On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:## Advertising

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable.But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it?The doctor does not need to emulate the "matter" of my brain. This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.The way I understand it, yes, it should be simulable for certain bounds, but neverglobally emulable - this in a twofold way: one in that the local 3p structure that weinfer might contain reals in the limit (or rationals, computable reals) and another inthat we can't know of all valid 1p continuations some of which could be outside thelocal 3p structure we estimated by induction. To elaborate in the first: consider amathematical structure which has some symmetries and can be computed up to some level ofdetail k, but you can also compute it to a finer level of detail k+1, and to a finerlevel 2*k, ... and so on. Eventually in the limit, you get "reals". We only care thatthe abstract structure that we call a mind is implemented in our bodies/brains which areimplemented in some physical or arithmetical or computational substrate. Suchimplementations being statistically common (for example in a quantum dovetailer) makelocal future continuations probable. Of course, unusual continuations are possible andwe cannot find them all due to Rice's theorem - we cannot know if some computation alsohappens to implement the structure/computations that represent our mind - we might beable to prove it in some specific case, but not in all cases.But I'm still unclear on what constitutes "my current states". Why is there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of consciousness?Even in the trivial case where we're given a particular physics implementation, we canfind another which behaves exactly the same and still implements the same function (thisis trivial because it's always possible to add useless or equivalent code to a program).However, for our minds we can allow for a lot more variability - I conjecture that mostquantum randomness is below our substitution level and it faithfully implements our mindat the higher level (quasi-classically, at subst. level).

`Yes, I think that must be the case simply from considerations of biological evolution.`

`But that implies that a "state of consciousness" or a "state of mind" is a computationally`

`fuzzy object. It is constituted by uncountably many threads through each of many`

`(infinitely many?) states which are not identical but are similar enough to constitute a`

`"conscious state". But the 1p view of this is to be conscious *of something*, which you`

`describe as the "computation seen from the inside". What is it about these threads`

`through different states that makes them an equivalence class with respect to the`

`"computation seen from the inside"?`

Brent

Of course, there are some problems here - there can be continuations where we will thinkwe are still 'ourselves', but our mind has been changed by stuff going below thesubstitution level - in which case, the notion of observer is too fuzzy and personal(when will we think we are not "ourselves" anymore? when will others think we are not"ourselves"?)A single computation can be implemented by an infinity of other computations, thus withCOMP, an infinity of programs will all have the same subjective experience (somespecific class which implements the observer).Brent

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