On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?
Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?
We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
hypothesis than most forms of CTM, given that comp allows the
substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically
lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.
Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.
Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
materialism (weak materialism). We could say that comp makes the
notion of primitive matter supernatural.
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