On 16 Feb 2012, at 23:37, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/16/2012 1:00 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It
would be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is
capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of QM and
its implications.

This where the paradox of the philosophical zombie arises. It seems
pretty certain that a TM, given the right program, can exhibit
intelligence. So can we then deny that it is conscious based on
unobservable quantum entanglements (i.e. those that make its
computation classical)?

So is intelligence and consciousness, ala having 1p, qualia and all that
subjective experience stuff, the same thing in your mind?
Surely they must be related. If not, you do indeed get the p. zombie problem: someone who acts in all respects like a different person with (assumed) consciousness, indistinguishable in behavior, yet without consciousness. The question boils down to: let's say you knew some person well, they one day got a digital brain transplant, they still behave more or less as you remember them, do you think they are now without consciousness or merely that their consciousness is a bit changed due to different quantum entanglements?

I think substituting for neurons or even groups of neurons in the human brain would preserve consciousness with perhaps minor changes. But when it comes to the question of whether an intelligent behaving robot is necessarily conscious, I'm not so sure. I think it would depend on the structure and programming. It would have *some kind* or consciousness, but it might be rather different from human consciousness.

Note that Bruno answers the concern that interaction/entanglement with the environment by saying that the correct level of substitution may include arbitrarily large parts of the environment. I think this is problematic because the substitution (and the computation) are necessarily classical.

I don't see why this would be a problem. Quantum computation is Turing emulable. So, if my state is my "complete" quantum state, then I am entangled with the whole universe, and this would only mean that the quantum dovetailer on the vacuum state wins the "measure battle". This would be rather astonishing, but is not logically impossible. Now, if true, we have to show, once we assume comp, that such is the case. It would mean that the only semantics of the material hypostases (the modal logic of the family S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*) would contains the quantum computing machinery. That is not impossible. Note also that this would not prevent local duplication, à la "yes doctor", providing some quantum swapping of the entanglement between "me" and the physical universe.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to