________________________________
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Fri, February 24, 2012 11:58:51 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function



On 23 Feb 2012, at 15:12, marty684 wrote:


>
>
>
________________________________
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>Sent: Thu, February 23, 2012 4:48:10 AM
>Subject: Re: The free will function
>
>
>
>On 22 Feb 2012, at 18:17, marty684 wrote:
>
>Bruno,
>>             If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP)

Nothing is "made of". Everything appears in the mind of Universal numbers 
relatively to universal numbers, with hopefully reasonable relative statistics.

Think about a dream. If you dream that you drink coffee, you can understand 
that 
such a "coffee" is not made of anything. The experience of coffee is due to 
some 
computation in your brain. With the big picture apparently implied by comp, 
even 
the brain is like that dreamed coffee: it is not made of anything. It is only 
locally made of things due to the infinitely many computations generating your 
actual state.

The "matrix" metaphore, or the Galouye "simulacron" metaphore is not so bad. 
And we don't need more than the numbers + addition and multiplication to get an 
initial dreaming immaterial machinery.

Thanks for this vivid clarification. But...


Read UDA. You might understand that if we are machine (numbers relative to 
other 
numbers), then we cannot knowwhich machine we are, nor which computations 
supports us, among an infinity of them. Everything observablebecomes 
probabilistic. The probability bears on the infinitely many computations going 
through your actual state (that's why they are relative).

Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On what 
is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by that 
which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we 
inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ?

But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of arithmetic 
(equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic structure, which from our 
points of view will look indeterministic.

The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the 
experience. 
Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will happen to you you have 
to look at all the computation accessing the computational state you have when 
throwing the coin, and infer what will happen from a measure on the 
continuations.

          
     I'm delighted to learn that I understood you after all. Thanks for this 
further clarification.



                      Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of 
problem, so we might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to 
grasp why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties,  in front of 
everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more 
subtle immateriality point implied by computationalism.May be you have a 
problem 
with my english. Please, begin by the step one, on page 4 of sane04, read it, 
and tell me precisely what you don't understand in the step 1.  I might need to 
re-explain comp to you, or you can glance its definition on page 2. 

>
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>My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry.
>

When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step, and so one. 

Bruno
                  
               I don't have a problem with your english. I have a problem with 
the logical complexity of your work. Also I no longer remember where to find 
the 
text you're referring to. Warmest wishes,   marty

               


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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