On 29 Feb 2012, at 06:23, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 3:35 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 2:23 PM, Stephen P. King<stephe...@charter.net > wrote:
On 2/28/2012 10:46 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
When we are dreaming we are in a higher level relative
emulation (all UMs can do that).
That's confusing. I find it hard to believe a bacteria can dream. The UM implemented by a bacteria could *potentially* run any program, but
it is *actually* running the bacteria program. To suggest that
bacteria (e.g. one of the class of "all UMs") can dream by virtue of
being definable as a UM generates more confusion than clarity.

Put another way, if a particularly instantiated UM possesses the
ability to dream (to imagine), then that says something non-trivial
about the constitution of that UM's cognitive architecture.


Hi Terren,

If a bacterium is a physical system capable of implementing a universal Turing machine aka the particular bacteria's program, then Bruno's argument shows that it will necessarily be able to dream, for what are dreams if not
alternative TMs running on the same hardware via dovetailing?


Dreaming in the context of Bruno's remark means that the running of a
single program could result in alternate 1p realities being
constructed... not that multiple programs could be run in the UM. At
least, that's how I interpret it.

Dear Terren,

How does the running of a single program generate different content (in the sense that the program is equivalent to a virtual reality generator)

The notion of virtual reality generator is nonsensical with comp, although it can be approximated by lowering down the substitution level. Deutsch needs a physicalist revision of Church Thesis, which makes no sense once we assume comp.

unless it is a dovetailing of many programs? Is this how you get a many = one situation for programs? This makes no sense. AFAIK, 1 = 1, many = many. many =/= one. Or is my mathematical knowledge faulty?

This is unclear.

A bacteria is a universal machine in that it can potentially run any
program. However, bacteria as they appear to us run specific programs
(as selected by evolution). Their instantiation as such is a stable
measure relative to us - the shared 1p plural reality. Bacteria that
run programs capable of dreaming (as above), while possible, would
probably count as white rabbits.


Could you tell me this explanation in your own words, particularly what "the shared 1p plural reality" is. I truly do not comprehend this concept as you are using it here. How is 1p content sharable by a plurality of entities?

You need to duplicate population of machine. You need to make enter many candidate in the teleporting or duplicating devices. You can understand that they will share their first person indeterminacy. This is provided in QM by the tensorial structure of the quantum state(s). In comp, that tensor structure should be retrieved from the comp quantum logics.

AFAIK, any experiencial content that is "sharable" by a plurality is 3p,

Not at all. It looks like that, but it is first person plural. That's why physics is really reduced to epistemology. The quanta are particular case of qualia. The MWI confirms this, and save comp from solipsism.

in other worlds content that we all agree on as being "real" and having such and such properties is the definition of "objective reality".

Only with the Aristotelian theology, which is not compatible with comp. The physical objective reality is a sharable subjective experience.



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