On 2/29/2012 12:50 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/28/2012 9:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/28/2012 3:41 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux<allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.
What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
Disembodied consciousness is silly.
The implication of Comp is that there is no "you". "You" are an
abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world.
Just a question about the semantics. What difference is there
between a "you" and an abstraction that is indistinguishable from it?
The difference is that there isn't *a* "you", there are arbitrarily
many or at least there will be momentarily. The absraction is tracing
just one of these. This is already a consequence of MWI in which
quantum events cause "you" to split into orthogonal subspaces. To the
extent consciousness is realized by classical processes the splitting
only happens when the quantum events have classical level effects.
So we could say that the "you" is tied to a particular "world".
Would it be consistent to think of this notion of "realized by classical
processes" as an abstraction of the same kind, i.e. a tracing of
individual 1p content, each of which is generated by a potential
infinity of computations? I am trying to tease out the relation of
COMP's ontology picture with that of MWI.
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