On 16 Feb 2012, at 23:37, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 1:00 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote:
Surely they must be related. If not, you do indeed get the p.
zombie problem: someone who acts in all respects like a different
person with (assumed) consciousness, indistinguishable in behavior,
yet without consciousness. The question boils down to: let's say
you knew some person well, they one day got a digital brain
transplant, they still behave more or less as you remember them, do
you think they are now without consciousness or merely that their
consciousness is a bit changed due to different quantum
On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:
So is intelligence and consciousness, ala having 1p, qualia and
On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It
would be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is
capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty
convinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of QM
This where the paradox of the philosophical zombie arises. It seems
pretty certain that a TM, given the right program, can exhibit
intelligence. So can we then deny that it is conscious based on
unobservable quantum entanglements (i.e. those that make its
subjective experience stuff, the same thing in your mind?
I think substituting for neurons or even groups of neurons in the
human brain would preserve consciousness with perhaps minor
changes. But when it comes to the question of whether an
intelligent behaving robot is necessarily conscious, I'm not so
sure. I think it would depend on the structure and programming. It
would have *some kind* or consciousness, but it might be rather
different from human consciousness.
Note that Bruno answers the concern that interaction/entanglement
with the environment by saying that the correct level of
substitution may include arbitrarily large parts of the
environment. I think this is problematic because the substitution
(and the computation) are necessarily classical.
I don't see why this would be a problem. Quantum computation is Turing
emulable. So, if my state is my "complete" quantum state, then I am
entangled with the whole universe, and this would only mean that the
quantum dovetailer on the vacuum state wins the "measure battle". This
would be rather astonishing, but is not logically impossible. Now, if
true, we have to show, once we assume comp, that such is the case. It
would mean that the only semantics of the material hypostases (the
modal logic of the family S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*) would contains the quantum
computing machinery. That is not impossible.
Note also that this would not prevent local duplication, à la "yes
doctor", providing some quantum swapping of the entanglement between
"me" and the physical universe.
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