On 01 Mar 2012, at 14:49, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/1/2012 3:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Hello Stephen, On 29 Feb 2012, at 20:26, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/29/2012 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substitutedwith a program, that obviously imply comp (that we cansubstitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows thatto be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece ofmatter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinitiesof computation that goes through your consciousness currentstate.[SPK1]Can you see how this would be a problem for the entiredigital uploading argument if functional substitution cannotoccur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictlyclassical level measurement of brain structure? Any dependenceof consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any formof digital substitution.This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. levellower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantumsystem. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was notTuring emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' whocannot be aware of the delays.Bruno [SPK2]This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument -as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function orendomorphism of entire "universes" in the many-worlds sense -but would doom any change of immortality via digital uploading.Dear Bruno,Did you not see this last comment [SPK2] that I wrote? We needto distinguish between the actions on and by physical systems,such as human brains, and the "platonic" level systems.We certainly have to do that locally, when we say 'yes' to thedoctor, or when the doctor builds the artificial brain. But thereasoning leads to a conceptual distinction between the physicalsystems and the objects of Platonia.Roughly speaking, the objects in Platonia are specific numbers andnumbers relations, while physics is a relative sum on allcomputations going through my actual computational state. Thisfollows form step seven.Dear Bruno,In my thinking physics is a relative to mutual consistencies of1p, via bisimilations. Bisimulation is explained here.

`Unfortunately I don't understand. I told you at that time. You might`

`give examples. What does A and B denote? What is the relationship`

`between your notion of simulation, and the notion from computer science.`

Since bisimulation algebras are "telescoping" then they seem toinclude the intersection of 'infinite number of computations".

This is too much unclear.

Your remark seemed to be one that was considering my comment[SPK1] as if it where discussing the Platonic level aspect. Thisis just probably a confusion caused by our use of the same wordsfor the two completely different levels. For example, a physicalsystem is a UTM if it can implement any enumerable recursivealgorithm, aka is "programable" in the Turing Thesis sense, butits actual behavior is limited by its resources, transitionspeeds, etc.It is the difference between a UM, and a UM implemented in someother UM. When we implement a UM physically, we Implement a UM insome local subparts of the physical reality, which is itselfemerging from the sum on all UMs' computations going through mycurrent state.Note that the physical reality is not in Platonia. It is how theborder of Platonia looks to "me", taking into account the infinityof UMs and computations to which I "belong".I watched a You tube video last night on Aristotle's Metaphysicsand in it there was a comment on why Aristotle was skeptical ofPlato's Theory of Forms. My skepticism is very similar.One has to show how the Forms necessarily give rise to theappearances of physical worlds if we are to use Plato's theory ofontology. This is where and why I have trouble with UDA 8.

`You still don't get the point. My whole work is just a precise`

`formulation of "One has to show how the Forms necessarily give rise to`

`the appearances of physical worlds if we are to assume comp".`

`The work is negative. It does not explains much things, it shows that`

`if we are rational and willing to assume the comp hyp in the cognitive`

`science, then we can no more use anything found by the physicists to`

`explain anything else, including physics.`

`UDA shows that the only explanations possible have to rely on numbers`

`(or equivalent), and no more (than definitions). There is no choice in`

`the matter. It is a negative theorem showing that physics is`

`metaphysically wrong at the start, even if locally fertile and useful.`

`And I show that we can do that *only* by "interviewing universal self-`

`introspecting machines", and that this has to give the qualia and the`

`quanta, and an explanation why they look different. And on this, the`

`theory extracted from the introspective machine already works.`

`Comp is cute, because it is simple, already believed by the`

`rationalist, and it explains the origin of the three gods, and the`

`fall of soul, and the apparition of the two matters (intelligible and`

`sensible), but it does not explains time, space, particles, energy,`

`boson-fermions, etc. The math is hard. But that was not the goal. The`

`goal was to show that comp makes physics and theology a branch of`

`arithmetic. Elementary arithmetic is shown to be a theory of`

`everything, necessarily. Church thesis rehabilitates Pythagorus, and`

`UDA justifies the origin of the appearance of the physical laws. What`

`needs to be done is to compare those physical laws with the one we`

`infer from observation, and with some luck we refute comp.`

`Before I interviewed the machine, I said that it might take a billions`

`years before we get an hint how the numbers generates the relevant`

`dreams for getting physics. So the quantization in the Z1* and X1*`

`(and S4Grz1) comes as a surprise, and people makes me write a PhD`

`thesis, in math, on that. But this gives only the logic of`

`observability, which is still a long way from deriving a physical`

`notion, although it is an important non trivial first (tiny) step.`

`My goal was just to convince scientists that the mind-body problem can`

`be tackled with the scientific method. Nobody should be astonished`

`that it leads to difficult math, nor that it contradicts our`

`philosophical prejudices.`

`This does not show that there is any wrong propositions in physics,`

`just that those propositions must be justifiable from arithmetic, once`

`we do the comp hypothesis. It might be seen as radical, because it`

`made physics into an emerging pattern, but it is very modest. It is`

`just a precise recall that the mind-body problem is not solved.`

An abstract Platonic Machine, such as what you consider in SANE04,does not have any such limits.I am not sure which one you are talking about.Platonic "machines" do not have any limits except those of thelogic that they are defined in.

`Machines does not have logic, a priori. They can use some logic or`

`some other logic. And if you agree that boolean logic applies on`

`numbers and machines, then you can use logic to prove facts about`

`machines, and some of them can do that too.`

This is not a problem until we notice that there is not any a priorireason why one form of logic is chosen over another.

In which logic are you asserting this proposition?

`It does not makes sense for me. In science everyone use some *portion*`

`of classical logic.`

Given that the models of Arithmetic are many and not just one, weneed to be a bit careful that we are not being parochial in ourthinking that the logic we are using is "absolute" to theminimization of all others.

`Gödel's completeness theorem makes ALL theorems in logic and`

`elementary arithmetic true in all models of arithmetic.`

`Some models are non standard, and contained very weird infinite`

`numbers, and weird propositions, but I am not interested in those non`

`standard constructs. Those non standard constructs exist for ALL first`

`order theory. Löbian machine avoids them by using second order axioms,`

`if and when they need them. You make things complex without providing`

`the motivation.`

My contention is that we have a natural prejudice for Integer basedarithmetic and bivalent logic because those are the one that bestmatch the way our explanations of our physical world work.

Explanations in which logic.

Umm, my wording here is a bit ambiguous, but I hope the idea istransmitted OK..

`Comp explains from the numbers that numbers are confronted to many`

`different logics. To each epistemic notion (which includes now matter)`

`comp gives the corresponding logic (quantum logic for qualia and`

`quanta, intuitionist logic for the 1p view of the 1p, etc.)`

`With comp there is an explanation why machines develop a lot of non`

`classical logics, which corresponds to the different machine x-person`

`povs.`

I think that we should consider a formal way to describe theserelations. Perhaps some one that is fluent in Category theory willcome to help us in these discussions.I have used category theory in "Conscience et mécanisme", but ithelps only for the semantics of the 1-person (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X1*).It is also very distracting. It is better to understand well theproblem before musing on the tools which can solve them. Theproblem *is* a problem in computer science, which has already goodtools.Yes, but the tools that one uses can enhance consideration ofsome properties but occult others. As I am thinking, we have to holdthe concrete and abstract aspect of Existence on the same level andto hold one as more primitive than the other leads only to problems.This has been my complain of your result all along.

`Then you might just abandon the idea that comp is correct. But I don't`

`see where your complain comes from, unless you get a mystical`

`experience where God told you that primitive matter exists.`

`Nobody has ever see primitive matter. It is a metaphysical assumption`

`introduced in science by Aristotle. It is not used by physicists,`

`which have content themselves with extrapolation on number relations.`

`It should be a problem only for those who believe in some religious`

`way in some primitive matter. It should annoy only the metaphysical`

`materialists, like some Marxists perhaps, and the catholics who have`

`reintroduced matter to justify the identity Bread = Christ's body.`

`It is used by animals, including us, in the everyday life as a`

`preprogrammed manner to avoid metaphysical vertigo, which can be an`

`impediment in front of preys and predators. We don't have to make it`

`into a law.`

`I have no clue of what is the problem you have with the result. Why`

`don't you abandon mechanism, if you find its consequences so much non`

`swallowable.`

`Or you might search for a flaw. Who knows, perhaps there is one. But`

`then you should try to put your finger on it, because you will never`

`invalidate a reasoning by criticizing the semantics of the assumptions`

`from philosophical grounds. By definition, and construction, a`

`reasoning does not depend on the interpretation of its premise. That's`

`the whole point of doing logic.`

We need a way to define the idea of "the limit of the infinitiesof computations that go through a given consciousness state" in away that is more clear given that "a given consciousness state" isstill a very ambiguous notion.We can bet that some equivalence relation is at play, like allsimilar 1p in non-diverging computations, yes. But this isnecessarily a non constructive notion, and that is why it issimpler to start with the logic of measure 'one' extracteddirectly from the modalities of self-reference.Why does it have to be "non-constructive"?

`In computer science, the general question if program x and y compute`

`the same function is provably insoluble.`

`I don't want to dig into the details now, but in computer science all`

`interesting notions are non constructive, especially in theoretical`

`artificial intelligence.`

This seems to be a treachery or hand waving way to not address theproblem that I am pointing out!

`No, it is a theorem. We have to live with that, forever. It is like`

`the irrationality of sqrt(5).`

In the bisimulation algebra that I mentioned above we see that thereis some properties that disallow closure but this does not mean thatmeasures have to be non-constructive.

`If that is true, it means that you are no more working in the comp`

`theory, but in some non-comp theory.`

It just means that because there is no absolute measure on all thepossibilities that only local and relative measures obtain. Thisreasoning only happens when we consider Aristotle's criticism ofPlato's theory.

You make invraisemblable jumps.

it seems that in your haste to reject Aristotle you have missedthis. :-(

`Note that I do appreciate Aristotle a lot, for having the courage and`

`ingenuity to make scientific (refutable) physics, biology and`

`theology. The fact that all those have been refuted just confirms how`

`serious the guy was, including in theology. He was the creator of`

`logic, independently of Indians and Chineses.`

`And I agree with some Platonist scholars that he was a platonist, even`

`if its metaphysics appears to be incoherent with it, when we add comp`

`or Pythagorus.`

Is Löbianity required for bare consciousness, e.g.consciousness without self-awareness? It seems to me that ourentire discussion seems to assume that consciousness is just the"inside aspect" of computation.I have come to be open to the idea that bare consciousness needsonly one UM, or even less. Löbianity is required for self-consciousness, and for the machine able to reason on all this,making the interview enough rich to extract physics.OK, we agree there.

You accept the idea that all computers are conscious?

`I don't use this in UDA, and it seems to me a rather radical`

`position. I have been made open to this when swim (not me!) smoked`

`Salvia divinorum, where we can be completely amnesic, no more feeling`

`anything, nor even the time passing, literally, or the space proprio-`

`perception, and yet be fully conscious. Without time, neither`

`objective nor subjective, no space, nor anything at all. Swim might`

`have been temporarily reduced to the abstract virgin UM. But this,`

`unlike UDA, is very speculative.`

But Löbianity is basically given once the machine believes in the(arithmetical) induction axioms. All chatting UMs obeys to Gödel'ssecond incompleteness theorem, but only the Löbian "knows that",that is, they can prove their own incompleteness theorem.Yes, but we have to be more explicit as to how this "chatting"can occur.

`Not at all. This is trivial in the comp theory. It occurs because of`

`the laws of addition and multiplication. The UD emulates all possible`

`interactions between programs.`

`The only real problem, which I try only to formulate, is the relative`

`measure problem justifying why the "physical hallucination" is`

`persistent. The hypostases constitute a tiny beginning of a solution`

`on a very long path. The result is mainly the formlaution of the`

`problem, and the fact methodology to find the solution, preserving the`

`qualia and quanta distinction.`

This is where the concurrency issue is important and must beaddressed.

`It can be addressed, because it is quite interesting. I mentioned to`

`you the work by Abramski, Girard, the dagger categories, etc. This is`

`very convincing, logically, technically, and its shed light on both`

`classical and quantum computation. I might have been able to say more`

`with the combinators, and the Curry Howard isomorphism I have talkd`

`about, some times ago. But it is qucikly very technical.`

`Now, such works is still physics in the pre-comp sense. They cannot by`

`that method extract the qualia, and the quanta are still justified in`

`a non-comp way. They are just not addressing the mind-body problem.`

`Girard seems aware that his move is necessitate by incompleteness, but`

`then I show that it has to be derived from incompleteness (in the comp`

`frame).`

I argue that when we take the abstract COMP and physical worlds asbeing on the same level

This is meaningless. COMP is a theory. Physical worlds are objects.

but neither as ontologically primitive,

This looks like the neutral comp monist consequence.

we can easily solve the concurrency problem. This is what Prattshowed in his papers.

`I will not come back on what I have already explained to you. Pratt is`

`not aware of the very peculiar form that the mind-body problem get`

`once we postulate comp. It is interesting algebra, and perhaps someone`

`will use Pratt's insight to progress, but that is the more I can say.`

We also solve the problem of the "motivation" of Plato's Forms byusing Bertrand Russell's idea of a neutral monism that becomesobvious in the limit of the vanishing of the duality between theabstract and the concrete. Just as how our physical world vanishesinto a singularity as we wind the clock backwards, the same occursin this ontology that I am discussing.

`Well actually, between us, I have never believed in the big bang`

`theory, with or without comp. I doubt that the big bang is the origin`

`of the physical universe. I think it is just a big explosion among many.`

Anyway, I cannot use physics.

The entire discussion use only the invariance of consciousness fora set of transformation, in UDA, and from the classical theory ofknowledge and observation in AUDA. You can approximateconsciousness by an unconscious bet in self-consistency. To beconscious is only to be in a state of believing in some reality.Yes, but for the belief to be "true" it must have some concreteexpression that is robust.

Too vague.

Only physical worlds have that feature,

`You beg the question. If you grasp comp, you grasp that we have no`

`clue of what is a physical universe, except as an hallucination by`

`machines, made persistent by having relevant relative proportions.`

`In fact a physical universe becomes a very abstract notion. It looks`

`concrete to us, because billions of neurons and glials cells makes us`

`believe it like that, for the struggle of life purpose.`

it provides an "objective" standard for "true statements" thatotherwise would be completely contingent.

`I might accept this for arithmetic. Not physics, at least not in the`

`fundamental studies. Provably so, once we work in comp (that's the`

`point).`

Concreteness in comp is just complex indexical abstraction.

This is a subtle philosophical point that I may need to explainfurther.

`I am not so much for doing philosophy. It is even confusing in the`

`context of working on a "philosophical problem" with the scientific`

`method.`

`Sometimes I get the feeling that you illustrate that philosophy just`

`slow down science, like (pseudo) theology, which I think is partially`

`true (but globally false, science has its feet in philosophy).`

So White Rabbits would be the abstract equivalent of a BoltzmannBrain?White rabbits are perception by people on aberrant computationsexecuted by the (concrete in step 7, abstract after step 8) UD.Boltzmann brains are physical UMs appearing in physical universe.The UD can be said to generalize them through the arbitrarycomputations in arithmetic.So White Rabbits are the "hallucinations" that computations canhave? I thought that White Rabbits where content of computationsthat where inconsistencies or random noise....

`... from the 1p machine views. They are experienced. They are`

`experiences belonging to the 1p-indeterminacy problem when you are "in`

`front" of the UD (concrete or abstract, depending of the UDA steps you`

`grasp). The measure problem is equivalent with hunting the White`

`Rabbits away. I have used the notion of 1-white rabbits, to make`

`precise that it is not the type of quantum white rabbit, in some`

`context. I have talked about the aberrant dreams, that the UD cannot`

`not introduce in the personal indeterminacies of the machines.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.