On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?

Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?

We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker hypothesis than most forms of CTM, given that comp allows the substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.

Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.

Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with materialism (weak materialism). We could say that comp makes the notion of primitive matter supernatural.



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