On 2/17/2012 2:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Feb 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/17/2012 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:
I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's
English papers and participated in these discussions, at least. You
do not need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)
The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the
existence of the equivalent machine and from there the argument
follows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that
there still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that
is possible *in principle*, I just direct you at
merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is given
to you if MWI happens to be true).
Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of
thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptions
that might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the
idea of a random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences
of lottery winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The main
problem is that one has no control at all over which numbers will
pop up, so one has to substitute a scheme to select numbers after
they have "rolled into the basket".
This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signals
are embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.
If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you
consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM
being false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't
know that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to
someday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find out
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the
possibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing
Machine. It would be helpful if we first established that a Turing
Machine is capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I
am pretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I have
studied of QM and its implications. For example, one has to
consider the implications of the Kochen-Specker
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/> and Gleason
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems - since
we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!
We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a reasoning,
it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.
All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence
has occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical
world to obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see
discussion that assume the physical world to be completely
classical therefore it assumes a model of Reality that is not true.
Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicality
is assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps, where we use
the neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical reason, and that
assumption is explicitly eliminated in the step seven. You forget
that Quantum reality is Turing emulable.
I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from the
infinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What we
observe must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could not
have consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute?
I am not sure what we observe should always be subject to A or ~A
rule. I don't think that's true in QM, nor in COMP.
Think about it, what would be the consequence of allowing A ^ ~A to
occur in sharable 1p? If we start out with the assumption that all
logics exist as possible and then consider which logics allow for
sharable 1p, then only the logics that include the law of bivalence
would have sharable 1p that have arbitrarily long continuations.
We could get contradictions in the physics at least! This would
disallow for any kind of derivation of physical laws. My thinking is
motivated by J.A. Wheeler's comments, re: It from Bit and Law without
Law. We are considering that our physical laws derive from the sharable
aspects of first person content, after all... This is a natural
implication of UDA, no? So either we are assuming that physical laws are
given ab initio or that they emerge from sharable 1p. Either way, the
logic of observables in any sharable 1p must be A or ~A. This is part of
my reasoning that observer logic is restricted to Boolean algebras (or
Boolean Free Algebras generally).
My question is looking at how we extend the absolute space and time
of Newton to the Relativistic case such that observers always see
physical laws as invariant to their motions, for the COMP case this
would be similar except that observer will see arithmetic rules as
invariant with respect to their computations. (I am equating
computations with motions here.)
So do you understand my question about the Standard-ness of
arithmetic models? I am assuming that each 1p continuation has to
implement a model of arithmetic that would seem to be standard so that
it always is countable and recursive, if only to allow for continuation.
Is this OK so far? I do not know where the arithmetic model would be
implemented. Would it be in the Loebian Machine or a sublogic of it? The
idea is that every observer thinks that it's arithmetic is countable and
recursive even though from the "point of view of god" (a 3p abstraction)
every observers model is non-standard.
The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of
infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either
way, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or
just accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that there
is no subst. level.
No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you are
presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea
of primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to
discuss ideas and not straw men with me.
This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having a
physical reality to communicate about numbers.
OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completely against
my intuition of what is required to solve the concurrency problem. Do
you have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaum theorem seems to
indicate that "standardness" in the sense of the standard model of
arithmetic might be an invariant for observers in the same way that
the speed of light is an invariant of motions in physics?
My motivation for this is that the identity - the center of one's
sense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures is always
excluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of the integers
result from the constant (that would make one's model of arithmetic
non-standard) being hidden in that identity? This wording is
terrible, but I need to write it for now and hope to clean it up as I
The feeling that + and * are computable, which most people have when
coming back from school, can be used with Tennenbaum theorem to defend
the idea that we share the standard model, in some way. I would not
dare saying more than that. Do you know if Tennenbaum theorem extends
to non countable models?
All this is a bit technical, and perhaps out of topic, I think.
No, it is important because we cannot just assume a shared standard
model of arithmetic because that would collapse all the plural 1p
Loebian Universal Machines into a single solipsistic Machine. Where has
to be a reason for the separateness of the individual LUM and what I am
proposing might accomplish that and also give us a reasoning why physics
is relativistic as opposed to absolute, i.e. why GR is possible.
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