On 06 Mar 2012, at 19:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/6/2012 12:52 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Mar 2012, at 17:53, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/6/2012 5:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

That specific retrodiction came from Bruno's hypothesis which is that universes are generated by computation. What is computable is much less than all mathematics.

This is not my hypothesis. It might be Fredkin or Schmidhuber hypothesis, but not mine. My hypothesis is the hypothesis that "I am a machine", which is ambiguous, so I put it in the form of "yes doctor", which means that there exist a level such that my consciousness remains unchanged for a digital functional substitution done at that level.

And then the reasoning shows that the physical universe(s), are not generated by any computation. Computations generated my consciousness, and the physical universe is what my consciousness can predict from the mixing of determinacy and 1- indterminacy in the UD* (or sigma_1 part of arithmetic).

If I had written universes are indirectly generated by computation, would that have reflected your view?

But the presence of the word "generated" might still lead to confusion in this setting. Universe(s) are only observed, It is, or they are the 'natural solution' of the comp diophantine measure problem, which bear on the first person.

The only catch I see is that you wrote "can predict" instead of "must predict". Are you allowing for some agency here? m
I allow for agency, but not at that level. Indeed Matter, but matter only, is what the mind cannot act on. But the mind can act on the mind, and agency emerges at higher levels.

Dear Bruno,

Why does it seem that you are tacitly accepting the definition of matter as a "substance" as Descartes did in his substance dualism?

I precisely don't do that. That's when I use the word "primitive matter" for the aristotelian conception of matter, which is more primary than substantial, but is still primary.

If matter is an appearance (and not a substance), does this not allow a form of "mind acting on matter"?

In a large sense of that expression.

One only need to consider that the selection process whereby the "next" state in time of a configuration of matter is done by a computation.

This does not really work. matter is a question of observable, by machine, and the way you talk leads to the digital physics confusion, with the idea that matter is generated by programs, when matter is seen by programs, due to the first person indeterminacy, which bears on infinities of computations, not just one. They might be a winner program, but that's an open problem in the comp theory.

A real example of this idea is implemented in the generation of MMORPG games that are very popular. Consider the Bostrom-like question: Since we cannot prove that our physical reality is not a MMORPG virtual world, should we not bet that it actually is?


Comp precisely entails that we are in infinities of "video games". So we can test if we are at the level zero, or if we are simulated, just by comparing the physics hen being infinity of games, which is unique and well defined (the Z and X logics, and their higher order extension) with what we observe.

One test for this question is to consider the upper bounds on the ability to detect differences in features at smaller and smaller scales. If, for example, space-time is "granular" then this would almost certainly prove that our physical world is isomorphic to a MMORPG.

The contrary. Comp a priori makes matter into a continuum. You confuse, like many, comp and digital physics.

This idea would be compatible with COMP if we can identify the "players of the MMORPG" with the individual Löbian machines. Given that some very resent observations of ultra-high energy gamma photons indicate that space-time is not granular, we need a more sophisticated theory to get the idea to work.

Not at all. Comp implies high plausibility of the existence of a physical continuum, given that physics becomes an infinite sum of infinite computations, including infinite dovetailing on infinities of fields, including the reals. You are not yet taking into account the role of the first person indeterminacy in the translation of the comp body problem into a measure problem on the whole UD*, I think.

No. The reason why "my consciousness" can predict, as opposed to "must predict", is the first person indeterminacy. It is the fact that I cannot know which machine I am, nor which computations executes the relevant states.

We can have partial information set, like, assuming bla-bla-bla, if I am duplicate in {W, M}, I will feel to be in M or in W. That is disjuncts. But by UDA-(step 8 included), I have to say at each instant I will be in u1, u2, u3, u4, ... that is the infinite sequence of programs generating my current state. They all compete in the measure, and "we" can only see the result of that from inside. Here the 1p and its invariance for the delays explains that such "results" never appear in the UD, but is on the border of UD*.

Does not first person indeterminacy also occur in any kind of displacement of relative position, no matter how small that displacement might be? But we have to consider more than one kind of change. We have to consider relative changes for all possible observables such that the canonical conjugate rule is preserved.

We don't have yet any notion of position, so your problem is not yet formalizable in the comp frame. It is premature.



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