On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:

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Hi ACW,I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno'sEnglish papers and participated in these discussions, at least. Youdo not need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes theexistence of the equivalent machine and from there the argumentfollows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that therestill is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that ispossible *in principle*, I just direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htmwhich merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which isgiven to you if MWI happens to be true).Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements ofthermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptionsthat might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the ideaof a random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences oflottery winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The mainproblem is that one has no control at all over which numbers willpop up, so one has to substitute a scheme to select numbers afterthey have "rolled into the basket".This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signalsare embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then youconsider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTMbeing false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don'tknow that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing tosomeday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find outfor ourselves).All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon thepossibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal TuringMachine. It would be helpful if we first established that a TuringMachine is capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I ampretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I havestudied of QM and its implications. For example, one has to considerthe implications of the Kochen-Specker and Gleason Theorems - sincewe hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!

`We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a reasoning,`

`it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.`

All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherencehas occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical worldto obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussionthat assume the physical world to be completely classical thereforeit assumes a model of Reality that is not true.

`Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicality is`

`assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps, where we use the`

`neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical reason, and that`

`assumption is explicitly eliminated in the step seven. You forget that`

`Quantum reality is Turing emulable.`

The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form ofinfinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Eitherway, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect orjust accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that thereis no subst. level.No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you arepresenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the ideaof primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted todiscuss ideas and not straw men with me.

`This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having a`

`physical reality to communicate about numbers.`