On 3/2/2012 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes notcompletely Turing emulable.But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes toreplace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulationof it?The doctor does not need to emulate the "matter" of my brain. This is completely notTuring *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable atsome digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1pindeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states inarithmetic/UD.OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there areinfinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state.But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.If you can prove that.I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to emulate bigger andbigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are only defined in the limit, beingunaware of the UD-delays. Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractablesense. Hmm... Interesting question.I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your decimals, of yourprediction might take a very long time to stabilize. I dunno.But I'm still unclear on what constitutes "my current states". Why is there morethan one? Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state ofconsciousness?If you say "yes" to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily accurate, the "currentstate" is the encoding of the "universal number + data" that he got from the scanning.Basically, it is what is sent through the teleportation.From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is "you <here and now>" at themoment of the scanning (done very quickly for the sake of the argument).There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant decoding, are generatedinfinitely often in the UD*, with different continuations, leading to your currentself-indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people in W and M beforethey open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation.Oops, I see that I wrote "my current states", with a "s". So it means I was talkingabout the 3p computational states in the UD* corresponding on my (unique) currentconsciousness state. That exists, in the comp theory.Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your theory. But then I amnot clear on the relation of this unique "current state" to the many non-equivalentstates at a lower, e.g. quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classicallevel. Is the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states?Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy. Usually I invoke therule Y = II. That is, two equivalent computations (equivalent in the sense that itleads to the same conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at somepoint, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM, there is a need forpossible distinction in principle.Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting from Helsinki,but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, in exactly the sameenvironment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3or to 1/2.My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two computations inW are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, thenthe probability is 1/2. But I am not sure of this. What do you think?

`I think there's a typo and the second 1/2 was intended to be 2/3. I wonder though why we`

`should consider an hypothesis like "in exactly the same environment" (to the quantum`

`level?) which is nomologically impossible.`

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