On Feb 23, 2:45 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > >     Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made
> > > > of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of
> > > > reality are “conscious” while others aren’t.
> > > DIsconnects exist. Some things are magnetic and others not. And many
> > > other examples. What's special about consc? That we don;t understand
> > > where or what the disconnect is?
> > It doesn't make consc special, but he is saying it makes it universal.
> > Magnetism is a good example. In our naive perception it seems to us
> > that some things are magnetic and others not, but we know that
> > actually all atoms have electromagnetic properties.
> That's a bit misleading. No atom has ferromagnetic properties,
> such properties can only exist in bulk (they are "emergent" in
> of the umpteen senses of the word). The elcetromagnetic properites
> of atoms are  more
> akin to panPROTOexperientialism..


I think it's a bit misleading to distinguish ferromagnetism from
electromagnetism. I wouldn't even call it emergent, it's more of a
special case. Just as human consciousness is a special case of
awareness. I'm ok with panprotoexperientialism though. We can't really
know one way or another at what point the proto is dropped and have no
particular reason to assume that there is no experience that
corresponds to atoms, so it seems safer to assume that that awareness
is 100% primitive instead of 100-x% primitive arbitrarily.

> > He is asking what
> > thing could make consc special
> What special? He doesn't have a ny evidence
> that cosnc is special beyond our inability to understand
> it in material terms.

He isn't saying it's special, he is asking why should we think that
consciousness arises as some exceptional phenomenon in the universe.
Why is such an 'arising' assumed?

> >and how we can assume that it isn't
> > universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be.
> > > But it isn;t at all pbvious that
> > > "we don't understand consc" should imply panexperientialism rather
> > > than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost
> > > all the philosophy of mind starts with "we don't understand consc"
> > That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do understand
> > about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as some
> > special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe.
> That isn't obvious, since there are plenty of physcialists about
> consc.
> around. And he didn;t mention physics.

He didn't mention physics but when he talks about 'disconnects' he is
referring to any theoretical discontinuity between consc and the
natural universe.

> > > >And don’t get me started
> > > > on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one
> > > > “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer
> > > > coming to the conclusion it is emergent.
> > > The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways.
> > > For some values of "emergent", emergent properties are
> > > trivially demonstrable.
> > Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a
> > conscious observer.
> Epistemologically dependent =/= ontologically dependent.

The ontology of emergence is epistemological.


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