On 2/29/2012 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:23, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/28/2012 10:46 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>
When we are dreaming we are in a higher level relative
emulation (all UMs can do that).
That's confusing. I find it hard to believe a bacteria can dream. The
UM implemented by a bacteria could *potentially* run any program, but
it is *actually* running the bacteria program. To suggest that
bacteria (e.g. one of the class of "all UMs") can dream by virtue of
being definable as a UM generates more confusion than clarity.
Put another way, if a particularly instantiated UM possesses the
ability to dream (to imagine), then that says something non-trivial
about the constitution of that UM's cognitive architecture.
If a bacterium is a physical system capable of implementing a
universal Turing machine aka the particular bacteria's program, then
Bruno's argument shows that it will necessarily be able to dream, for
what are dreams if not alternative TMs running on the same hardware
This does not follow. A bacteria is universal does not mean it has
been program to dovetail, or to make dream. Still less to know that
she can dream. Universal does not imply Löbianity, notably.
Is Löbianity required for bare consciousness, e.g. consciousness
without self-awareness? It seems to me that our entire discussion seems
to assume that consciousness is just the "inside aspect" of computation.
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