On Feb 29, 5:03 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> the you
> >> before is no more.
> > That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.
> > It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin
> > who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I
> > believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any
> > pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience.
> Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie.
No, I believe in puppets. Don't you?
> >>> Disembodied consciousness is silly.
> >>> I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an
> >>> environment...
> > Wait, so we actually agree on something?
> I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the
> coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive,
I don't know that even physicists would say that matter is
ontologically primitive these days, but comp goes a step further to
say that matter is completely Turing emulable.
> >> without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not
> >> something
> >> about disembodiment.
> > Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams.
> By the MGA.
> > But how can the
> > substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What
> > binds the experience of the program to the silicon?
> The relative proportion of computation going through your state in
> which silicon are observed.
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