On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/28 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
> difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
> substituted for a digital brain.
What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once
OK. The question of Craig is a bit ambiguous though.
and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
Brain A and Brain B will feel has being a continuation of the you
"before" substitution... they'll both be your future you and both
feel it... the you before is no more. (even if you keep your
"current" body... it's just adding a brain C... and same reasonning).
Disembodied consciousness is silly.
I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an
environment... without that what to be conscious of ? The
substitution is not something about disembodiment.
I have to say that I would have answer like here some years ago, but I
am a bit less sure now. Strangely we can be conscious of nothing
except of the fact that we are conscious. This seems to occur in some
reports of salvia divinorum users (either as a blissful or terrorizing
experience. It opens me to the idea that universal machine are
conscious at the start. But you remain correct, in the sense that all
universal machine needs a code, which plays somehow the role of a
relative body. The continuations of such a machine is literally given
by all possible experiences. For any memorizable experience a local
and relative embodiement is unavoidable, and its corresponding
"primitive matter" will be the usual sum on all continuations, which
in the case of the virgin (non programmed) universal machine, is just
I would say.
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