On 3/2/2012 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not
completely Turing emulable.
But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to
replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation
The doctor does not need to emulate the "matter" of my brain. This is completely not
Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at
some digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p
indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in
OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are
infinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state.
But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.
If you can prove that.
I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to emulate bigger and
bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are only defined in the limit, being
unaware of the UD-delays. Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable
sense. Hmm... Interesting question.
I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your decimals, of your
prediction might take a very long time to stabilize. I dunno.
But I'm still unclear on what constitutes "my current states". Why is there more
than one? Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of
If you say "yes" to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily accurate, the "current
state" is the encoding of the "universal number + data" that he got from the scanning.
Basically, it is what is sent through the teleportation.
From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is "you <here and now>" at the
moment of the scanning (done very quickly for the sake of the argument).
There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant decoding, are generated
infinitely often in the UD*, with different continuations, leading to your current
self-indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people in W and M before
they open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation.
Oops, I see that I wrote "my current states", with a "s". So it means I was talking
about the 3p computational states in the UD* corresponding on my (unique) current
consciousness state. That exists, in the comp theory.
Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.
Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your theory. But then I am
not clear on the relation of this unique "current state" to the many non-equivalent
states at a lower, e.g. quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical
level. Is the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states?
Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy. Usually I invoke the
rule Y = II. That is, two equivalent computations (equivalent in the sense that it
leads to the same conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at some
point, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM, there is a need for
possible distinction in principle.
Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting from Helsinki,
but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, in exactly the same
environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3
or to 1/2.
My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two computations in
W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then
the probability is 1/2. But I am not sure of this. What do you think?
I think there's a typo and the second 1/2 was intended to be 2/3. I wonder though why we
should consider an hypothesis like "in exactly the same environment" (to the quantum
level?) which is nomologically impossible.
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