# Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

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On 05 Mar 2012, at 22:30, John Clark wrote:```
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```On Mon, Mar 5, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

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>> What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from Moscow turning him into the Moscow man? 100%.
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>That's ambiguous.

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There is nothing ambiguous about it! Granted this thought experiment is odd but everything is crystal clear. According to the thought experiment you have been teleported to Moscow which means you will now be receiving sights and sounds and smells and tastes and feeling textures from Moscow instead of Helsinki. I say the probability of that happening is 100%, how can I tell if my prediction is correct? If after the experiment I can find something that says he is Bruno Marchal and that he feels like he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow then my prediction has been confirmed as being correct.
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So it is not ambiguous because you take for granted that we were talking on the 1p, from your outsider perspective.
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So you are still talking about the 3-view on the 1-view. In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other city? You told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance. He will tell you that you were wrong.
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After the experiment I CAN find such a thing so my prediction was correct. The fact that there is also a Bruno Marchal in Washington is irrelevant, it does not reduce the feeling that Bruno Marchal has that he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow by even a infinitesimal amount.
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Well, if you don't listen to the BM in W, then you are right, but why would you not listen to him?
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> If you say 100%, it means that you are talking on the first person that you can attribute to different people.
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Of course the first person can be attributed to different people because according to the thought experiment *YOU* have been duplicated, let me repeat that, YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Although perfectly logical that is certainly a unusual situation, I've never been duplicated before and you probably haven't either, so it shouldn't be surprising that the results of such a unusual situation are odd, not illogical not self contradictory just odd.
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Assuming comp, we can say that we practice duplication, and even more complex self-transformation; since the time of the first amoeba. It is not unusual.
```If QM is true, we are multiplied (or differentiated) all the times.

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> we get a paradox if you say that it is 100% for both Moscow and Washington.
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There is not the slightest thing paradoxical about it, in fact if I had said anything else then that WOULD have been paradoxical. Why? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, that means your first person perspective has been duplicated and will remain identical until differing environmental factors cause the two of YOU to diverge; and even then they would both be Bruno Marchal they just wouldn't be each other.
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Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has been duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1-view perspective has not been duplicated. Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split. You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can attribute to each reconstituted person.
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>> What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from neither Washington nor Moscow and thus leaving him as the Helsinki man? 100%.
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> In the protocol considered the Helsinki guy is annihilated.

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Fine, if that's the thought experiment then the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from either Washington or Moscow is 100% so the probability he will remain the Helsinki man is 0%. Annihilate or don't, either way the results are deterministic.
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From the 3-view perspective. Not from the 1-view of the participants. In Helsinki he does not know where he will feel to be after pushing the reading/annihilating button. And after the experience the one in W cannot know why he is the one in W, and the same for the guy in M. This is even clearer with the iteration of that experience, where most person write long strings of W and M in their diary, like WWWMWMMWWMMMMMMWMWMMWWMWW, and are unable to find any algorithm justifying that past which looks random to them.
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>> What is the probability the Helsinki man will feel like the Moscow man? 0% because if he felt like the Moscow man he wouldn't be the Helsinki man anymore.
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> In that case, the probability to survive, in the usual clinical sense, a teleportation experience is 0
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But "the usual clinical sense" is totally useless in this case because this case is about as far from "usual" as you can get and still remain logical. Why do I say that? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
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Nothing unusual, with comp we do that all the time since the first amoeba (and before, to be sure), with just less clear protocol. With QM, we do that all the time too. And the usual clinical sense is completely transparent, for a computationalist, which has no problem with duplication. It just makes some future experiences not predictable, but with a simple explanation (unlike QM-with collapse, which makes unpredictability completely magical and non physical (and non mechanical).
```You are introducing a difficulty which is not there.

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>> What is the probability that a third party in all this will see a person in Helsinki and Washington and Moscow with all 3 having a exactly equal right to call themselves John K Clark? 100%.
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> The guy in Helsinki is annihilated

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Then 2 have a exactly equal right to call themselves John K Clark, and although "annihilated" the guy in Helsinki didn't die because dying means having a last thought and he didn't have one, he continued to feel sensations only now they originated in Moscow and Washington not Helsinki.
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Yes. But the one in W cannot explains why he is the one in W. That was not an a priori certainty, as the guy in M can confirmed.
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> You have avoided the question, asked in Helsinki to you: "where can you expect to be from a personal, first person point of view, after the duplication is done?".
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I have not avoided the question at all, the answer is that the one and only one place you will feel to be after the experiment is Moscow and Washington and there is nothing paradoxical about that.
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This is plainly false. I will not FEEL to be in M and W. I will feel to be in M or W. I know by comp that I will survive, and that all my reconstitution will feel to be in one place. Only an outsider can project a consciousness of being me in both place, but neither the W- guy and the m-guy can do that. You are doing the same confusion between the 1-view from the 1-pov, and the 1-view that an outsider can ascribe to the two persons.
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I think your difficulty is that when you blithely say you have been duplicated you don't really understand that it means YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
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> You cannot answer in W and in M, because you will not write, after the experience, in your diary "I feel to be W and I feel to be in M"
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In Washington you will write in your diary "I feel like I am in Washington and only in Washington" and in Moscow you will write in your diary "I feel like I am in Moscow and only in Moscow" because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
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Idem. In fact my body has been duplicated, and for an outsider my 1- view have been duplicated, but the Nagel-Everett subjective view on the 1-view are not.
```You confuse 3p discourses on 1-views with 1-p discourse on its 1-view.
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(Note that in the modal logic of self-reference G, we can refine that analysis a lot).
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> something akin to that first person indeterminacy is used implicitly in the QM
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The two are not even close. Quantum Mechanical indeterminacy is real and can be measured experimentally, "first person indeterminacy" not only can't be measured nobody can even clearly express exactly what it is that is supposed to be indeterminate.
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The quantum indeterminacy is under an ongoing since the beginning of QM.
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It is just a bit clearer in QM-without collapse, because in that case, it is arguably a form of comp-indeterminacy, but then we have to justify the wave itself from it.
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> Consider a giant screen composed of 16180 x 10000 black and white pixels. There are 2^(16180 x 10000) possible images that can be done on that screen. OK? Now, here is the self-multiplying protocol. I multiply you in 2^(16180 x 10000) exemplar, in front of each of the possible screen image ...... and I iterate that experience, meaning that I re-multiply all the resulting persons again by 2^(16180 x 10000), putting them again in front of each possible screen, and this 24 times per second, during 1h30 hours (= 90 minutes). You can see that the number of people getting out of the lab will be 2^[(16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24], given that the candidate is multiplied 24 times per second, and that there is (60 x 90) seconds in 1h30. OK? Again the question is asked to the guy (you) before the experiment begin. What question? This one: what experience do you expect to live.
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As the number of John K Clark's is now equal to the number of ways a screen of that size changing 24 times a second can produce in 90 minutes I would expect that John K Clark would see every 90 minute 16180 x 10000 black and white videos that is possible to exist. To prove me wrong just produce a video that John K Clark has not seen, but there is no such video.
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None of the John K Clark going out of the movie-lab-room will agree with you. They all said, obviously with comp, that they have seen only one movie, from their 1-pov (as we were asking), and that they only know "intellectually", in a 3p sense that the other John K Clark have seen different movie.
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It seems to me pretty obvious.

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> If you want, I can still make everything 3p in that question, in the following manner. I make a genuine sample of 1000 persons among the 2^[(16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24] resulting persons, by selecting them with a random coin, or whatever choice reasonable enough for not biasing the statistics. I ask them the same question, including "did you expect to see the movie you did see?".
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Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can show.
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But that John Clark has seen a documentary on Asphalt, and not the Monty Python Flying Circus. He can understand now what the 1- indeterminacy is all about, because the question was which movie will you feel to see (not known intellectually to be seen by all your fellows), and he can answer "I did not expect to feel personally to feel that particular movie". OK? You have just to understand that the question bears on the future personal feeling from the 1-pov, not the 3p view on all possible experience. You systematically confuse them, despite your prose shows clearly that you see the difference, but you don't take it into account, and I don't see why.
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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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