On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical
processes not completely Turing emulable.
But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor
who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made
of matter) with a Turing emulation of it?
The doctor does not need to emulate the "matter" of my brain.
This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently)
Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of
my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy
on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states
in arithmetic/UD.
OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable
because there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained
level reaching your current state. But it is
simulable to an arbitrary degree.
If you can prove that.
I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to
emulate bigger and bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are
only defined in the limit, being unaware of the UD-delays. Not
obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable sense. Hmm...
Interesting question.
I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your
decimals, of your prediction might take a very long time
to stabilize. I dunno.
But I'm still unclear on what constitutes "my current states".
Why is there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations
that constitutes a single state of consciousness?
If you say "yes" to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily
accurate, the "current state" is the encoding of the "universal
number + data" that he got from the scanning. Basically, it is what
is sent through the teleportation.
From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is "you <here
and now>" at the moment of the scanning (done very quickly
for the sake of the argument).
There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant
decoding, are generated infinitely often in the UD*, with different
continuations, leading to your current self-indeterminacy. It is
the subjective same you, like the people in W and M before they
open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation.
Oops, I see that I wrote "my current states", with a "s". So it
means I was talking about the 3p computational states in the UD*
corresponding on my (unique) current consciousness state. That
exists, in the comp theory.
Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.
Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your
theory. But then I am not clear on the relation of this unique
"current state" to the many non-equivalent states at a lower, e.g.
quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical level. Is
the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states?
Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy.
Usually I invoke the rule Y = II. That is, two equivalent
computations (equivalent in the sense that it leads to the same
conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at some
point, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM,
there is a need for possible distinction in principle.
Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication,
starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in
two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the probability,
asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2.
My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the
two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2,
but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is 1/2. But I
am not sure of this. What do you think?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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