On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 29, 5:03 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:

the you
before is no more.

That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.
It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin
who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I
believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any
pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience.

Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie.

No, I believe in puppets. Don't you?

Sure. But the guy who comes back from the hospital does not look like a puppet to me, nor to you. And its has to be one, if yes-doctor = yes- death, as you argued. That puppet is by definition a zombie. Stathis has already made clear that point with you.

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an

Wait, so we actually agree on something?

I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the
coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive,

I don't know that even physicists would say that matter is
ontologically primitive these days, but comp goes a step further to
say that matter is completely Turing emulable.

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable.

without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not
about disembodiment.

Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams.

By the MGA.

But how can the
substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What
binds the experience of the program to the silicon?

The relative proportion of computation going through your state in
which silicon are observed.


By UDA step seven (in the case of comp + robust universe).

Tell me first if you get the sixth first steps, and I explain the seven one, if you are interested.



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