On 2/29/2012 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state.
Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution.

This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was not Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays.


This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire "universes" in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via digital uploading.
Dear Bruno,

Did you not see this last comment [SPK2] that I wrote? We need to distinguish between the actions on and by physical systems, such as human brains, and the "platonic" level systems. Your remark seemed to be one that was considering my comment [SPK1] as if it where discussing the Platonic level aspect. This is just probably a confusion caused by our use of the same words for the two completely different levels. For example, a physical system is a UTM if it can implement any enumerable recursive algorithm, aka is "programable" in the Turing Thesis sense, but its actual behavior is limited by its resources, transition speeds, etc. An abstract Platonic Machine, such as what you consider in SANE04, does not have any such limits. I think that we should consider a formal way to describe these relations. Perhaps some one that is fluent in Category theory will come to help us in these discussions. We need a way to define the idea of "the limit of the infinities of computations that go through a given consciousness state" in a way that is more clear given that "a given consciousness state" is still a very ambiguous notion.



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