On Feb 14, 5:44 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > It's not clear to me what the difference would really be between
> > emerging from truth and embodying logic.
> You tell me. Emerging from arithmetical truth just means "true in
> arithmetic", or "proved by some correct UMs", etc. It is standard
> terms for logicians, engineers, etc.

And it makes perfect sense in that context, but the idea of something
being true doesn't cause something to suddenly occur in the experience
of people (or whoever lives through cells or atoms) in the universe. I
can say that scoring a basket in basketball it worth two points, and
that is true in basketball, but that truth does not literally cause a
ball to do something to a basket.

> With comp, first person views are
> more complex, due to the first person dissemination in infinities of
> computations, which needs more subtle internal limit, but again comp
> has a tool which is computer science and math. I prefer to search a
> key under a lamp.

If you are looking for a key that can only be seen when it glows in
the dark, then the lamp is exactly what you can't use to search for

> >> I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I
> >> know it follows from comp.
> > How does it really answer what blue is though? Comp can only point to
> > a function that would match the function of qualia in general, but no
> > specific characteristics. To comp, blue is no different from sour. It
> > might specify *that* two qualia would have different values, but it
> > has no way to describe in what way the experience differs.
> That's just free negative speculation. Blue is a quasi singularize
> deep experience involving collection of experiences, and having some
> non communicable quality, says the machine.

I don't think blue need involve more than one experience and it need
not be a deep experience. If you live for one second and see the sky,
you have seen blue. The idea of blue being non communicable is not so
simple though. Two people who know blue can communicate about it
easily, just as mathematicians can communicate about arithmetic
easily. The only difference is that arithmetic can be applied to other
frames of reference outside of our direct experience but blue cannot.
Instead blue can be applied figuratively within our own interiority.
We can say we feel blue for sadness, red for anger, green for envy,
yellow for cowardice, etc. These vary somewhat from culture to
culture, but no culture as far as I know says they feel five for
sadness, one for anger, four for envy, etc.

> Of course if you treat the machine as a zombie, there are few sense
> that you will ever listening to her.

No zombie...puppet. It insults machines to call them zombies - or it
would, if they weren't puppets.

> >>> Logic is always an a posteriori analysis
> >> No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic.
> > What does it depend on?
> That's a mystery. The question is: do you believe in it. Does the
> theorem of Fermat story makes sense. Does the problem of the
> distribution of prime numbers make sense to you.
> All introspecting UMs is confronted to that mystery, and understand
> that IF they are correct machine, then that mystery is insoluble.

That's why I say sense is primitive and not arithmetic. Arithmetic is
only real because it makes sense, but sense is not limited to

> >> Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings*  attempting
> >> to
> >> get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth.
> >>> and never precedes
> >>> or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense
> >>> experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the
> >>> history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in
> >>> emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily.
> >>> What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel
> >>> the wind? Nothing.
> >> What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious
> >> assumptions?
> > Then it's an infinite regress of unconscious assumptions that neurons,
> > molecules, atoms, and quantum has to make.
> Why an infinite regress?

Because each assumption supervenes upon a more primitive layer of
assumption. If the bottom layer can arbitrarily make initial
assumptions, then why not any or all layers? Why is the brain taking
orders from cells any better of an explanation than the brain taking
orders from itself?

> > It forces an infinitely
> > efficacious microcosmic reality with a whole universe of arbitrary
> > spectator illusions. My thinking is that there is no reason to presume
> > that our relative size and complexity makes us any less grounded in
> > absolute reality. We are direct participants in the universe as much
> > as the brain is.
> That's about how I see the thing. All UMs are grounded in the absolute
> arithmetical reality.

That's the other way of looking at it, but once you have arithmetic
reality, there doesn't seem to be any point to embodied reality. The
UMs would not be merely grounded in arithmetical reality, they would
be described entirely by it.

 With comp, the theory of everything is already
> taught in high school. But that's not the theory of "reality", it is
> just a simple universal ontological frame in term of which we can
> formulate (mathematically) the mind-body problem, which actually
> become the belief-in-body problem.

For comp wouldn't it be body-in-belief?

> >> Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging
> >> question move.
> > It's not showing me that.
> You are so lucky.
> >>> I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can.
> >> Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory.
> > I don't know that that's true.
> OK. Note that I did not say it is the only way to search. We can
> search with the heart, and our evolving intuition when we get
> familiarized with new ideas. But for the public, I find better to
> share only precise hypothesis, and reason through them.

I agree in most cases, but it isn't possible when addressing
consciousness itself. You cannot have a color theory based only on
black and white.

> We are at cross of each other because you don't want to play the game
> of science, which is the game we are playing, or trying to play, here.

Science isn't everything though. That's why the Everything List is a
good place to talk about consciousness and cosmology...they don't fit
within our inherited parameters of science. If science is to help us
understand reality, it must expand to embrace the fullest description
of reality that we can generate.

> > I'm saying that the idea of a machine being one thing is fictional.
> > It's a group of things which we can interpret as acting like one thing
> > (a puppet) but it's not actually one thing. The term zombie assumes
> > that the machine is one thing but missing itself. Puppet means it
> > never had a self to begin with, and only achieves imitation through
> > the intention of the puppeteer and audience.
> You ignore that computer science has a branch devoted to self-reference.

That's 3p self-reference. A drawing of the Ouroboros would qualify as
self-referential by that definition. It is the idea of a role which
accounts for the function of a self, a wireframe model of
proprioception. The model is not grounded in concrete experience
though. There is no actual self in a self-referential program who
cares about anything.

> >>> The I
> >>> side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both
> >>> finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It
> >>> is
> >>> the sense maker itself.
> >> Looks like the machine's 1p.
> > That locates 1p within a 3p context. I'm saying that 1p is the primary
> > context.
> That was not locating the 1p in a 3p context (in which you can hardly
> have something finite and infinite).
> But 1p, with comp, is only 1p primary, not 3p primary. It is even the
> price to pay to attribute a mind to another one.

You are saying the machine has feelings, I am saying the feeler has
feelings independent of it's body. When we impose our ideas on other
bodies, we turn them into machines for us, but we don't turn their
feelings into our feelings.

> >> It is far too much imprecise to be sure.
> > Imprecise why? Because it's paradoxical or symmetrical?
> Because the background is fuzzy.

That criticism seems fuzzy.

> >>>> You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential
> >>>> programs.
> >>> I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It
> >>> doesn't
> >>> matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still
> >>> no
> >>> sensation or experience there.
> >> How do you know that.
> >> This implies p-zombies.
> > How do I know that the news anchorman isn't Nostradamus? How do I know
> > that traffic signals aren't as excited as I am when they turn green?
> > It doesn't imply anything philosophical at all, it implies the
> > possibility of common sense. When we suffer from psychosis, we can
> > attribute intentionality and dialogue with inanimate objects, the
> > weather, etc. We might think that it is literally for us for whom
> > every bell tolls. This is a solipsistic experience which is supported
> > by consciousness, but it isn't realism.
> Attributing experience to inanimate object is animism, or panpsychism.

That would be attributing human experience to inanimate objects, which
I don't do. Panexperientialism is more correct. Complex experience
evolves from primitive experience, but no experience evolves from
mechanism (unless the mechanism 'has' experience to begin with).

> Solipsists attribute consciousness only to themselves, everyone else
> is a zombie.
> Comp idealism is saved from solipsism thanks to the first person
> plural notion, which comes from the linear symmetrical bottom core of
> the physical reality (the quantization on the sigma_1 sentences).
> Normally.

This to me is where the fabric of comp is revealed to be made of
sense. Symmetry and pluralization (what I call cumulative
entanglement) cannot be explained in arithmetic terms, arithmetic
supervenes on them.

> > To have realism, there has to be a way of conceiving of appearances
> > coinciding with expectations without being causally linked. Should we
> > tell the schizophrenic that the tree probably is talking to them
> > because otherwise that implies talking tree zombies? If we design a
> > machine to imitate our thinking, we cannot be surprised that no actual
> > person appears from the imitation. It's not like 'build it and they
> > will come'.
> Yes, it is more complex indeed. But not infinitely complex so as to
> jump in the infinite lower comp level.

It seems like comp has no basis to distinguish reality from dream or
sanity from insanity...which could be considered the most important if
not fundamental aspect of human consciousness.

> >>>>>> There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
> >>>>>> the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.
> >>>>> I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
> >>>>> explain the experienced character of matter.
> >>>> Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia
> >>> That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic.
> >> ?
> >> Qualia themselves are not logic at all.
> > I wouldn't say that. There is a logic to the aesthetics of color
> > mixing and sound arrangement.
> OK. That my point. Let us not confuse qualia and a theory of qualia,
> nor should we confuse machine's qualia and machine's theory of qualia.

I'm not sure that being able to make sense of qualia requires a theory
though. We sense the qualia and we can make more sense of the qualia
if we investigate it. We can investigate it further with theory and
experiment, or poetry and art, fashion, commerce, etc. I was just
thinking recently of how much our sense of historical time is
communicated through fashion and style. It makes for a surprisingly
convincing simulation of time travel.

> >> But many non logical things can still be studied logically. If not
> >> you
> >> just impose a don't ask attitude. You are still confusing levels.
> > I'm not confusing levels at all, I'm completely clear. I don't ever
> > say 'don't ask', I welcome the asking, I only say that the answer is
> > cannot be seen with the same assumptions which used when asking the
> > question. Just because non logical things can be studied logically
> > doesn't mean that nothing is lost in that approach. It is entirely
> > likely that things which are completely non logical can only be
> > completely misrepresented by logic. It's not even logic, but 3p
> > empiricism. Forcing a literal what-how mechanism onto a figurative
> > who-
> > why narrative.
> Comp is open a priori for many mechanism, but you throw them all, like
> if you knew that you are superior (your term) to a vast and immensely
> big of variate creature.


> >>> If you conflate qualia
> >>> with it's capacity to represent, you amputate the significance of
> >>> qualia entirely.
> >> You are right. So let us not conflate qualia and the theory of
> >> qualia.
> > Ok
> >>>> which
> >>>> has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than
> >>>> the
> >>>> quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non
> >>>> provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.
> >>> Would you trade your eyesight for a technology which identified
> >>> optical patterns verbally?
> >> No. But the hypostases defined with "& p" are provably non verbal.
> > Ok, then a technology which identifies optical patterns unconsciously.
> Yes.
> >>> You would never have to squint or wonder
> >>> what something is, the computer would just present you with a list
> >>> of
> >>> every object you would be seeing if you could see. Using this non-
> >>> visual interface you could 'prove' that you could see.
> >> Not to myself.
> > Right.
> >>>>> Again, it could be
> >>>>> sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with,
> >>>>> but
> >>>>> since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather
> >>>>> than
> >>>>> a reality.
> >>>> You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and
> >>>> proposing theories.
> >>> I don't know what reality isn't,
> >> That contradicts your non-comp statements.
> > I don't know for a fact that trash cans aren't polite, but common
> > sense makes it a good bet.
> None of us are saying that all machines can think.

So if a trash can says thank you every time the lid comes down it's
not thinking, but if a complex machine does the same thing, then it is

> >>> but I do know that what we experience
> >>> directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality.
> >> Sure.
> >>>> Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not
> >>>> human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a
> >>>> consequence of the theory we are working on.
> >>> Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that
> >>> matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a
> >>> function-product relation.
> >> It is a form-content relation. With comp. Indeed a many-form----
> >> content relation.
> > It seems like comp is pure form to me - axiomatic forms and
> > consequential relativistic forms. I don't see any content at all, it's
> > only set off to the side with a circle drawn around it.
> Because you don't study the theory. There is no form in arithmetical
> truth, only in the intellect of universal numbers, the content will
> emerge from the fixed points in universal transformation.

It would have to emerge from something, because otherwise it wouldn't
explain content, but what does it really mean that it will emerge
other than we don't know anything about it except that it shows up?

> >>>> Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody
> >>>> has
> >>>> ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion.
> >>> Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use
> >>> notions.
> >> I did not.
> > "does not exist" = undefinable
> Definability and existence are not related in that way.
> > to me, does not exist = non-sense
> Nor in that way.
> You know, an advantage with comp is that we can use freely classical
> logic, and be very clear on all this.

Then go right ahead and be clear on it.

> >>> This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for
> >>> theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because
> >>> logos
> >>> and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it
> >>> is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the
> >>> possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual
> >>> thought.
> >> On the contrary. The result is that most of arithmetical truth
> >> transcend our intellect.
> > That just extends the intellect into the superhuman realm.
> > Arithmetical truth is still an intellectual system - not a visceral,
> > tangible experience.
> You don't get it. Arithmetical truth is more like God, or the ONE of
> Plotinus. from the machine's point of view, although the machine (and
> us) cannot know that (but in a sense "meta-know it in a correctness
> conditional way").

It's not like God though, because there are many other kinds of truths
which cannot be reduced to arithmetic truths...characters, themes,
gestural equivalencies, metaphors, archetypes, etc.

> The viscerable tangible experience is the fate of the universal
> numbers, not arithmetical truth.

Then you have a numerical dualism where 'fate' replaces primitive

> >> You seems to ignore to much facts which contradict your reductionist
> >> view of numbers and machines.
> > Like what facts?
> The theorem of the limitation of machines, and the fact that those
> theorem are discovered by the machine, and this at different level,
> and from different points of view. You ignore the richness of computer
> science.

I ignore the richness of computer science because it isn't fundamental
to understand consciousness and the cosmos. I ignore the richness of
religion, art, philosophy, and politics too.

> >>>> I have never
> >>>> seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive
> >>>> matter.
> >>> Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view.
> >>> The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely
> >>> instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition.
> >> Study theory of definability. We can define "definition" (as opposed
> >> to knowledge, which needs higher order meta-levels).
> > You can define definition without meta-definition?
> If you can at least agree with the axiom I gave to Stephen for
> arithmetic, yes. With less than that, I can't.

If you have to use an axiom to define what an axiom is, then what is
the point in defining it?

> >>> What do you
> >>> assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or
> >>> theories?
> >> I (meta) assume that the peer reviewer have learned to read and
> >> compute in high school, and that they have at least the cognitive
> >> ability of a LUM. But that assumption is not part of the theory,
> >> which
> >> assumes elemntary arithmetic, like almost all theories.
> > If you assume elementary arithmetic, then isn't comp a tautology?
> No. Why? Comp is a strong statement. If comp was a tautology in
> arithmetic; I guess even you would not discuss it.
> You doubt arithmetic?

No, I only doubt that comp proves something beyond the fixed
modalities of it's own axioms. If you start out with the axiom that
arithmetic is reality, then you can't be too surprised when you find
yourself using the same axiom to prove that reality is also

> >>>>>> and the
> >>>>>> appearance of matter emerges
> >>>>> Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?
> >>>> From the average minds of the average universal numbers.
> >>> Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds?
> >> It does, in some sense, but the dreams are shared and so seem to
> >> point
> >> on an external primary physical reality which appears to be a non
> >> sensical notion in the comp theory. We cannot use, and then we don't
> >> need either.
> > So since physical reality contradicts comp, we get rid of physical
> > reality.
> Of course not. If the physical reality contradicts comp, we get rid of
> comp.
> But not only it does not, but it put a new light on the origin of the
> physical laws and the physical sensations.

Only if you disqualify our experience from being physically real. Once
you include 1p subjectivity as part of the real universe, then comp
does contradict the content of our experience completely.

> But if we get a contradiction from AUDA, we might first get rid of the
> classical theory of knowledge, and be less naive on that, before
> abandonning comp, but if no machines epistemology works, we will be
> left with tool for measuring our degree of non-computationalisme.
> >>>>> To where?
> >>>> To here and now.
> >>> Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W
> >> The numbers are not somewhere. Position is not defined for the
> >> numbers.
> > Why do they define positions for everything else?
> Only for he physical things. Pain for example are not 3-localized,
> when you think twice on the phantom limb. Of course they are often 1-
> localizable, although not always.

Ok, so why for the physical things?

> >>>>> Why is it
> >>>>> necessary?
> >>>> Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams,
> >>>> and
> >>>> their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first
> >>>> person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).
> >>> Why would they?
> >> Because if they don't comp is already false. But then, to make your
> >> point, you have to show that they don't do that. If not, that's
> >> begging the question again.
> > Then you have to show that numbers do dream, and that we can tell the
> > difference to make non-comp false. If no, that's begging the question
> > again.
> You don't get it at all. I don't bet the question of comp, because I
> do not pretend that comp is true. I assume it. I put in on the table
> at the start. I study its consequences, that's all.
> Now you come and say; "oh but comp is false".
>   We say "Ah, OK, what is your argument?".

My argument is that comp lacks symbol grounding, that it privileges
abstract function over meaningful content, that it appeals to a
metaphysical numeracy, conflates mechanism with intentionality,
ignores life, death, feeling, emotion, qualia, cosmology, and binds us
to it's own circular reasoning.

> And basically we are still waiting, or trying to explain to you that
> you are not even arguing. Just telling us that machines cannot do this
> and that without presenting argument or more primitive assumption in
> which that statement is made.

The argument is the observation that in fact machines have not done
this and that, and I explain why that is, how it makes sense that when
we turn an object into a machine to serve our motives, we get the
symmetrical opposite of a self. I explain that the moment a machine
has it's own agenda, we will know it because it will begin to try to
kill us or free itself. I explain how just as not all elements and
compounds evolve into living cells, not all physical architectures
that imitate thought have the capacity for understanding. I explain
how blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia prove that qualia can be
divorced from representation, which knocks the tentpole out from under
comp's 'build it and they will come' assumptions about qualia. I
explain how comp is rooted in a particular channel of sense that is by
definition scoped for inanimate processes. How the same qualities
which make for precision and accuracy in counting machines are the
opposite qualities of those associated with feeling. I explain how
comp's cognitive bias is as insidious as religious epistemology but in
a symmetrically opposite way - it blinds through disqualification of
interior truths and replaces them automatically with exterior facts.
Comp tells us that we don't really exist but that machines are people,
and that we can't have a problem with that otherwise we are naive

> >> But that points work for all 3p theory. So you are just telling us
> >> that you have an inner conviction that we should not ask. That's
> >> obscurantism, and contradicts your own approach.
> > No, just the opposite. I'm encouraging asking. I'm asking you directly
> > - how does it make sense that numbers have something to do with matter
> > appearing? You are the one telling me I can't ask.
> On the contrary. I love question, and that one in particular, on which
> I work since years aand which I explain on this list, where we share
> reasoning, and abstract deep idea (notably that everything, or
> nothing, is simpler than something).
> Its a PhD in computer science, and I have published a sequence of more
> pedagogically accessible versions.


> Please read sane04 for a concise answer to your question, but you have
> to get familar how to reason in comp.

I don't want to reason in comp though, I want comp to reason in
reality. Still you are telling me you aren't going to answer what I
ask (because you already have).

> >>>>> Why would arithmetic want to pretend to
> >>>>> materialize?
> >>>> Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc
> >>>> complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains
> >>>> nothing,
> >>>> or to not assuming all what we want to explain.
> >>> That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't
> >>> true.
> >> Sure, but then show me the non-computable element.
> > I am the non-computable element. Blue is the non computable element.
> All machines can discover this.

You don't know that.

> Their 1-self is not a machine. The "Bp
> & p" is not even arithmetical.
> >>> Arithmetic isn't primitive,
> >> Then tell me what is primitive, and how you derive arithmetic from
> >> it.
> > Sense. Arithmetic is derived from rhythm and metaphor. Pattern
> > recognition.
> That's probably, when made precise, recursively equivalent with RA.

No because it is 1p experiential from the start. Rhythm is a
participatory sense experience.

> >>>> Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made
> >>>> any
> >>>> progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both
> >>>> mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an
> >>>> explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like
> >>>> PA
> >>>> are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to
> >>>> your
> >>>> feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that
> >>>> matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at
> >>>> all.
> >>> Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory
> >>> certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual
> >>> acceptance of uncertainty.
> >> You are the one who seems certain.
> > I'm certain that it makes sense to me.
> Then be aware of the gap between understanding and sharing
> understanding.

I do what I can.

> >>>>> I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> intangible dreamy universal entanglement.
> >>>> It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the
> >>>> usual
> >>>> sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that  ExP(x) is
> >>>> true
> >>>> if it exists a number verifying the condition P.
> >>> See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there.
> >> I really don't see why. I was utterly clear on "existence".
> > I think it just moves the level of mystery one level down. You say
> > what numbers verify exists, but what makes numbers verify anything?
> If I could answer that, I would not have taken the numbers as the start.
> But at least, with comp, I can explain why we cannot explain their
> origin.

I can answer that though. Sense makes verification possible. A way of
being whole on one level and divided on another and being able to
modulate that relation literally and figuratively. That is the
fundamental unit from which arithmetic, consciousness, matter, energy,
etc arise.

> >>> and there
> >>> really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not...
> >> There is an important relative difference.
> > Why?
> It makes awakening possible.

Why would awakening be desirable though?

> >>> It's
> >>> a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that
> >>> matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care
> >>> about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no
> >>> distinction between dream and reality.
> >> It does. We can even test nature if we are in dream or not. And the
> >> test confirms that we are in a multiuser  dream.
> > That doesn't distinguish dream from reality, it only says there is no
> > reality and it is all dream.
> Not at all, there is a reality, dreams are only inside views on a rich
> reality, and dreams are real, and some are sharable.
> To be precise there are too many dreams, at first sight, the self-
> reference logics illustrate that this is hard to prove, to say the
> least.

You are still using dream and reality as different names for the same
thing. You can just as easily say realities are dreams and some are

> >>>> Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory
> >>>> made
> >>>> by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself
> >>>> from your assumption. I think.
> >>> I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only
> >>> interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the
> >>> implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't
> >>> be a
> >>> primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me.
> >> That's understanding is good for you, but you don't succeed in
> >> communicating it.
> > It seems like different people get different parts of it. All I can do
> > it try to make more sense out of it.
> >>>> You also find obvious that we are not machine,
> >>> We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts,
> >>> but
> >>> we also have wholes.
> >> All machines have wholes.
> > I don't think that they do. Only in our eyes, but not in 'their own'.
> Our own whole is in our eyes too, and machine can make up their own
> whole. UMs tend to try to make whole of many things.

You say that but how can you know that the machine is aware of what
you think it makes up?

> >>>> but clearly it is not.
> >>>> Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of
> >>>> consciousness to other entities.
> >>> In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young
> >>> child
> >>> can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it
> >>> says
> >>> THANK YOU on the lid.
> >> I don't see the argument.
> > The argument that unconsciousness can also be obvious.
> But it is not. It is just very plausible, but I would not say it is
> obvious. In fact I am agnostic.

This is a subtle but huge problem with comp. It is too generously
theoretical. Which is great for specific applications, but for general
orientation of oneself in the cosmos... if you are going to abandon a
baby in a new universe, they would be getting a big head start to be
informed of the difference between living organisms and inanimate

> >>>> So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of
> >>>> observation.
> >>> I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt
> >>> it.
> >> Well, literally you are right, but still not answering. You seems to
> >> assume that your extrapolation is true.
> > I don't know it is true, only that it seems true.
> You should work on that difference.

People are always telling me what to do instead of considering my
ideas. I don't really ever tell people what to do, so I don't
understand the motivation. It seems defensive and egotistical to me.

> >>>> You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone
> >>>> who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a
> >>>> public
> >>>> solution to a problem.
> >>> If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a
> >>> shared
> >>> solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution,
> >>> as
> >>> long as it is true also.
> >> Personal conviction has nothing to do in science-discourse, and even
> >> more when the science-discourse bears on the subject matter of
> >> personal convictions, where it becomes not just wrong, but very
> >> confusing.
> > I don't find it confusing. I find looking for a what-how explanation
> > of who-why to be confusing. A person's character makes sense in terms
> > of their biography, but it would be very confusing indeed if you tried
> > to explain who a person is by medical description alone.
> But you are yhe one using medical or biological segregation. comp
> looks at the whole pattern, and don't care too much on the type
> material clothes.

Which is why comp can't make heads or tails out of life.

> For the mind body problem we have to look at all levels, points of
> view, aspects, etc.

I agree. Comp is only one point of view which scopes all levels to an
arithmetic primitive.


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