On Feb 20, 2:48 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Sorry, I resend this because there was a little mistake:
> On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >> On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>> Why would Gods be supernatural?
> >>>>>> Why would bachelors be married?
> >>>>> That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim
> >>>>> that
> >>>>> the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines
> >>>>> from
> >>>>> being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk
> >>>>> terminology.
> >>>>> It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
> >>>>> MWI.
> >>>> I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
> >>>> control means "god" or "supernaural">
> >>> You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would
> >>> have to
> >>> admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make
> >>> changes
> >>> to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your
> >>> universe
> >>> and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?
> >> You are natural.
> > How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
> > simulation or not.
> I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that
> we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person
> point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to
> verifiable (empirically) constraints.

How does that relate to the issue of simulation though? Any internally
consistent simulation is verifiable within the simulation. Are you
saying there is a way to see through all simulations and know the
ultimate host universe?

> With comp we are in a complex "matrix" whose existence is deducible
> from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible
> from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.

Ok, but if I am running on an Apple 6000 computer in a furniture store
in Teaneck, NJ, how are + and * going to help me know where that is?
Even if I could, how would I know that New Jersey wasn't just part of
the simulation?

> >> You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
> >> catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.
> > No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
> > Pegasus, and that is all that is required.
> >>>>>>> If comp is true, then when we create
> >>>>>>> AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and
> >>>>>>> reprogram
> >>>>>>> their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we
> >>>>>>> be to
> >>>>>>> them other than Gods?
> >>>>>> But we are natural so they would be wrong.
> >>>>> They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.
> >>>> So? Is appearance reality?
> >>> That is what comp says.
> >> Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.
> > Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
> > without the notion of computational realism?
> Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the
> incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including
> physicalism. This shows just the gap between computer scientist,
> philosopher of mind, and physicists, together with the usual
> authoritative dogma in the field.

That's all beside the point though. My argument is simple. If comp is
true, then programmers are, in a sense, gods.

> >>> The simulation is reality as far as the
> >>> simulatees are concerned.
> >> And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
> >> real reality.
> > It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
> > their reality.
> Not really. Peter is right, here. The physical reality is not a
> simulation, unless we discover that it violate the material modal
> logical (arithmetically based) hypostases.

What does that mean for the universe which I live in that runs on the
Apple computer in New Jersey? I'm saying that my reality is whatever
Skyrim Matrix program that is the world I interact with but now you
seem to be saying that my physical reality is the physical inside of
the computer? Or is it New Jersey?

> > Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
> > possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
> > Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
> > what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
> > is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.
> You miss the first person indeterminacy. From the first person
> perspective, viewed in the theory from some third person point of
> view, the subject 'belongs' to an infinite set of computations, which
> ask for compromise between the little numbers and the big numbers.

Sorry, I don't understand how that relates to my point, nor do I
understand how infinite computations collectively decide to become a
set, ask for compromises, or take ownership of a subject.

> >> You seem to be arguing
> >> appearance=reality on the premise that
> >> opinion=truth.
> > Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
> > be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
> > the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
> > is in fact a logical program.
> Hmm... reality will be the result of the indeterminacy. We can bet,
> thanks to QM, and quasi-already comp, on a first person sharable
> winning computation sheaf.

Are you saying that comp supervenes on QM? Doesn't that mean a
material primitive? In any case, all of this seems to me a smoke
screen that has nothing to do with the clear thesis of all forms of
comp, that subjectivity arises from, through, or as a consequence of
computation. These computations must literally be reality for the
subject (what other reality can they have?)

> >>> Appearances may not reflect the truest level
> >>> of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
> >>> representation of the simulation's function.
> >> Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
> >> still aren't reality
> > It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
> > itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
> > the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
> > reality than the simulation.
> Comp confront each machine with reality, all the "time". But then
> there is the reality of lies, and this has to be taken into account,
> but with comp, there is a sense to say that the reality cannot lie to
> you. Just extract comp from arithmetic, and compare it with your local
> reality. Roughly speaking, if it differ, it means that you are not at
> stage 0 of the comp reality, you are relatively failed, but this you
> can be aware of. Comp makes the physically real more real, and more
> solid, and we can test if the degree of relativity of the simulation,
> and up to now, the "non primitive" stage zero seems to obey to the
> matraila hypostases, that is, not refuting comp, or the fact that
> hereby we are at the stage zero.

Can I find New Jersey if I am living in a video game? Can I tell that
the rules of the video game are not the laws of physics?

> >>>>> It doesn't
> >>>>> matter who you call 'natural'.
> >>>> It matters a great deal what you call anything.
> >>> It would if the word natural had some relevant meaning, but even in
> >>> food labeling, that term is notoriously vague. Natural means
> >>> anything
> >>> that exists. Natural plastic comes from natural petrochemicals.
> >> If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard
> >> your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim
> >> might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better.
> > Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
> > Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
> > which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
> > *their* Gods.
> yes, but that would not mean a lot if those are Harry Potter
> universes, or white rabbits histories. The physics is the sum on all
> histories, with comp, but structured by the constraints of the logic
> of self-reference.

All histories of all MWI universes or just the histories within the
local universe or branched family of universes?

> >>>> "Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
> >>>> poisonous".
> >>> Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
> >>> place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that
> >>> you
> >>> would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
> >>> view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
> >>> agents than living organisms.
> >> What we are arguing about is the supernatural.
> > No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing
> > about are gods (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over
> > the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and
> > their inevitability in MWI.
> The question is their relative proportion, how would you define them,
> etc.
> Comp makes the physical reality unique and necessary, and multiversal.

I don't see how. What is Watson's physical reality like? An Earth-like
topography of trivia questions? I don't see why the question is their
relative proportion either. With the antrhopic principle, our universe
will inevitably be the one freak MWI universe which supports whatever
we need to justify.

> >> You
> >> do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural
> >> meaningless.
> > Why not? Besides, as I keep saying, I am not trying to rescue the
> > supernatural, I am pointing out that God is not supernatural at all,
> > it is an accurate description of the relationship between the
> > programmer and the programmed.
> If comp is correct that god does not exist, because he don't program,
> he let the (universal) entities free.

Then he programmed them to be free, and the entities freedom is
conditional upon god's whim to modify that program.

> >>>>> Now who is arguing a special case for
> >>>>> natively evolved consciousness?
> >>>> I don't know. Who?
> >>> You.
> >> No, you have misunderstood.
> > If you could prove that statement, you would have tried.
> >>>>>> "The Goa'uld are false gods!" -- Stargate, passim.
> >>>>> If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can
> >>>>> intervene
> >>>>> and change my program and the program of my universe at will,
> >>>>> then to
> >>>>> me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to
> >>>>> them.
> >>>> "To me"= appearance =/= reality
> >>> No. To me = my reality.
> >> The causes and conditions upon which my
> >>> existence supervenes. If my programmer can make a Bengal tiger
> >>> appear
> >>> or disappear in my living room, then he is God in reality.
> >> No he isn;t, because reality is where the sim is running and there
> >> he is just a programmer.
> > Why do you think the programmer's reality is any more real? Maybe he
> > is a program running in another sim. Comp is the very idea that it
> > would be impossible to tell the difference.
> It is the contrary. You miss, or forget to take into account the first
> person indeterminacy. It is crucial to get the genuine comp big picture.

How does first person indeterminacy get me from Skyrim Matrix to
Teaneck, NJ?

> > The bottom line is that in
> > the sim reality, anyone who programs the sim is God.
> metprogramming is the science of writing program writing programs,
> mathematically you can enumerate them by phi_phi_i, those are still
> program though. What about programs testing transformation of
> themselves Phi_i = eval T(i)?
> God is not a programmer. But you might say that it is responsible for
> the existence of the programs or the relative universal numbers.

I'm not speculating on what God is to us though, I'm saying that if
you live inside a computer program, the programmer is
indistinguishable from God.

> >>> This is
> >>> what comp says.
> >> What do you mean by "comp".
> > Computationalism. Digital functionalism. CTM. UDA. All of it. All are
> > predicated on the idea that experience is generated by arithmetic,
> That is true, but is predicated in a weak sense. It is not obvious
> that if we can survive with a physical approximation of a digital
> universal machine, then physics is emerging in the universal mind
> looking at itself, when the universal machine introspect itself, as
> she does already from the tiny sigma_1 part of the very big
> arithmetical truth. And the result, from the point of view of the UM,
> is that she see something vastly bigger than Arithmetical truth, in
> fact.

That's ok with me, but that larger truth still arises from arithmetic
in comp, which was all I was saying.

> > and
> > therefore no arithmetically generated experience can be seen through
> > with certainty by the machines/programs within the simulation.
> That's remains correct, because we have to bet on comp, and this we
> can never be certain of.


> >>>>>>> Computationalism says that we have no way of
> >>>>>>> knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
> >>>>>>> classification) demands that this is inevitable in some
> >>>>>>> universes.
> >>>>>>> In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility
> >>>>>>> be said
> >>>>>>> to be supernatural?
> >>>>>> There is a supernatural/natual distinction in MWI based
> >>>>>> multiverses.
> >>>>> If it is not supernatural for us to build a Turing machine and
> >>>>> control
> >>>>> the content of it's 'tape', then it cannot, cannot, can-not be
> >>>>> supernatural for that UM to have its world be controlled by us.
> >>>> So? I never said that could no be apparently omnopotent
> >>>> control of a VM. I said it doesn't fit the defintition
> >>>> of supernatural.
> >>> That's why I say in MWI + Comp + Anthropic principle, there would
> >>> inevitably be an infinite number of universes in which simulations
> >>> exist with citizens to whom God is real and natural.
> >> "to whom God is real" is just an opinion. If the sim was created
> >> by a human prog. with BO and dandruff, their opinion is wrong.
> > You are conflating the levels (as Bruno always tells me). The
> > simulation has no access to extra-simulatory information,
> Why? The UD dovetails on the reals, and on all relatively computable
> use of those reals. That plays for them extra-simulatory information,

Extra-simulatory in the sense of universal numbers and arithmetic, but
you aren't saying that Skyrim denizens can smell New Jersey, right?
The furniture store is on one level, and the glorious Emerald ice
continent of Skyrim is on another.

> like the WM self-duplication gives already one bit of information,
> from the first person points of view.
> > it is a
> > complete sub-universe. It's logic is the whole truth which the
> > inhabitants can only believe in or disbelieve to the extent which the
> > simulation allows them that capacity.
> That exists also in the UD, but either the simulation is physically
> correct, and then the inhabitants are in all coorect simulation, and
> so it changes nothing, or the simulation is physically incorrect (as
> it should be given that the comp primary matter is not Turing
> emulable),

Is the Emerald ice continent physically correct or incorrect?

> if you gives them enough time, and play honest with them,
> they will conclude that their are in a relative simulation.

With WMI there should be an infinite number of universes where the
Admin does not play honest with them.

> This is because it is not the same to be in all simulation (the
> physical reality), and being failed by some local universal machine.
> You cannot fail a UM on physics, because physics is in their head. So
> they can compare.
> > If the programmer wants all of
> > his avatars to believe with all their hearts that there is a cosmic
> > muffin controlling their universe, she has only to set the cosmic
> > muffin belief subroutine = true for all her subjects.
> It will not work if the avatars are Löbian machine. You will have to
> brainwashed them, and forbid the course of logic to them.

That seems to be how religion works on Earth. Maybe that's the reason?

> >> If MWI is a complete theory of the universe, their opinions
> >> is wrong too.
> > Opinions can be right or wrong but the reality is that a programmer
> > has omnipotent power over the conditions within the program. She may
> > be a programmer, but she can make her simulation subjects think or
> > experience whatever she wants them to. She may think of herself as
> > their goddess, but she can appear to them as anything or nothing. Her
> > power over them remains true and factually real.
> There are few chance we can program intelligence that way. It is more
> like letting free the creatures, and being patient, very patient.
> Experts will develop more quickly, but hey are not the paragon of
> intelligence ...

Isn't that up to the programmer? What happens when B.F. Skinner III
gets his hands on them?

> >>> There would also
> >>> be infinite MWI UM sub-universes where God is supernatural, sub-
> >>> universes where Gods are aliens, pirates, beercans, Pokemon, etc.
> >> There can;t be any supernatural entities in a physics-based
> >> multiverse.
> > I'm not talking about the physics-based multiverse level, I'm talking
> > about the computational (read what I wrote again please) "UM sub-
> > universes". MWI alone does not make gods inevitable but MWI+ Comp
> > does.
> Comp implies MWI. (not deciding if we should talk about dreams or
> worlds or relative states, ...)

Comp can't work in just one universe?

> > Add the anthropic principle levels any objections about
> > probability. This seems iron clad and straightforward to me.
> You missed the 1-indeterminacy.

Maybe I do. How does it allow Skryim Ted to know that he lives in New

> >>>>> As
> >>>>> long as the top level programmer is natural and resides in a top
> >>>>> level
> >>>>> MWI universe, there can be no limit to their omnipotence over
> >>>>> their
> >>>>> programs in comp. To claim supernatural distinctions within an
> >>>>> emulation is to turn the programs into zombies, is it not?
> >>>> There is a conceptual distinction between the natural and the
> >>>> supernatural in MWI and computaitonl multiverses, and
> >>>> such that the extension of the concept "superntatural"
> >>>> could likely be empty.
> >>> I agree, supernatural is an empty concept in comp.
> >> No, that is not at all an equivlaent claim. There may
> >> be no extension of "magnetic monopole", but it is a meaningful
> >> concept.
> > Supernatural can be meaningful if you want it to be, but in comp all
> > it means is meta-programmatic or meta-simulation. It has no mystical
> > charge. It is not what is impossible by the logic of the MWI universe,
> > only what is impossible by the programmed logic of the UM-Sub
> > Universes. Your argument is based on confusing the levels. If I force
> > you to stay within the logic of comp, you have no argument. To get out
> > of the logic of comp, you need something like 'sense', which is my
> > claim all along. Usually I am the one arguing reality, but now that it
> > is turned around, you can see how the constraint of comp is
> > tautological, or you could if you could get passed the idea that I
> > have to be wrong.
> >>> That why I said it
> >>> from the start. Computational simulations can define anything as
> >>> being
> >>> natural or supernatural.
> >> And they may or may not be right. Opionion does not
> >> trump truth.
> > The opinion of the programmer *is* truth to the programmed.
> No it is not. Unless the programmer tells the truth to the machine,
> but even him does not know that, and can commincate only belief (like
> the belief that zero has no predecessor).

If my opinion is that Skyrim Ted belongs in a boat forever, then I can
change the program to disallow him from leaving the boat. That he
cannot leave the boat is now his truth.

> > That's
> > what makes them God.
> That's what would make them charlatan. If they hide to the machine
> that they communcate only a belief. Nature has programmed us to make
> that error all the time, except in dreams (when we wake up).

Some dreams are more real than reality, some are less. We don't
remember most dreams probably because they literally are not worth

> >>> The 'nature' of the simulation is fabricated
> >>> arithmetically.
> >> Is it? Show me. Every sim I have ever seen was
> >> running on silicon.
> > Huh? You could run it on vacuum tubes if you want. Or a stadium full
> > of people holding up colored cards. A cartoon is a simulation. A
> > puppet show is a simulation.
> We always talk of exact simulation. We use often the term emulation.
> comp, that is digitality makes the notion sensefull.

It doesn't have to be silicon to be digital though. A player piano
roll is digital.

> >>> You are the one who claimed that Gods are supernatural
> >>> in the first place:
> >>> "> > > Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds
> >>> with
> >>> all
> >>>>>> kinds of Gods.
> >>>>> QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
> >>>>> universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification? "
> >>> See? I say MWI could have all kinds of Gods (in their simulated sub-
> >>> universes), and you object on the grounds that it would mean
> >>> something
> >>> 'supernatural'. Not supernatural, artificial.
> >> It would mean somethig supernatural because that is the
> >> way "god" is defined.
> > That is the way you define "god". That is both an argument from
> > authority and a straw man. Please note:
> >>>>>>> QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural
> > occurs in any
> >>>>>>> universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's
> > classification?
> >>>>>> Why would Gods be supernatural?
> >>>>> Why would bachelors be married?
> > This is your argument, not mine. My whole point is that God becomes
> > natural, and inevitable under MWI + Comp.
> I repeat: comp implies MWI. Exactly? We don't know what that means on
> both sides.

That's ok with me, but we were talking about MWI so it seems relevant
to specify + comp. Can't you have MWI without comp? Turtles all the
way down...

> > That God has to be
> > supernatural is your opinion. The reality is that God need only be
> > meta-programmatic from the perspective inside a simulation. I don't
> > know that I can make it much clearer.
> Once upon a time the gods needs to pass exams in Goddessnes.
> That time god was asked two questions, and was told tha get the choice
> between the two questions. Only one answer should be given. the
> question was rather traditional:
> 1) can you create a problem that you cannot solve?
> 2) can you create a god more powerful than you.

Yes, that is the point of creating the universe. You tie off a piece
of yourself and then there are problems it can't solve. In another
sense, anything you do or create is also you. Multisense realism
allows both realities to coexist and not coexist.

> >> You might have artificial something-or-others,
> >> but we should invent a new word for them.
> > We can invent as many words for it as we want, but none will be any
> > more or less appropriate than God. Call it Administrator if you want.
> > The functionality is the same.
> Hmm... OK, but it might be a little more complex, with the comp hyp at
> least.
> >>>>> They become
> >>>>> the second class citizens that I am criticized for suggesting.
> >>>>>>> Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
> >>>>>>> quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our
> >>>>>>> programmers...who
> >>>>>>> appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.
> >>>>>> Appearance =/= reality.
> >>>>> I agree, but comp does not. In comp, reality is only deep
> >>>>> appearance.
> >>>> Oh good grief. In comp, reality is the lab where the simulation  is
> >>>> running.
> >>> I agree, but comp would say that you are confusing levels. Comp says
> >>> that reality is within the computations.
> >> What version of comp? The actual sceintific CToM, or Bruno's
> >> metaphysical weirdness?
> > I don't think it matters. Any form of comp + MWI = inevitable all
> > powerful (relative to some simulation) Administrators.
> Yes. It the same comp. I repeat a last time, comp implies a MWI of
> arithmetic, and it should be equal to the MWI of the universal wave,
> in some limiting sense from the points of view of the normal (average)
> UMs in deep computational histories.

I don't know if that is clear to everyone though. I suspect it's
fairly common for people to be familiar with MWI and not comp, but
I'll take your word for it.


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