On Feb 23, 9:34 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made > > of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of > > reality are “conscious” while others aren’t. > > DIsconnects exist. Some things are magnetic and others not. And many > other examples. What's special about consc? That we don;t understand > where or what the disconnect is?
It doesn't make consc special, but he is saying it makes it universal. Magnetism is a good example. In our naive perception it seems to us that some things are magnetic and others not, but we know that actually all atoms have electromagnetic properties. He is asking what thing could make consc special and how we can assume that it isn't universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be. > But it isn;t at all pbvious that > "we don't understand consc" should imply panexperientialism rather > than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost > all the philosophy of mind starts with "we don't understand consc" That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do understand about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as some special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe. > > >And don’t get me started > > on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one > > “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer > > coming to the conclusion it is emergent. > > The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways. > For some values of "emergent", emergent properties are > trivially demonstrable. Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a conscious observer. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.