On 2/17/2012 2:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Feb 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/17/2012 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:


I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's English papers and participated in these discussions, at least. You do not need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)

The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the existence of the equivalent machine and from there the argument follows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that there still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that is possible *in principle*, I just direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm which merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is given to you if MWI happens to be true).

Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptions that might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the idea of a random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences of lottery winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The main problem is that one has no control at all over which numbers will pop up, so one has to substitute a scheme to select numbers after they have "rolled into the basket". This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signals are embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.

If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM being false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't know that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to someday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find out for ourselves).

All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It would be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of QM and its implications. For example, one has to consider the implications of the Kochen-Specker <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/> and Gleason <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems - since we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!

We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a reasoning, it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.

All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence has occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical world to obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussion that assume the physical world to be completely classical therefore it assumes a model of Reality that is not true.

Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicality is assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps, where we use the neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical reason, and that assumption is explicitly eliminated in the step seven. You forget that Quantum reality is Turing emulable.

Dear Bruno,

I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from the infinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What we observe must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could not have consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute?

I am not sure what we observe should always be subject to A or ~A rule. I don't think that's true in QM, nor in COMP.

Dear Bruno,

Think about it, what would be the consequence of allowing A ^ ~A to occur in sharable 1p? If we start out with the assumption that all logics exist as possible and then consider which logics allow for sharable 1p, then only the logics that include the law of bivalence would have sharable 1p that have arbitrarily long continuations. We could get contradictions in the physics at least! This would disallow for any kind of derivation of physical laws. My thinking is motivated by J.A. Wheeler's comments, re: It from Bit and Law without Law. We are considering that our physical laws derive from the sharable aspects of first person content, after all... This is a natural implication of UDA, no? So either we are assuming that physical laws are given ab initio or that they emerge from sharable 1p. Either way, the logic of observables in any sharable 1p must be A or ~A. This is part of my reasoning that observer logic is restricted to Boolean algebras (or Boolean Free Algebras generally).

My question is looking at how we extend the absolute space and time of Newton to the Relativistic case such that observers always see physical laws as invariant to their motions, for the COMP case this would be similar except that observer will see arithmetic rules as invariant with respect to their computations. (I am equating computations with motions here.)


So do you understand my question about the Standard-ness of arithmetic models? I am assuming that each 1p continuation has to implement a model of arithmetic that would seem to be standard so that it always is countable and recursive, if only to allow for continuation. Is this OK so far? I do not know where the arithmetic model would be implemented. Would it be in the Loebian Machine or a sublogic of it? The idea is that every observer thinks that it's arithmetic is countable and recursive even though from the "point of view of god" (a 3p abstraction) every observers model is non-standard.

The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either way, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or just accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that there is no subst. level.

No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you are presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea of primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to discuss ideas and not straw men with me.

This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having a physical reality to communicate about numbers.

OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completely against my intuition of what is required to solve the concurrency problem. Do you have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaum theorem seems to indicate that "standardness" in the sense of the standard model of arithmetic might be an invariant for observers in the same way that the speed of light is an invariant of motions in physics? My motivation for this is that the identity - the center of one's sense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures is always excluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of the integers result from the constant (that would make one's model of arithmetic non-standard) being hidden in that identity? This wording is terrible, but I need to write it for now and hope to clean it up as I learn better.

The feeling that + and * are computable, which most people have when coming back from school, can be used with Tennenbaum theorem to defend the idea that we share the standard model, in some way. I would not dare saying more than that. Do you know if Tennenbaum theorem extends to non countable models?
All this is a bit technical, and perhaps out of topic, I think.

No, it is important because we cannot just assume a shared standard model of arithmetic because that would collapse all the plural 1p Loebian Universal Machines into a single solipsistic Machine. Where has to be a reason for the separateness of the individual LUM and what I am proposing might accomplish that and also give us a reasoning why physics is relativistic as opposed to absolute, i.e. why GR is possible.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to