On 22 Feb 2012, at 15:49, Terren Suydam wrote:

On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 21 Feb 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote:

But is it really either-or? Isn't it likely there are different kinds and degrees of consciousness. I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about this. On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious,
but then he says it depends on the program they are executing.

Imagine that I am duplicated in W and M. I would say that the guy in M and the guy in W are equally conscious, and that both are me, although they will
feel very different and have different content of consciousness.
In that sense I would say that all Löbian machines are equally conscious. Of course the Löbian humans have very different experience than the jumping
spider, and even more different than Peano Arithmetic.

As I said in another post today, I am not sure why Terren thinks that that the first person indeterminacy is needed for consciousness. First person indeterminacy is implied by the self-multiplication (in the UD, say), as a
consequence of comp, but is not presented as something needed for the
existence of consciousness. Mary is conscious in both scenario. But comp implies, as Quentin said, that she cannot escape the indeterminacy of its many continuations in the UD. It is hoped that the QM indeterminacy is just the reflect of the comp indeterminacy, so that QM confirms comp. The Everett mutiplication of populations of machines in QM would also be an empirical reason to assess that comp does not lead to solipsism (which I would take as a refutation of comp, if that happen to be the case). The apparition of a
quantum logic in the material hypostases is a reassuring step in that


Hey Bruno,

I seem to remember reading a while back that you were saying that the
1p consciousness arises necessarily from the many paths in the UD. I'm
glad to clear up my misunderstanding.

OK. What happens, if there is no flaw in the UDA-MGA, is that your futures can only be determined by the statistics bearing on all computations going through your state.

The 1p nature of that consciousness will rely on the logic of (machine) knowledge (or other modalities), which put some structure on the set of accessible computational states.

Sorry for being unclear, and for the many misspellings, and other grammatical tenses atrocities.

The problem is also related to the difficulty of the subject, which is necessarily counter-intuitive (in the comp theory), so that we have some trouble in using the natural language, which relies on natural "intuitive prejudices".

In fact I can understand why it might look like I was saying that the 1p needs the many computations. The reality is that one is enough, but the others computations, 1-p undistinguishable, are there to, and even for a slight interval of consciousness, we must take into account that we are in all of them, for the correct statistics. So the 1p is attached to an infinity of computation, once you "attach" it to just one computation.

However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single
continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a
counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a
"concrete" example?

You should really find this by yourself, honestly. It is the only way to be really convinced. Normally this follows from the reasoning.
Please ask if you don't find your "error".
Oh! I see Quentin found it.

Your mistake consists in believing that when you simulate your friend Mary in the deterministic sim, completely closed, as you say, you have succeeded to prevent Mary, from her own pov, to "escape" your simulation. Her 1-indeterminacy remains unchanged, and bears on the many computations, existing by the + and * laws, or in the UD.

The counterfactuals, and the indeterminacy comes from the existence of an infinity of computations generating Mary's state. Your deterministic sim can be runned a million times, it will not change Mary's indeterminacy, relatively to the infinities of diverging (infinite) computations going through her 1-state.

You might also reason like that. The consciousness of Mary is only in Platonia. We have abandoned the idea that consciousness is related to any singular physical activity. Her consciousness and other 1p- attributes depends only on her arithmetical relative state, relatively to the infinity of UMs running her in Platonia. In that sense, all the Mary you interact with are zombie, but this is just due to the trivial fact that you can interact only with Mary's body or local 3p description. Once you grasp that you too are in Platonia, there is no more zombie because bodies become only local interface between "soul" in Platonia. But intuition fails us, and that's why we need the math and the computer science.

The indeterminacy might be too big, and the comp counterfactuals might be too large, but that remains to be proved, and would be a refutation of comp (CTM, mechanism).

Let me comment your last paragraphs (the entire post is below for ease)

In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD*
and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed
by the quantum number generator "brings Mary along", so to speak.

That's partially correct. But as Quentin said, you have no means to isolate Mary in the scenario you want. You propose a logically impossible though experiment. Mary belongs already to an infinity of computations. Even if you run a program dovetailing your friend on the reals, assuming a robust universes you will not change much the measure, because those states will not be distinguishable by Mary. You have to bifurcate them enough, if I can say, and that will be equivalent to an UD.

So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a

Let us say that she is as much conscious in one scenario, and the other. But her consciousness is in Platonia, and the physical embodiments is a complex structure made by the consciousness and infinities of UMs.

The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to
insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.

So this does not necessarily follow.
But with Everett, we might have evidences that the level is determined by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations. There are higher level, where you can survive, but with consciousness changes, though.

If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy.

I would say consciousness, with comp, implies 1p indeterminacy. It requires it logically, in the sense that if you have consciousness then you have the 1p indeterminacy. Your Mary enclosed in the deterministic local sim, is deterministic only for you, she is really, that is her 1-pov, distributed in the UD*. I use the same reasoning to explain that with comp, we cannot enclose people in simulation. Either the simulation is comp-physically correct, but then it simulates locally what the UD does in the limit, and like Mary, it makes no sense to say that they are only in the simulation, or the simulation is not comp-physically correct, and the simulated people will figure out at some moment.


Terren's original post (21 Feb 2012):

Bruno and others,

Here's a thought experiment that for me casts doubt on the notion that
consciousness requires 1p indeterminacy.

Imagine that we have scanned my friend Mary so that we have a complete
functional description of her brain (down to some substitution level
that we are betting on). We run the scan in a simulated classical
physics. The simulation is completely closed, which is to say,
deterministic. In other words, we can run the simulation a million
times for a million years each time, and the state of all them will be
identical. Now, when we run the simulation, we can ask her (within the
context of the simulation) "Are you conscious, Mary?  Are you aware of
your thoughts?" She replies yes.

Next, we tweak the simulation in the following way. We plug in a
source of quantum randomness (random numbers from a quantum random
number generator) into a simulated water fountain. Now, the simulation
is no longer deterministic. A million runs of the simulation will
result in a million different computational states after a million
years. We ask the same questions of Mary and she replies "yes".

In the deterministic scenario, Mary's computational state is traced an
infinite number of times in the UD*, but only because of the infinite
number of ways a particular computational state can be instantiated in
the UD* (different levels, UD implementing other UDs recursively,
iteration along the reals, etc). It's a stretch however to say that
there is 1p indeterminacy, because her computational state as
implemented in the simulation is deterministic.

In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD*
and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed
by the quantum number generator "brings Mary along", so to speak.

So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a
zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to
insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.

If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy.



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