On 2/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote:On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote:On 24 February 2012 11:52, acw<a...@lavabit.com> wrote:I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness,experience),(Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3,mind isthe sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thingpossible, evenif non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from ourexperience(but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanismwhich meansour experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we buildmechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really avoidany ofthe 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the othercan bedirectly inferred. However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that thesenotions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but neverall 3.Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying theexistenceof mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence.(This tendsto be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomachbecauseall our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a bit self-defeating.Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonicversionswhere matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some piece ofabstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those thatwishmatter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies into reality (even if low-measure).Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter whichcannotobey any rules - not even all possible rulesNice summary. You say "Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math feels from the inside", which is essentially how Bruno puts it. However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it seems obvious that mind is no more "identical" to math or computation than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as "categorically different". Math and mind are still distinct, though correlated. Do you think that such a duality can still be subsumed in some sort of neutral monism?Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated withthem. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm not surethere's much to gain by adding extra "indirection layers" - it's notthat consciousness is associated with some scribbles on a piece ofpaper, it's associated with some abstract truths and we could saythat 3p-wise those truths look like some specific structure we cantalk about (using pen and paper or computers), but at the same time,that that abstract structure does have some sensory experienceassociated with it. Other structure might represent some machinesimplementing some partial local physics. In that way it's neutralmonist. We could try to keep experience separate and supervening onarithmetical truth, but I'm not sure if there's anything to gain byintroducing such a dualism - it might make epistemological sense, butI'm not sure it makes sense ontologically. I'm rather unsure of sucha move myself, I wonder what Bruno's opinion is on this.I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism,because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view, ifyou agree to1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentiallycorrect machine) by GĂ¶del's provability. I can provide many reason todo that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting thingsis that it leads to an already very complex "machine's theology". Wemight take it as a toy theology, but then all theories are sort of toys.2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp -> BBp) provides the bestaxiomatic theories for knowledge.Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp & p) gives a notion ofknowledge, i.e. (Bp & p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory.The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalentwith Bp & p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point wherethe "divine intellect" (G*), the believer (G) and the kower (soul) Bp& p, will completely differ, and this will account for a variety ofdualism, unavoidable for the machine.So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and thedefinition above explains why, at the least, the machine will behavesas if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp andunderstand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of takingthat talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe, nor evenexplictly express that she is correct).Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*,S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to solveproblems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidable nuancesbrought by the provably correct self-reference logic of machines intheoretical computer science.

Dear Bruno,

`I think that it would help all of us if you wrote up more about G,`

`G*, S4Grz, Z and X logics. I would also appreciate your comments on this`

`paper by Barry Cooper:`

`http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6sbc/preprints/rome.paper.pdf`

Here is its Abstract: "Amongst the huge literature concerning emergence, reductionism and mech-

`anism, there is a role for analysis of the underlying mathematical`

`constraints.`

`Much of the speculation, confusion, controversy and descriptive verbiage`

`might`

`be clarified via suitable modelling and theory. The key ingredients we`

`bring`

`to this project are the mathematical notions of definability and`

`invariance, a`

computability theoretic framework in a real-world context, and within that,

`the modelling of basic causal environments via Turing's 1939 notion of`

`interac-`

`tive computation over a structure described in terms of reals. Useful`

`outcomes`

`are: a refinement of what one understands to be a causal relationship,`

`includ-`

`ing non-mechanistic, irreversible causal relationships; an appreciation`

`of how`

`the mathematically simple origins of incomputability in definable`

`hierarchies`

are materialized in the real world; and an understanding of the powerful ex- planatory role of current computability theoretic developments."

`I am still not seeing how you define the philosophical terms that`

`you are using, as the way that you are using words, such as "dualism"`

`and "monism" are inconsistent with their usage by others in philosophy.`

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