On 2/16/2012 10:16 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all
kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia,
etc. We
intentionally lie... The list of computationally erroneous behavior of
the brain is almost endless. How does this occur given COMP? But I
digress. Explaining "physical reality" is to explain the properties
it has as opposed to those that it does not, UDA does not do that. It
even presupposes things that are simply not possible in the physical
world, such as teleportation and computations generating knowledge
without the use of resources. Even a Reversible computer requires
to compute and memory is a physical quantity.
The notion of teleportation used in UDA is nothing magical or
requiring new physics. The experiments in the UDA can be read as after
someone said "yes" to the doctor and became a SIM(Substrate
Independent Mind), thus after the substitution, they can know one of
their godel numbers/programs (assuming correct observation). This
essentially means that said program state can be transmitted and
ran/instantiated anywhere you want and with any delay or order or
form. A "teleportation" from A to B would merely require the SIM to
stop itself in A, have another program transmit it to B(for example
through the Internet or some other communication channel) and have
someone run it in B, for example on a general purpose
Turing-equivalent computer or more likely a special-purpose digital
brain (for better performance within our physics) with access to an
environment(or more, such as VRs). For all intents and purposes this
isn't any different from me writing a program and you downloading it
and running it on your own hardware. For UDA 1-5 this works trivially.
For UDA 6, it also works, with changes in software. UDA 7 does make a
stronger assumption: the sufficiently robust universe, however one
doesn't really assume strong physical continuity by now (by 1-6), so I
don't see UD even has to be coherently ran all at once and in a
continuous manner (for example a running like that in "Permutation
City" would work just well, "in the dust"). If you do consider some
other 'everything' theories like Tegmark's or Schmidhuber, they also
grant you an UD (and I would venture to say that your neutral
Existence might also grant you such robust universes). UDA 8 you seem
to disagree with, but I don't see what explanatory power could any
primitively physical structure grant you: all possible digitalised
observers and their continuations already have to be in the UD, thus
you cannot use primitive physics for prediction. Thus the only claim
that one could make for saving primitive physics would be that it
allows for consciousness to manifest (for example by implementing the
body). UDA 8 and MGA show that such a claim is specious and
unnecessary. You seem to disagree with it, although its not clear to
me as to why or how. You seem to claim that physical reality isn't
primary (COMP agrees, it emerges from arithmetical/computational
truth), although don't agree with the way it emerges in COMP or its
nature(?)? Does that mean that you don't think that all possible
observers are contained in the UD? To be frank, I'm still rather
confused at what point your theory becomes incompatible or predicts
different things than COMP (given the standard assumptions used in the

Dear ACW,

Please rethink exactly what teleportation requires to be possible. It is
not any different from the ability to copy information.

Yes, COMP assumes that there is a subst. level, which means that stuff
below the subst. level may vary (or even look like noise, due to
1p-indeterminacy, we tend to think of this, in our universe, as the
quantum foam and the like). A doctor (which is included in the
assumption, but if it weren't...) only need be able to copy/emulate
either exactly at the right subst. level or slightly below it (copying
at a higher level may entail memory loss or functionality loss or
worse). What this effectively means is that you don't need to be able
to read the full quantum state (which is not possible), but just
quasi-classical states, which we can do and which should be either at
subst. level or below. (If the subst. level was below, COMP would be
practically false, as we do assume that the observer's universal
number is at least partially stable at the subst. level). No violation
of the no-cloning theorem here. And aside from that we can
copy/transmit quasi-classical information pretty well.


There is a problem with this way of thinking in that it assumes that all
of the properties of objects are inherent in the objects themselves and
have no relation or dependence on anything else. This is is wrong. We
know from our study of QM and the experiments that have been done, that
the properties of objects are definite because of interdependence and
interconnections (via entanglement) between all things within our event
horizon. You seem to be laboring under the classical Newtonian view. To
have a consistent and real idea of teleportation one has to consider,
for example, the requirements of quantum teleportation
The assumption in COMP is that a subst. level exists, it's the main assumption! What does that practically mean? That you can eventually implement the brain (or a partial version of it) in a (modified) TM-equivalent machine (by CTT). It does not deny the quantum reality, merely says that the brain's functionality required for consciousness is classical (and turing-emulable).

But it assumes that the classical brain/TM interacts with a quantum world, so that one's state of consciousness can become entangled with Schrodinger's cat. So the external quantum world may still be essential.

Mrs. Schrodinger: "Irwin, what have to done to that cat? It looks half dead!"
Schrodinger: "I don't know.  Ask Wigner."

Although, I suppose some versions including oracles should be possible, and a weakening of COMP into simple functionalism may also be possible. The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the existence of the equivalent machine and from there the argument follows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that there still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that is possible *in principle*, I just direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm which merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is given to you if MWI happens to be true). If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM being false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't know that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to someday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find out for ourselves). The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either way, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or just accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that there is no subst. level.
It is things like that that are preventing COMP from being a realistic
explanatory theory. :-( I like COMP and UDA because I see them as ideas
that have errors can be corrected. This is not to say that my own ideas
are not error filled! We are all, including me, finite and fallible.



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