On 2/17/2012 2:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

## Advertising

On 17 Feb 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/17/2012 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi ACW,I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno'sEnglish papers and participated in these discussions, at least. Youdo not need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes theexistence of the equivalent machine and from there the argumentfollows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet thatthere still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation thatis possible *in principle*, I just direct you atwww.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm whichmerely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is givento you if MWI happens to be true).Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements ofthermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptionsthat might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like theidea of a random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequencesof lottery winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The mainproblem is that one has no control at all over which numbers willpop up, so one has to substitute a scheme to select numbers afterthey have "rolled into the basket".This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signalsare embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then youconsider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTMbeing false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don'tknow that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing tosomeday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find outfor ourselves).All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon thepossibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal TuringMachine. It would be helpful if we first established that a TuringMachine is capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. Iam pretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I havestudied of QM and its implications. For example, one has toconsider the implications of the Kochen-Specker<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/> and Gleason<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems - sincewe hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a reasoning,it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherencehas occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classicalworld to obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we seediscussion that assume the physical world to be completelyclassical therefore it assumes a model of Reality that is not true.Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicalityis assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps, where we usethe neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical reason, and thatassumption is explicitly eliminated in the step seven. You forgetthat Quantum reality is Turing emulable.Dear Bruno,I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from theinfinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What weobserve must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could nothave consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute?I am not sure what we observe should always be subject to A or ~Arule. I don't think that's true in QM, nor in COMP.

Dear Bruno,

`Think about it, what would be the consequence of allowing A ^ ~A to`

`occur in sharable 1p? If we start out with the assumption that all`

`logics exist as possible and then consider which logics allow for`

`sharable 1p, then only the logics that include the law of bivalence`

`would have sharable 1p that have arbitrarily long continuations.`

`We could get contradictions in the physics at least! This would`

`disallow for any kind of derivation of physical laws. My thinking is`

`motivated by J.A. Wheeler's comments, re: It from Bit and Law without`

`Law. We are considering that our physical laws derive from the sharable`

`aspects of first person content, after all... This is a natural`

`implication of UDA, no? So either we are assuming that physical laws are`

`given ab initio or that they emerge from sharable 1p. Either way, the`

`logic of observables in any sharable 1p must be A or ~A. This is part of`

`my reasoning that observer logic is restricted to Boolean algebras (or`

`Boolean Free Algebras generally).`

My question is looking at how we extend the absolute space and timeof Newton to the Relativistic case such that observers always seephysical laws as invariant to their motions, for the COMP case thiswould be similar except that observer will see arithmetic rules asinvariant with respect to their computations. (I am equatingcomputations with motions here.)OK.

`So do you understand my question about the Standard-ness of`

`arithmetic models? I am assuming that each 1p continuation has to`

`implement a model of arithmetic that would seem to be standard so that`

`it always is countable and recursive, if only to allow for continuation.`

`Is this OK so far? I do not know where the arithmetic model would be`

`implemented. Would it be in the Loebian Machine or a sublogic of it? The`

`idea is that every observer thinks that it's arithmetic is countable and`

`recursive even though from the "point of view of god" (a 3p abstraction)`

`every observers model is non-standard.`

The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form ofinfinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Eitherway, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect orjust accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that thereis no subst. level.No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you arepresenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the ideaof primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted todiscuss ideas and not straw men with me.This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having aphysical reality to communicate about numbers.OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completely againstmy intuition of what is required to solve the concurrency problem. Doyou have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaum theorem seems toindicate that "standardness" in the sense of the standard model ofarithmetic might be an invariant for observers in the same way thatthe speed of light is an invariant of motions in physics?My motivation for this is that the identity - the center of one'ssense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures is alwaysexcluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of the integersresult from the constant (that would make one's model of arithmeticnon-standard) being hidden in that identity? This wording isterrible, but I need to write it for now and hope to clean it up as Ilearn better.The feeling that + and * are computable, which most people have whencoming back from school, can be used with Tennenbaum theorem to defendthe idea that we share the standard model, in some way. I would notdare saying more than that. Do you know if Tennenbaum theorem extendsto non countable models?All this is a bit technical, and perhaps out of topic, I think.

`No, it is important because we cannot just assume a shared standard`

`model of arithmetic because that would collapse all the plural 1p`

`Loebian Universal Machines into a single solipsistic Machine. Where has`

`to be a reason for the separateness of the individual LUM and what I am`

`proposing might accomplish that and also give us a reasoning why physics`

`is relativistic as opposed to absolute, i.e. why GR is possible.`

Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.