On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux<allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.
What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
Disembodied consciousness is silly.
The implication of Comp is that there is no "you". "You" are an abstraction, a fiction,
just another element in a model of the world.
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