On Feb 21, 10:41 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > On Feb 21, 5:41 am, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial > > > simulation or not. > > > That doens't make you supernatural. > > Why would I be? I'm not the administrator of a virtual universe. You would not be supernatural if you were. > > The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications. > > Why not? Fiction is arguably the basis for all culture. Only it arguably isn't, because without the fiction/fact distinction, science would not be science. > I'm not > talking about that though, I'm referring to comp's view of > epistemology. Comp has to justify itself in the face of epistemology not vice versa. >That's the whole question is whether the truths of our > universe are as true as any to us. > > > Both. > > > Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory. > > What does that have to do with it's conception of in-simulation > epistemology? The issue is whether Bruno's Comp = science's CTM. Since CTM requires nothing to be simulated, and has no epistemoloogical implications, the two are not the same. > > >What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism > > > without the notion of computational realism? > > > What do you mean by computational realism? > > That the reality within any simulation derives from computation rather > than material substance. OK. Then the answer to "What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism without the notion of computational realism?" would be something like "There is a real reality, containing humans and their brains, and human the human mind is like software running on the hardware of the real physical brain, and that is the Computational Theory of Mind". > > > > >The simulation is reality as far as the > > > > > simulatees are concerned. > > > It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still > > > their reality. > > > "their reality"=appearance=/= reality. > > What is reality without an appearance? >If the only world I know is not > my reality, then what is it? The answer is supplied by the Simulation Hypothesis, the Deception Hypothesis, etc. if you world is simulated, then reality is the place where and means wheresby it is being simulatd. The Simulation Hypothesis--which you call "comp"-- is a claim about reality. To claim that what you know is not reality because it is simulated is to claim something else is reality. > > But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated, > > and "our reality" is delusional. > > It's simulated from our perspective, but from inside the simulation > it's the only reality there is - according to comp.r False. It is not the Only Reality There Is Accoding to Comp, because there hypothses state that there is a ground level... the lab where the sim is running (or Platonia in Bruno's case). > > > Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to > > > be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but > > > the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which > > > is in fact a logical program. > > > That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are > > saying elsewhere. > > I'm giving you the comp version. I don't subscribe to it personally, > so I have no reason to talk about it elsewhere. You have given me two versions of comp. > > > It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief > > > itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by > > > the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer > > > reality than the simulation. > > > Can't a red pill be programmed in? > > Not unless you are already a being outside the simulation who is > participating vicariously. Prove that. > > > Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI + > > > Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in > > > which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as > > > *their* Gods. > > > ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all > > sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods > > are supernatural by definition > > This is just begging the question and arguing from authority. No, it is valid analytical apriori argument. > Your > claim is that the word 'scientific' wards off the supernatural and > that alone makes anything that anyone decides is supernatural > impossible. I'm telling you that because > > 1. comp makes godlike influence over a simulation possible "Godlike" only in a delusional sense. > 2. MWI makes such influence and simulations inevitable not necessarily. Depends on the flavour. > 3. AP makes the relative numbers of MWI universes with godlike > simulation influence irrelevant. > 4. comp makes it impossible to tell whether such influence is physics > or extra-simulation intervention from inside the sim. Yep. and "impossible to tell"--epistemic inaccessibility-- still doens't mean there is no fact of the matter. You assume absolute, transcendent facts when you assume Comp+MWI+AP > Therefore, whatever your reality, if you believe Comp and AP, then you > could be in a simulation subject to godlike intervention. Like, schmike. > >, no belief in a god arising in such > > circumsntances is *correct*, be it every so persuasive. > > Are you saying that a belief can only be true if it is correct in all > possible universes? If it is *about* something that by definition transcends all local questions, then yes, very much so. >Or that correctness within a sim supervenes on > truth external to the sim? Correctness is just correctness. "Correctness within" is a misleading way of stating what is actually agreement with false data and deluded individuals. > If so then what is the point of Comp? The point of CTM is to scientifically explain the human mind. Bruno wants to revive Plotinus or somehting. Ask him. > > > > What we are arguing about is the supernatural. > > > > No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing > > > about are gods > > > Gods are supernatural by definition. > > Supernatural is just a word. "Word" is just a word. >You seem to be clinging to it though. If we do not stick to common and accepted meanings, we will fail to communicate. > Call them Administrators then. Are they supernatural? Not if they are inferred from MWI, etc. > > > (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over > > > the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and > > > their inevitability in MWI. > > > That's superbeings, not gods. > > Superbeings is a made up word, if you want to get technical about it Of course. We don't have tradtiotional words to describe hypothetical entities our ancestors could not have conceived of. "Iphone" is a made up word, too. > You seem to be at once saying that supernatural concepts like gods are > made up, but then getting very picky about what they are and are not. You seem to be STILL failing to understand the difference between definitional (analytical, semantic, apriori) truths and empirical (synthetic, aposteriori) truths. I claim to know nothing at all about gods as actual entities, but "god" is *defined* to mean a supernatural being. > I see no important difference relative to this conversation between > Zeus, Wotan, God, and super being. superbeings are logically, conceptually, compatible with naturalism, whether they exist or not. > > > Why not? > > > Because, if the one is meaningless, so is the other. > > That's my point. I never said supernatural, you did. You implied it by using "god". You say "pegasus", you imply "wings". it is no good saying a catappulted horse is a wingless pegasus. It is not good just saying it is Pegasus. No wing, no pegasus, and if you choose not to mention the winglessness, that doesn't save the situation. >I'm saying > godlike, omnipotent, superiority, Administrator, gods...whatever. > Someone who reigns over a world without the constraints imposed on > those living in that world. Hair splitting over word definitions is > what I find meaningless. What you said was misleading, because a "god" could very reasonably be taken to mean whatever is in charge of the WHOLE shebang, not the spotty teenager who is in charge of his PSP. > > Gods are superntarual by definition. You can no more > > provide evidecne of a natural god than of a married bachelor. > > Are programmers supernatural? Not where I come from. A lot of them are somewhat sub. > > > Why do you think the programmer's reality is any more real? > > > Why do you think comp is true? > > I don't! That's my whole argument here is to respond to the claim that > Comp doesn't need gods by showing how in fact the possibility of gods > are inevitable in Comp. But the word "god" means different things in each claim. THat's the whole problem. When Bruno says *his* Comp doens't need gods, what *he* means is he doesn't need anyone to create o decide basic arithmetical truths: that's where *his* buck stops. What *you* mean when you say that ther *are* gods is that some illusions have illusory powers relative to even more illusory situations. You are miscommunicating, talking past each other. > > False, false, false , false false!!!! Standard CTM has nothing > > to do with Dreaming Machines in Platonia, or any other fanciful > > notion Bruno has come up with. > > Then what does CTM make of consciousness? CTM says human consciousness is a physical brain running a certain programme. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
