On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes
not completely Turing emulable.
But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who
proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter)
with a Turing emulation of it?
The doctor does not need to emulate the "matter" of my brain. This is
completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing
simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain.
Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more
fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.
OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because
there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level
reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.
The way I understand it, yes, it should be simulable for certain bounds,
but never globally emulable - this in a twofold way: one in that the
local 3p structure that we infer might contain reals in the limit (or
rationals, computable reals) and another in that we can't know of all
valid 1p continuations some of which could be outside the local 3p
structure we estimated by induction. To elaborate in the first: consider
a mathematical structure which has some symmetries and can be computed
up to some level of detail k, but you can also compute it to a finer
level of detail k+1, and to a finer level 2*k, ... and so on. Eventually
in the limit, you get "reals". We only care that the abstract structure
that we call a mind is implemented in our bodies/brains which are
implemented in some physical or arithmetical or computational substrate.
Such implementations being statistically common (for example in a
quantum dovetailer) make local future continuations probable. Of course,
unusual continuations are possible and we cannot find them all due to
Rice's theorem - we cannot know if some computation also happens to
implement the structure/computations that represent our mind - we might
be able to prove it in some specific case, but not in all cases.
But I'm still unclear on what constitutes "my current states". Why is
there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that
constitutes a single state of consciousness?
Even in the trivial case where we're given a particular physics
implementation, we can find another which behaves exactly the same and
still implements the same function (this is trivial because it's always
possible to add useless or equivalent code to a program). However, for
our minds we can allow for a lot more variability - I conjecture that
most quantum randomness is below our substitution level and it
faithfully implements our mind at the higher level (quasi-classically,
at subst. level). Of course, there are some problems here - there can be
continuations where we will think we are still 'ourselves', but our mind
has been changed by stuff going below the substitution level - in which
case, the notion of observer is too fuzzy and personal (when will we
think we are not "ourselves" anymore? when will others think we are not
"ourselves"?)
A single computation can be implemented by an infinity of other
computations, thus with COMP, an infinity of programs will all have the
same subjective experience (some specific class which implements the
observer).
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
