Hi Marty,

On 25 Feb 2012, at 01:51, marty684 wrote:

Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On what is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by that which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ?

But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of arithmetic (equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic structure, which from our points of view will look indeterministic.

The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the experience. Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will happen to you you have to look at all the computation accessing the computational state you have when throwing the coin, and infer what will happen from a measure on the continuations.

I'm delighted to learn that I understood you after all. Thanks for this further clarification.

You are welcome.

Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of problem, so we might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to grasp why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties, in front of everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more subtle immateriality point implied by computationalism.

My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry.

May be you have a problem with my english. Please, begin by the step one, on page 4 of sane04, read it, and tell me precisely what you don't understand in the step 1. I might need to re-explain comp to you, or you can glance its definition on page 2.

When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step, and so one.


I don't have a problem with your english. I have a problem with the logical complexity of your work.

It is not simple, but not *that* difficult either (I mean UDA, AUDA needs a background in logic which is not so well taught).

Also I no longer remember where to find the text you're referring to. Warmest wishes, marty

You can find the paper, and the unique slide to easily remember the different steps here:





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