# Re: The free will function

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On 23 Feb 2012, at 15:12, marty684 wrote:```
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From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
Sent: Thu, February 23, 2012 4:48:10 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function

On 22 Feb 2012, at 18:17, marty684 wrote:

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```Bruno,

If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP)

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Nothing is "made of". Everything appears in the mind of Universal numbers relatively to universal numbers, with hopefully reasonable relative statistics.
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Think about a dream. If you dream that you drink coffee, you can understand that such a "coffee" is not made of anything. The experience of coffee is due to some computation in your brain. With the big picture apparently implied by comp, even the brain is like that dreamed coffee: it is not made of anything. It is only locally made of things due to the infinitely many computations generating your actual state.
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The "matrix" metaphore, or the Galouye "simulacron" metaphore is not so bad. And we don't need more than the numbers + addition and multiplication to get an initial dreaming immaterial machinery.
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Thanks for this vivid clarification. But...

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Read UDA. You might understand that if we are machine (numbers relative to other numbers), then we cannot knowwhich machine we are, nor which computations supports us, among an infinity of them. Everything observablebecomes probabilistic. The probability bears on the infinitely many computations going through your actual state (that's why they are relative).
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Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On what is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by that which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ?
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But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of arithmetic (equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic structure, which from our points of view will look indeterministic.
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The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the experience. Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will happen to you you have to look at all the computation accessing the computational state you have when throwing the coin, and infer what will happen from a measure on the continuations.
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(If you've been over this before, please refer me to the relevant posts, thanks.) marty a.
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Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of problem, so we might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to grasp why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties, in front of everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more subtle immateriality point implied by computationalism.
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My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry.
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May be you have a problem with my english. Please, begin by the step one, on page 4 of sane04, read it, and tell me precisely what you don't understand in the step 1. I might need to re-explain comp to you, or you can glance its definition on page 2.
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When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step, and so one.
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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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