On 28 Feb 2012, at 16:29, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote:What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify COMP?Hi,Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulatedby a Turing Machine equivalent computation.That would contradict digital physics. But digital physics is self-contradictory (indeed it implies comp which implies the falsity ofdigital physics). Roughly speaking: if "I" am a machine, theneverything else is not.Dear Bruno,Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them.COMP is the conjunction of "Yes Doctor", the Church Thesis andArithmetic Realism, correct?

`Yes, but note that this is redundant. "yes doctor" means "yes" for a`

`digital transplant. Church thesis is needed to make the term "digital"`

`mathematically precise. And AR is needed to make Church thesis making`

`sense.`

I am now not sure of the definition of "Digital physics" given thisthread so far... From what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on theidea of functional substitutability at some level or scale forphysical systems, such that a given algorithm will run on anyfunctionally equivalent physical system; it is basically arestatement of computational universality.

`I can say yes, to be short. but logically, universality is not used`

`here. But this is a technical point on which I don't want to digress`

`now. Primitive recursive function can have equivalent programs,`

`despite there is no universal primitive recursive functions.`

This idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on aparticular form of physical system if and only if our consciousnessis algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic onthis because I do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that ourbrain's implementation of consciousness does not involve quantumentanglement.My answer to Ronald's question was based on what I thought Iunderstood of COMP, so it seems that I still do not understand COMP.Does not COMP require that any observation of our physical world befaithfully representable as a finite list of yes or no typequestions and their answers?

See Quentin's comment.

`Comp is a priori neutral on any question of physics, until physics is`

`derived from comp.`

IOW, any non-computational physical process.Comp implies non-comp (non Turing emulable first plural person)physical processes. Indeed the "comp primitive matter" is notTuring emulable, it is an infinite sum on infinite computations.But this definition (of "comp primitive matter") is fraught withthe measure problem!

`OK, but a precise one that we can handle with mathematical tools.`

`That's the progress. Comp is fraught with tuns of problems. Comp is`

`just a toll for making those problem precise.`

Does this exclude an infinite collection of possible worlds torepresent the physical systems that can implement that infinitecomputations?

`A priori, no. Now in your sentence, the word "worlds" is ambiguous, so`

`I chose favorable interpretations of it, to make sense of what you say.`

I suppose that you could say that it does as the UD "will generateall possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?),

`Due to the closure of the diagonalization, it can be proved that the`

`phi_i sequence goes through all equivalent programs an infinity of`

`times. It is called the "padding theorem". It is obvious for most`

`computer scientists, because you can always add useless code, but it`

`is also a consequence of Kleene's second recursion theorem.`

which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutionscorresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, inall possible (locally) emulable environments or computationalhistories."The usual idea that I am considering is that a physical systemwill have to be potentially infinite to satisfy the requirements ofa universal Turing machine, as it has to have at least an infinitetape.

`The tape is not part of the universal machine. It is better to think`

`about the universal machine as the code of such a machine on the tape`

`(of some other one). Once a fixed ontological toe is given, a`

`universal machine is a number. It is a finite object. This is`

`important to keep in mind. i would not say that human or juming spider`

`are Löbian (and thus universal) if that needs some infinity. For the`

`1p, it is different because the 1p is indeterminate on infinity of`

`computations, and this structures the logic differently.`

You write:"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [amachine state] at space-time(x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf ofcomputations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platoniawhich is accepted as existingindependently of our selves with arithmetical realism)."

`Yes, that's a conclusion of a reasoning. It shows that primitive`

`matter lacks the ability to singularize matter out of the UD. So, even`

`if it makes sense, it is empty of explanation power for the mind-body`

`problem.`

This seems to bypass the requirement of the concreteimplementation of the UTM by appeal to the independent of the truthvalue of sigma_1 sentences (or equivalent) such that you can thenclaim that:"not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machinepsychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically reduced to‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the object study offundamental machine psychology."

`Yes. The reasoning shown that the concrete implementation has to be`

`bypassed, which save us from the problem of defining what that could`

`mean. It is the result, not something added to the assumptions.`

Therefore any considerations of, for example, thermodynamics isirrelevant as such would be derivable from the "accidentalcorrectness" of Sigma_1 sentences.

Exactly.

This is interesting on its own as it strongly resembles the"occasionalism" of Malebranche and others that was proposed toexplain psycho-psychical parallelism between mental and physicalevents.

OK.

Pratt's residuation solves this problem without AR's idealism,

`If you can prove that, then Pratt's theory has been shown incompatible`

`with comp, given that the AR *idealism* is a consequence of comp, as`

`opposed to AR which is part of the assumption of comp, and of any`

`theory capable of defining a (Turing) universal system.`

among other things, by reducing global computations to pairwiseinteractions between a potentially infinite number of computations.This is a form of accidentalism, but is more subtle as therelationship between mental and physical states/events does not needa causal explication. Additionally, Pratt's residuation proposal(similar to this concept) generates only consistent extensions offirst person indeterminacy modulo arbitrarily large memoryresources. It is only when memory resources are limited to beingfinite ("Forgetfulness" as what occurs in the Telephone game) thatinconsistent extensions might occur.

Perhaps. I cannot judge. You might write a paper on that.

My skepticism of your interpretation of COMP has always turnedon the allegation of eliminatism (in the sense of "that ‘‘matter’’has been ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’") that you seem toderive from the independence of truth valuation, for example thatbecause the primeness of 17 is completely independent of ourknowledge of 17ness or primeness properties, that the truth valuealone of "17 is prime" is sufficient to determine the propertiesthat the sentence "17 is prime" implies to the exclusion of allothers.

`This is not quite clear. I don't see what is special with the`

`interpretation of comp. It is the standard one. The result might be`

`startling, but we can say we get a contradiction so far. It is perhaps`

`weird, but not much weirder than physics, up to now.`

I have looked at your Strobe argument and MGA but I still do not seehow it is that the reduction follow. I have not had the "aha"moment. :-( I am not convinced by Maudlin's arguments. How does thetruth value determine the properties of a referent absent thepossibility of prior identification of the referent?

`You lost me completely. I think you introduce philosophical problems,`

`which might be of some interest, but which distract you from looking`

`at the validity of the argument.`

How can the exactness of the properties of an entity follow onlyfrom its potential existence as an entity?

`In arithmetic there is no potential existence. Either a number,`

`verifying some property, exists, or it does not exists. On the`

`contrary, comp rehabilitates Pythagore and Quine on this issue.`

It is how you answer these questions that I need to understand.

`In the whole theory, properties are derived directly from the laws of`

`+ and *. "potentiality" and other modalities comes the abilities of`

`some cognitively rich numbers to lokk at themselves and to discover`

`many possibilities.`

So to refute comp you need to find a non recoverable, by the firstperson indeterminacy, physical processes. If there were evidencesthat the wave function collapse, that might be considered as arefutation of comp. But after a century of the collapsespeculation, we can only say that this evidences is meagre.OK, so we have to show a counter-example to the recoverabilityof physical process by first person indeterminancy (IPI)? Could youelaborate a bit more on how IPI covers all possible physical processes

`The result is that we have to do that job. AUDA shows the most direct`

`way to do it, in a way which keeps the distinction between quanta and`

`qualia.`

`But to do it is a job which maight take centuries, or more. I just`

`show that we have to do it. You should not take comp as an answer, but`

`as a tool to make the questions and problems mathematically precise.`

without assuming AR?

`If I can't assume AR, I can't even define digital, Church thesis,`

`universal numbers.`

I ask this because it seems to me that AR is what allows your entirethesis to run.

`Yes. But I have never find someone doubting AR. I can see philosophers`

`faking that they doubt AR for the purpose of blocking a reasoning, on`

`the internet (to talk like John Clark). But someone doubting AR? I`

`have never seen that. I have taught to highly mentally disabled`

`persons, and none of them shows doubt in AR. Without the help of a`

`computer, I might have been able to conclude that some miss it,`

`because they could neither talk, nor count, but by using some game-`

`trick with the computer I realize that they understood and believe in`

`AR like anybody else.`

My problem with AR is that it prevents us from finding any solutionsto many problems including the concurrency problem as it assumesproperty definiteness absent specifiably.

`Prove this, or at least formulate this in the comp theory. If you show`

`that the concurrency is not solvable in comp, then you refute comp,`

`and that would be a progress. But that task might be premature. Comp-`

`physics is not yet at that stage.`

`Stephen, we are probably 200 years in advance, on this list. Not 500`

`years!`

:)

You are tacitly assuming that all possible computations can inspecteach other simultaneously and act upon each other without anyoccurrence of a conflict or contradiction.

?

This tells me that you do not understand the concurrency problem!This is an aspect of the problem of time that many thinkers havenot considered. This problem is seen in the statement: "Time existsbecause not everything can occur all at once". Simultaneity is not asimple and unproblematic concept in ontology.

`This is true for all theories negating the possibility of "block`

`realities", that is theories which presuppose a primary time. But`

`comp, by MGA, is incompatible with such theories. You can forget comp`

`if you don't like that, or you can try to find a flaw in the argument.`

`But this contradicts your repeated claim that you don't assume mind or`

`matter (in which I include time) at the start, so I am not sure what`

`to think.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.