On 25 Feb 2012, at 20:01, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote:On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote:On 24 February 2012 11:52, acw<a...@lavabit.com> wrote:I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness,experience),(Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all3, mind isthe sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thingpossible, evenif non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred fromour experience(but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanismwhich meansour experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we buildmechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't reallyavoid any ofthe 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the othercan bedirectly inferred.However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate thatthesenotions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but neverall 3.Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denyingthe existenceof mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence.(This tendsto be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard tostomach becauseall our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it'sa bitself-defeating.Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonicversionswhere matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how somepiece ofabstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by thosethat wishmatter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasiesintoreality (even if low-measure).Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matterwhich cannotobey any rules - not even all possible rulesNice summary. You say "Mind becomes how some piece of abstractmathfeels from the inside", which is essentially how Bruno puts it. However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. itseems obvious that mind is no more "identical" to math orcomputationthan it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as"categorically different". Math and mind are still distinct,thoughcorrelated. Do you think that such a duality can still besubsumed insome sort of neutral monism?Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associatedwith them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'mnot sure there's much to gain by adding extra "indirection layers"- it's not that consciousness is associated with some scribbleson a piece of paper, it's associated with some abstract truths andwe could say that 3p-wise those truths look like some specificstructure we can talk about (using pen and paper or computers),but at the same time, that that abstract structure does have somesensory experience associated with it. Other structure mightrepresent some machines implementing some partial local physics.In that way it's neutral monist. We could try to keep experienceseparate and supervening on arithmetical truth, but I'm not sureif there's anything to gain by introducing such a dualism - itmight make epistemological sense, but I'm not sure it makes senseontologically. I'm rather unsure of such a move myself, I wonderwhat Bruno's opinion is on this.I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism,because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view,if you agree to1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentiallycorrect machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reasonto do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interestingthings is that it leads to an already very complex "machine'stheology". We might take it as a toy theology, but then alltheories are sort of toys.2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp -> BBp) provides thebest axiomatic theories for knowledge.Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp & p) gives a notion ofknowledge, i.e. (Bp & p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory.The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalentwith Bp & p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a pointwhere the "divine intellect" (G*), the believer (G) and the kower(soul) Bp & p, will completely differ, and this will account for avariety of dualism, unavoidable for the machine.So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and thedefinition above explains why, at the least, the machine willbehaves as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on compand understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error oftaking that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe,nor even explictly express that she is correct).Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*,S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented tosolve problems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidablenuances brought by the provably correct self-reference logic ofmachines in theoretical computer science.Dear Bruno,I think that it would help all of us if you wrote up more aboutG, G*, S4Grz, Z and X logics.

`It needs familiarity with mathematical logic. I can try, but the real`

`understanding can only come from some work.`

`G and G* axiomatizes completely the propositional laws of Gödel's`

`arithmetical provability provable(x), and its dual consistency notion`

`consistent(x).`

`To explain this we need to explain how we can program a theory about`

`numbers in a language containing only the symbol 0, s, + and *. (and`

`the logical symbol).`

`This is done in the paper of Gödel, except he used a typed set theory`

`instead of arithmetic, like it is done in all textbook.`

`Technically it is long and tedious, with lot of subtle traps, to do`

`that task. It is like programming a high level programming language in`

`a low level assembly language, you can expect bugs. So you need to`

`prove each steps, among many, and you need to ensure that the proofs`

`you do can be done by the system itself.`

`For example G proves Dt -> ~BDt means that the Löbian entity (= self-`

`referentially correct "rich" machine or non-machine different from`

`"god") can prove their own incompleteness theorem: consistent('1=1')`

`implies non-provable(consistent('1=1').`

`S4Grz, will be the logic of an intensional variant of provable(x),`

`which is provable('p') & p. We cannot use provable(x) & true(x), as`

`"true" cannot be defined in the language of the entity, so we model it`

`for each arithmetical sentences p by provable('p') & p. (That's the`

`essence of what is clever in the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge,`

`which fits well with the step 6 of UDA, and more generally with the`

`dream argument in metaphysics.`

`Likewize Bp & Dt, and Bp & Dt & p, are other important variants. I`

`will say more when I get more time, but by searching 'S4Grz' or`

`'hypostase' in the archive you might find the many explanations I`

`already give. See my papers and the reference therein. Ask precise`

`question when you don't understand, so I can help.`

I would also appreciate your comments on this paper by Barry Cooper: http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6sbc/preprints/rome.paper.pdf Here is its Abstract:"Amongst the huge literature concerning emergence, reductionism andmech-anism, there is a role for analysis of the underlying mathematicalconstraints.Much of the speculation, confusion, controversy and descriptiveverbiage mightbe clarified via suitable modelling and theory. The key ingredientswe bringto this project are the mathematical notions of definability andinvariance, acomputability theoretic framework in a real-world context, andwithin that,the modelling of basic causal environments via Turing's 1939 notionof interac-tive computation over a structure described in terms of reals.Useful outcomesare: a refinement of what one understands to be a causalrelationship, includ-ing non-mechanistic, irreversible causal relationships; anappreciation of howthe mathematically simple origins of incomputability in definablehierarchiesare materialized in the real world; and an understanding of thepowerful ex-planatory role of current computability theoretic developments."

`Interesting, but still not taking into account the comp mind-body`

`problem, or the comp first person indeterminacy.`

`Might say more on this later. It would have been nice I (re)discovered`

`that paper soon, but many thanks :)`

I am still not seeing how you define the philosophical terms thatyou are using, as the way that you are using words, such as"dualism" and "monism" are inconsistent with their usage by othersin philosophy.

I use them in the sense of the wiki you did provide to me.

`Neutral monism, in the "philosophy of mind" consists in explaining`

`mind and matter, and the relation between, in term of something else.`

`If your theory is scientific, the something else must be clearly`

`specifiable, that is itself described by a reasonable theory, so that`

`the explanation of mind and body from it makes (sharable) sense.`

`With comp, in short, a TOE is given by RA (ontological), and its`

`epistemological laws is given by the variants of relative self-`

`reference of all the (Löbian) numbers. Physics consists in some of`

`those variants (hypostases).`

`Some believe that the numbers belongs to the mind, but with comp it is`

`more natural to define the mind, in a large sense, by the universal`

`numbers imagination.`

`The mind is, notably, what computer can explore, quasi by definition`

`with comp.`

`Local computers, like the one you are using right now, are universal`

`number written in physical universal sublanguage of physics. And`

`normally UDA should help you to convince yourself that physics becomes`

`necessarily a sort of projective limit of the mind, with comp.`

`With comp, the only way to singularize you or your neighborhood`

`consists in layering down the substitution level in the transfinite.`

`Why not? The study of comp can help to build rigorous non comp theory.`

`Sets and hypersets can be helpful for this, indeed. For comp too,`

`probably.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.