On Feb 23, 8:27 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > On Feb 23, 2:45 pm, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made > > > > > of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of > > > > > reality are “conscious” while others aren’t. > > > > > DIsconnects exist. Some things are magnetic and others not. And many > > > > other examples. What's special about consc? That we don;t understand > > > > where or what the disconnect is? > > > > It doesn't make consc special, but he is saying it makes it universal. > > > Magnetism is a good example. In our naive perception it seems to us > > > that some things are magnetic and others not, but we know that > > > actually all atoms have electromagnetic properties. > > > That's a bit misleading. No atom has ferromagnetic properties, > > such properties can only exist in bulk (they are "emergent" in > > of the umpteen senses of the word). The elcetromagnetic properites > > of atoms are more > > akin to panPROTOexperientialism.. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-molecule_magnet > > I think it's a bit misleading to distinguish ferromagnetism from > electromagnetism. I wouldn't even call it emergent, it's more of a > special case. Just as human consciousness is a special case of > awareness. I'm ok with panprotoexperientialism though. We can't really > know one way or another at what point the proto is dropped and have no > particular reason to assume that there is no experience that > corresponds to atoms, so it seems safer to assume that that awareness > is 100% primitive instead of 100-x% primitive arbitrarily. > > > > > > He is asking what > > > thing could make consc special > > > What special? He doesn't have a ny evidence > > that cosnc is special beyond our inability to understand > > it in material terms. > > He isn't saying it's special, he is asking why should we think that > consciousness arises as some exceptional phenomenon in the universe.
Every phenomenon is exceptional. > Why is such an 'arising' assumed? > > > > > > > > > > > > > >and how we can assume that it isn't > > > universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be. > > > > > But it isn;t at all pbvious that > > > > "we don't understand consc" should imply panexperientialism rather > > > > than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost > > > > all the philosophy of mind starts with "we don't understand consc" > > > > That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do understand > > > about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as some > > > special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe. > > > That isn't obvious, since there are plenty of physcialists about > > consc. > > around. And he didn;t mention physics. > > He didn't mention physics but when he talks about 'disconnects' he is > referring to any theoretical discontinuity between consc and the > natural universe. Whatever. It might be better to take as your text the writings of a notable panpsychist (Whitehead, Strawson, Chalmers) as your text, rather than Random Internet Dude. > > > > >And don’t get me started > > > > > on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one > > > > > “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer > > > > > coming to the conclusion it is emergent. > > > > > The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways. > > > > For some values of "emergent", emergent properties are > > > > trivially demonstrable. > > > > Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a > > > conscious observer. > > > Epistemologically dependent =/= ontologically dependent. > > The ontology of emergence is epistemological. Says who? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
