Re: The free will function

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________________________________
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, February 23, 2012 4:48:10 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function

On 22 Feb 2012, at 18:17, marty684 wrote:

Bruno,
>             If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP)

Nothing is "made of". Everything appears in the mind of Universal numbers
relatively to universal numbers, with hopefully reasonable relative statistics.

Think about a dream. If you dream that you drink coffee, you can understand
that
such a "coffee" is not made of anything. The experience of coffee is due to
some
computation in your brain. With the big picture apparently implied by comp,
even
the brain is like that dreamed coffee: it is not made of anything. It is only
locally made of things due to the infinitely many computations generating your
actual state.

The "matrix" metaphore, or the Galouye "simulacron" metaphore is not so bad.
And we don't need more than the numbers + addition and multiplication to get an
initial dreaming immaterial machinery.

Thanks for this vivid clarification. But...

Read UDA. You might understand that if we are machine (numbers relative to
other
numbers), then we cannot know which machine we are, nor which computations
supports us, among an infinity of them.Everything observable becomes
probabilistic. The probability bears on the infinitely many computations going
throughyour actual state (that's why they are relative).

Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On what
is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by that
which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we inhabit a seemingly
probablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ?

(If you've been over this before, please refer me to the relevant posts,
thanks.)      marty a.
Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of problem, so we might
single
out the precise point where you don't succeed to grasp why comp put
probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties,  in front of everything. UDA1-7
is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more subtle immateriality
point implied by computationalism.

My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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