________________________________
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, February 23, 2012 4:48:10 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function



On 22 Feb 2012, at 18:17, marty684 wrote:

Bruno,
>             If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP) 

Nothing is "made of". Everything appears in the mind of Universal numbers 
relatively to universal numbers, with hopefully reasonable relative statistics.

Think about a dream. If you dream that you drink coffee, you can understand 
that 
such a "coffee" is not made of anything. The experience of coffee is due to 
some 
computation in your brain. With the big picture apparently implied by comp, 
even 
the brain is like that dreamed coffee: it is not made of anything. It is only 
locally made of things due to the infinitely many computations generating your 
actual state.

The "matrix" metaphore, or the Galouye "simulacron" metaphore is not so bad. 
And we don't need more than the numbers + addition and multiplication to get an 
initial dreaming immaterial machinery.

Thanks for this vivid clarification. But...


Read UDA. You might understand that if we are machine (numbers relative to 
other 
numbers), then we cannot know which machine we are, nor which computations 
supports us, among an infinity of them.Everything observable becomes 
probabilistic. The probability bears on the infinitely many computations going 
throughyour actual state (that's why they are relative).

Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On what 
is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by that 
which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we inhabit a seemingly 
probablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ? 







   (If you've been over this before, please refer me to the relevant posts, 
thanks.)      marty a.
Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of problem, so we might 
single 
out the precise point where you don't succeed to grasp why comp put 
probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties,  in front of everything. UDA1-7 
is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more subtle immateriality 
point implied by computationalism.

My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry. 

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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