the > > history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in > > emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily. > > What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel > > the wind? Nothing. > > What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious > assumptions? Then it's an infinite regress of unconscious assumptions that neurons, molecules, atoms, and quantum has to make. It forces an infinitely efficacious microcosmic reality with a whole universe of arbitrary spectator illusions. My thinking is that there is no reason to presume that our relative size and complexity makes us any less grounded in absolute reality. We are direct participants in the universe as much as the brain is. > Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging > question move. > It's not showing me that. > > > > I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can. > > Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory. I don't know that that's true. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies. > > >> The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies > >> have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the > >> person having that body. > > > That's a loaded question fallacy. If we use puppet instead of zombie, > > there is no confusion and it all makes sense without invoking infinite > > complexity. The puppet isn't one thing. It's a bunch of parts. Besides > > being a bunch of parts on the outside, we are also one simple 'I' > > thing on the inside. The I side is opposite to the parts side, so it > > is very different; an experiential flow instead of discrete > > mechanisms. I can see myself in as simple or complex terms as I like. > > The outside cannot be seen that way. It is not subject to a 'seems > > like' shifting of attention - it is instead a fully explicated 'simply > > is' which can be quantified in terms like finite or infinite. > > I don't see any sense in that paragraph. Sorry. I'm saying that the idea of a machine being one thing is fictional. It's a group of things which we can interpret as acting like one thing (a puppet) but it's not actually one thing. The term zombie assumes that the machine is one thing but missing itself. Puppet means it never had a self to begin with, and only achieves imitation through the intention of the puppeteer and audience. > > > The I > > side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both > > finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It is > > the sense maker itself. > > Looks like the machine's 1p. That locates 1p within a 3p context. I'm saying that 1p is the primary context. > It is far too much imprecise to be sure. Imprecise why? Because it's paradoxical or symmetrical? > > > > >> You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs. > > > I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It doesn't > > matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still no > > sensation or experience there. > > How do you know that. > This implies p-zombies. How do I know that the news anchorman isn't Nostradamus? How do I know that traffic signals aren't as excited as I am when they turn green? It doesn't imply anything philosophical at all, it implies the possibility of common sense. When we suffer from psychosis, we can attribute intentionality and dialogue with inanimate objects, the weather, etc. We might think that it is literally for us for whom every bell tolls. This is a solipsistic experience which is supported by consciousness, but it isn't realism. To have realism, there has to be a way of conceiving of appearances coinciding with expectations without being causally linked. Should we tell the schizophrenic that the tree probably is talking to them because otherwise that implies talking tree zombies? If we design a machine to imitate our thinking, we cannot be surprised that no actual person appears from the imitation. It's not like 'build it and they will come'. > > > > >>>> There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But > >>>> the reason why it looks like there is matter are given. > > >>> I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to > >>> explain the experienced character of matter. > > >> Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia > > > That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic. > > ? > Qualia themselves are not logic at all. I wouldn't say that. There is a logic to the aesthetics of color mixing and sound arrangement. > But many non logical things can still be studied logically. If not you > just impose a don't ask attitude. You are still confusing levels. I'm not confusing levels at all, I'm completely clear. I don't ever say 'don't ask', I welcome the asking, I only say that the answer is cannot be seen with the same assumptions which used when asking the question. Just because non logical things can be studied logically doesn't mean that nothing is lost in that approach. It is entirely likely that things which are completely non logical can only be completely misrepresented by logic. It's not even logic, but 3p empiricism. Forcing a literal what-how mechanism onto a figurative who- why narrative. > > > If you conflate qualia > > with it's capacity to represent, you amputate the significance of > > qualia entirely. > > You are right. So let us not conflate qualia and the theory of qualia. Ok > > > > >> which > >> has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the > >> quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non > >> provable parts, from the point of view of the machine. > > > Would you trade your eyesight for a technology which identified > > optical patterns verbally? > > No. But the hypostases defined with "& p" are provably non verbal. Ok, then a technology which identifies optical patterns unconsciously. > > > You would never have to squint or wonder > > what something is, the computer would just present you with a list of > > every object you would be seeing if you could see. Using this non- > > visual interface you could 'prove' that you could see. > > Not to myself. Right. > > > > >>> Again, it could be > >>> sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but > >>> since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather > >>> than > >>> a reality. > > >> You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and > >> proposing theories. > > > I don't know what reality isn't, > > That contradicts your non-comp statements. I don't know for a fact that trash cans aren't polite, but common sense makes it a good bet. > > > but I do know that what we experience > > directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality. > > Sure. > > >> Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not > >> human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a > >> consequence of the theory we are working on. > > > Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that > > matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a > > function-product relation. > > It is a form-content relation. With comp. Indeed a many-form---- > content relation. It seems like comp is pure form to me - axiomatic forms and consequential relativistic forms. I don't see any content at all, it's only set off to the side with a circle drawn around it. > > > > >> Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has > >> ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion. > > > Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use > > notions. > > I did not. "does not exist" = undefinable to me, does not exist = non-sense > > > This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for > > theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because logos > > and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it > > is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the > > possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual thought. > > On the contrary. The result is that most of arithmetical truth > transcend our intellect. That just extends the intellect into the superhuman realm. Arithmetical truth is still an intellectual system - not a visceral, tangible experience. > You seems to ignore to much facts which contradict your reductionist > view of numbers and machines. Like what facts? > > > > >> I have never > >> seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive > >> matter. > > > Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view. > > The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely > > instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition. > > Study theory of definability. We can define "definition" (as opposed > to knowledge, which needs higher order meta-levels). You can define definition without meta-definition? > > > > What do you > > assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or > > theories? > > I (meta) assume that the peer reviewer have learned to read and > compute in high school, and that they have at least the cognitive > ability of a LUM. But that assumption is not part of the theory, which > assumes elemntary arithmetic, like almost all theories. If you assume elementary arithmetic, then isn't comp a tautology? > > > > >>>> and the > >>>> appearance of matter emerges > > >>> Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where? > > >> From the average minds of the average universal numbers. > > > Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds? > > It does, in some sense, but the dreams are shared and so seem to point > on an external primary physical reality which appears to be a non > sensical notion in the comp theory. We cannot use, and then we don't > need either. So since physical reality contradicts comp, we get rid of physical reality. > > > > >>> To where? > > >> To here and now. > > > Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W > > The numbers are not somewhere. Position is not defined for the numbers. Why do they define positions for everything else? > > > > >>> Why is it > >>> necessary? > > >> Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams, > >> and > >> their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first > >> person plural reality, normally (if comp is true). > > > Why would they? > > Because if they don't comp is already false. But then, to make your > point, you have to show that they don't do that. If not, that's > begging the question again. Then you have to show that numbers do dream, and that we can tell the difference to make non-comp false. If no, that's begging the question again. > > > Once you have numbers dreams, why would you need > > anything else? Number dreams should be the alpha and omega of the > > cosmos with no appearances, emergences, or coherences at all. > > What if that's the content of the (sharable) dreams? > That's the case for reason explained in UDA (+AUDA). Then physical matter is as primitive as pure fantasy or arithmetic truth. > > > > >>> Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in > >>> our world? > > >> This has no sense. I can only describe a reality (arithmetic) and > >> explain why some numbers will have some physical feeling and beliefs > >> in material thing. I have no evidence for actual matter. I have > >> personal evidence for consciousness and qualia, and historical > >> evidences for measurable numbers and plausible locally stable > >> relations. > > > That's my point is that it makes no sense to jump from numbers to > > appearances of matter. > > But that points work for all 3p theory. So you are just telling us > that you have an inner conviction that we should not ask. That's > obscurantism, and contradicts your own approach. No, just the opposite. I'm encouraging asking. I'm asking you directly - how does it make sense that numbers have something to do with matter appearing? You are the one telling me I can't ask. > > > > >>> Why would arithmetic want to pretend to > >>> materialize? > > >> Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc > >> complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing, > >> or to not assuming all what we want to explain. > > > That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't > > true. > > Sure, but then show me the non-computable element. I am the non-computable element. Blue is the non computable element. > > > Arithmetic isn't primitive, > > Then tell me what is primitive, and how you derive arithmetic from it. Sense. Arithmetic is derived from rhythm and metaphor. Pattern recognition. > > > > >> Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made > >> any > >> progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both > >> mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an > >> explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like > >> PA > >> are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your > >> feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that > >> matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at > >> all. > > > Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory > > certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual > > acceptance of uncertainty. > > You are the one who seems certain. I'm certain that it makes sense to me. > > > > >>> I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of > >>> intangible dreamy universal entanglement. > > >> It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual > >> sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that ExP(x) is true > >> if it exists a number verifying the condition P. > > > See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there. > > I really don't see why. I was utterly clear on "existence". I think it just moves the level of mystery one level down. You say what numbers verify exists, but what makes numbers verify anything? > > > The dreams are the > > only reality > > No. The numbers and +, and * is the only assumption. > > > but reality isn't really primitively real... > > No. You are foggy. Physical reality, and experiential reality is not > primitively real, but the phenomenlogy is explained. It's not explained, it is only accounted for. > > > and there > > really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not... > > There is an important relative difference. Why? > > > It's > > a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that > > matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care > > about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no > > distinction between dream and reality. > > It does. We can even test nature if we are in dream or not. And the > test confirms that we are in a multiuser dream. That doesn't distinguish dream from reality, it only says there is no reality and it is all dream. > > > > >> Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory > >> made > >> by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself > >> from your assumption. I think. > > > I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only > > interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the > > implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't be a > > primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me. > > That's understanding is good for you, but you don't succeed in > communicating it. It seems like different people get different parts of it. All I can do it try to make more sense out of it. > > > > >> You also find obvious that we are not machine, > > > We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts, but > > we also have wholes. > > All machines have wholes. I don't think that they do. Only in our eyes, but not in 'their own'. > > > > >> but clearly it is not. > >> Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of > >> consciousness to other entities. > > > In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young child > > can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it says > > THANK YOU on the lid. > > I don't see the argument. The argument that unconsciousness can also be obvious. > > > > >> So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of > >> observation. > > > I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt > > it. > > Well, literally you are right, but still not answering. You seems to > assume that your extrapolation is true. I don't know it is true, only that it seems true. > > > > >> You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone > >> who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a > >> public > >> solution to a problem. > > > If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a shared > > solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution, as > > long as it is true also. > > Personal conviction has nothing to do in science-discourse, and even > more when the science-discourse bears on the subject matter of > personal convictions, where it becomes not just wrong, but very > confusing. I don't find it confusing. I find looking for a what-how explanation of who-why to be confusing. A person's character makes sense in terms of their biography, but it would be very confusing indeed if you tried to explain who a person is by medical description alone. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. 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