On Feb 29, 5:03 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> the you > >> before is no more. > > > That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death. > > It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin > > who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I > > believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any > > pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience. > > Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie.
No, I believe in puppets. Don't you? > > > > >>> Disembodied consciousness is silly. > > >>> I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an > >>> environment... > > > Wait, so we actually agree on something? > > I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the > coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive, > though. I don't know that even physicists would say that matter is ontologically primitive these days, but comp goes a step further to say that matter is completely Turing emulable. > > > > >> without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not > >> something > >> about disembodiment. > > > Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams. > > By the MGA. > > > But how can the > > substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What > > binds the experience of the program to the silicon? > > The relative proportion of computation going through your state in > which silicon are observed. ? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
