On 21 Feb 2012, at 19:26, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/21/2012 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Feb 2012, at 17:02, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.
That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM,
That's exactly what I am saying above.
No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler
than multiple solipsistic physicses.
I show that the CTM theory entais that physics is the same for all
Löbian entity (machine or not), so that we canb derive physics from
machine's introspection. The general shape is given by a relative
sum on all computations. It depends for each machine to the
competition between infinities of machines. Negative amplitude of
probability comes from the formula p-><>p satisfied by the
sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD). Without this I
would have already conclude that comp and/or the classical theory
of knowledge is refuted.
Does this introspection manifest all possible means of
generating the appearance of other minds?
The introspection is needed only to recognize and assess other minds,
not for their generation. All the possible minds are already alive
from arithmetic (even just sigma_1 arithmetic).
It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to
matter, I think.
1) a little does not equal none
I don't use this. In MGA I use the fact that Physical Supervenience
Thesis (PST) entails that consciousness need to be attributed to
*arbitrary" physical activity, including none, and that is absurd
If you don't see this, quote the passage, and let us discuss it
really in detail.
Could it be that the "no physical activity" mode of
computational implementation is some kind of "at infinity"
extrapolation, i.e. it is in principle achievable but only in some
infinite limit? If this is true that we might have a chance of
capturing a Gaussian measure in the finite approximation of this
limit, otherwise the measure would vanish as one would have to
included the non-constructable cases of computation.
To much unclear for me. Sorry.
Maudlin, and me, does not reduce the physical activity to show it
unnecessary, we show it non relevant with respect to the computations.
The Gaussian measure on the distinguishable 1-person states, comes
from the iterated self-duplication, which shows that the resulting
people can recognize at each step of the iteration the Pascal triangle
partitioning, and the Gaussian measure is the limit of all such
partitioning for the infinite iteration. It is the same reasoning, in
Everett QM, to explain how a beam splitters is working.
2) redefine computation so that comptuational states must be
define "causally", and tell me in which theory you work. Usually,
when we implement a computation physically, or in any UMs, we just
manage to implement the arithmetical "causality" in terms of the
UMs capacity to link the computational states. Without this, the
concept of implementation would not make sense.
This is very weak reasoning as the notion of causation that you
are using, based of the truth of Sigma_1 sentences, is contingent on
the mathematical axioms that are chosen.
On the contrary, Church thesis makes it independent of the choice of
any formal system.
3) Given a choice between materalism and CTM, keep materialism, a la
[CTM implies ~MAT] is equivalent with [MAT implies ~CTM]. You are
not giving a refutation, but a rephrasing of a (partial) result.
I comment some other posts by you:
Shouldn't we open up our mind?
Maybe all multiversal theories are wrong and there is one univese.
open to that?
Sure. But then QM and CTM are both false. The point is a point of
reasoning, validity, not of conviction or truth.
We know that QM is true modulo the experiments done so far.
Testing CTM is difficult as we would have to show a non-computable
physical process to falsify it.
It is enough to compare empirical physics with the comp-physics. If it
differs, we have a string evidence that "we", whatever we are, are the
non computational element. Up to now, QM fits with the comp-physics,
which already make quasi obvious most of the quantum weirdness.
Consideration of computational intractability, e.g. the NP-Complete
problem is a hint but you do not seem to be interested in looking
NP concerns tractability issue, not the insolubility used in the
derivation of physics.
On Feb 20, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.
I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says
we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person
point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to
verifiable (empirically) constraints.
With comp we are in a complex "matrix" whose existence is deducible
from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is
from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.
Of course, Platonism/AR cannot be deduced mathematically: it is
We can do a theory for the ontology, then we can make ontological
deduction, and epistemological deduction for some notion of
reasoners or observers. That's the best we can do if we want to
keep the scientific modesty.
We can find as many theories as we can define axioms, the limit
is conceivability which is a weak constraint.
But with comp, all theories for the ontology are equivalent, once
enough rich to define a universal entity. They have to be sound on
arithmetic, also. They all define the same internal epistemologies,
Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
without the notion of computational realism?
Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the
incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including
There is no such incompatibility. It is mutual redundancy, not
contradiction. What BM calls incompatibility actually
hinges on Occams Razor, and O's R cuts both ways: AR/Platonism is
No. If you keep materialism *and* CTM, the reasoning shows that you
need to eliminate person or consciousness.
Materialism fails on its own as it reduces our 1p to
epiphenomena, so why this statement?
Because of the difference between saying consciousness is an
epiphenomenon and consciousness does not exist.
On Feb 20, 6:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation.
No. True = true of unsimulated reality.
Right. And with CTM, reality = (sigma_1) Arithmetical Truth. But
physical reality is a complex structure emerging in first person
plural way in collection of UMs.
Mere plurality does not solve the concurrency problem which is
what CTM must explain to derive physics.
Indeed, that's why we need to interview the LUMs. The UDA reasoning
shows that it is the only way, to get the minds and the other minds.
This needs more work before we are making such bold statements.
It has been done. But of course the remaining task is infinite, if
only because we have to bactrack first 1500 years of theology.
I am not solving a problem, I am formulating a problem (and showing
the shape of the solution, and why it is enough to say that comp (if
true) contradicts Aristotle metaphysics and theology (and his physics,
too, but that's not new).
No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it
The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications.
It has. Like it is a key of mathematical logic that rich and sound
(Löbian) theories cannot prove that they do not prove falsehoods.
The possibility of believing falsehoods is also a key in the dream
metaphysical argument, which steps six gives again in a modern
Perhaps you tell us that you have some direct access to reality, in
which case you behave as a pseudo-mystic, I am afraid.
How are we any different from you, Bruno, you seem to imply that
you have " some direct access to reality" !!!
Peter was the one talking like he knew directly that primary matter
exists. Not me.
Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.
Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory.
I agree, despite it is also religion/theology (the belief in a form
of possible in principle reincarnation). But computer science (with
Church thesis) made if scientific. Comp is a weaker version of the
usual version of CTM, so what you derive from comp remains valid
for all form of CTMs.
False, false, false , false false!!!! Standard CTM has nothing
to do with Dreaming Machines in Platonia, or any other fanciful
notion Bruno has come up with.
You have always failed to make this precise. It is not a question
of agreeing with philosophical principles, but of valid deduction
in a theoretical framework.
You are claiming that the lack of a formal model of his idea is
a falsification of his ideas.
Not at all. I was talking about the lack of rigor, not in his idea,
but in his claim that UDA is not valid. He is the one pretending that
there is a flaw.
The opinion of the programmer *is* truth to the programmed.
It still isn't truth. As soon as you add a "to" or "for" clause,
you are actually talking about opinion, even if you are using the
I agree. Craig seems to confuse belief and knowledge, which in comp
are distinct, from the points of view of the correct machine. They
obeys to different logics, even if G* knows they have the same
arithmetical extension (for each correct machine).
I do agree that Craig should explain his notions of belief and
The matter doesn't matter. What matters is that there is always
some matter. I have never seen a simulation run on arithmetic.
Read any (good) textbooks in computer science. Computations have
been discovered in arithmetic, or equivalent. See the book of
Matiyasevich for a proof than even a very tiny part of arithmetic
already emulates all computations. It is standard material.
Which of these do you recommend?
That is the way you define "god". That is both an argument from
authority and a straw man.
It is the way god *is* defined, which makes the argument valid
analytical apriori, not from authority.
Of course if you use the term God as presented by those who
redefine it for a clear political purpose! Better to use the
larger concept introduced by the original founders, or
crystalizers, of the notion.
By using the confessional notion of God, you just agree that they
continue to have credit on God, like if such fairy tales have not
You are defending fake theology and pseudo-science, in doing so.
And you ask us to accept a new fake theology, with a metaphysical
notion of primitive matter, which is already shown meaningless with
comp, because we cannot relate consciousness with it.
What about a theology where we are all actually God but have
just forgotten that we are?
To talk without too much caution, that's the case for the inner god.
The first person notion, related to a machine, behaves like the
Universal Soul (the third greek God). According to the Plotinus
scholar Bréhier (the first modern translator) Plotinus is using the
Theatetus' idea, like I have done for the machine. For the machine,
Artemov has shown that it is the only solution, for a notion of
My point is that that argument requires the meaning of "god" to
change, and, since language us public, you don't get to change it
Ah! But then why do you keep the definition given by the romans,
who changed it unilaterally for what we can understand today was
pseudo-political criminal reasons, despite a preceding millennium
of fruitful scientific (dialog, critics, modesty) studies of the
concept, which indeed has led to current sciences (but not yet
current theological studies, except in the dark).
Someone send me recently a PDF of "God and Golem", by Norbert
Wiener, the founder of cybernetics/IA. He can be considered as a
father of comp, (with many others from different periods, to be
We can get that pdf here.
I read it in my youth, and I cite it in "Conscience &
Mécanisme" (or elsewhere?), but by rereading it, I realize that it
is *very* good, and relevant for the "GOD/mechanism" question.
The subtitle of "God and Golem" is "A comment on certain points
where cybernetics impinges on religion".
Good stuff indeed!
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