On Tue, Mar 6, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other city? You
> told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance. He will tell you
> that you were wrong.

I was not wrong. When discussing the nature of identity care must be taken
when using personal pronouns or confusion will run riot; I did not tell
"him" that "he" will find "himself" in Moscow with a 100% chance, I said
there is a 100% chance Bruno Marchal will be in Moscow and events proved I
was 100% correct. The fact that Bruno Marchal is in Washington and knows
nothing about Moscow is irrelevant and makes no difference to Bruno in
Moscow whatsoever. Why do I say this? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.

> Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has been
> duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1-view
> perspective has not been duplicated.

Then when I said "you have been duplicated" there is something very
important about "you", the most important part in fact, that is missing
because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated. What can it be,
what is lacking in the copy that the original has? let's think, it can't be
information because that can certainly be duplicated and it can't be matter
because atoms are generic and we constantly replace our atoms with new ones
anyway; so I think we both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm
not yet ready to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace

I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are
a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and
you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room, thus
the two of you are receiving identical sensory input and thus act
identically. I now use a Star Trek brand transporter to instantly exchange
your position with the original, or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone
and just exchange the two brains. There is no way subjectively you or the
original Bruno Marchal would notice that anything had happened, and
objective outside observers would not notice anything had happened either.
There would not even be a way to tell if the machine was actually working,
I could even be lying about having a transporter. Who knows who cares?

Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there
was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things
would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they
would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and
objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't
sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very
reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there
are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one
intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view.

> Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split.

It's against my better judgment but I know you like the word so yes,
subjectively you do not feel a Everett style split, but God sees it; but in
my example above if the 2 are really identical and if the exchange is
really instantaneous then even God Himself doesn't know (or care) if things
really got swapped or not.

> You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which
> the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can
> attribute to each reconstituted person.

And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus "the
1-view from its own perspective" is no longer singular but has become

 >In Helsinki he does not know where he will feel to be after pushing the
> reading/annihilating button.

So after pushing the button the Helsinki man knows his sensory information
will no longer come from Helsinki, fine I have no trouble with that, and
for the sake of argument let's say that after he pushes that button the
Helsinki man does not know if his external stimuli will now come from
Washington or Moscow (he does know of course, he always knows but never
mind). And now what? There are after all lots of things about our
environment we can't predict so even if what you say were true (it's not)
how can you derive any profound philosophical insight from this trivial
mundane observation?

> Let us take again the "multiplication-movie" experience. But instead of
> multiplying only John Clark, into the 2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24,
> we have to multiply the couple [John Clark + a banker], and John, at the
> start, when still unique, is asked to choose the between the following bet:
> "I bet a billion$ that I will see the movie "Monty Python Flying circus" "
> or "I bet a billion$ that I will see white noise." The bet is done with the
> banker, which is multiplied together with John. (it is the comp first
> person plural case).

You should rephrase that without using so many personal pronouns because as
stated it isn't clear who gets the money if the bet is won. If John K Clark
thought the banker really had enough money to pay off a colossal losing
bet, that is to say if the banker had 2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24 x
(a billion dollars) then the following bet would be instantly accepted: "if
John K Clark sees Monty Python Flying circus then John K Clark will receive
one billion dollars" and I (personal pronoun is OK in this case) would know
with certainty that in just 90 minutes I (personal pronoun also OK in this
case) would be very rich. On the other hand if the bet was "only the fellow
who saw Monty Python Flying circus will get the money" then John K Clark
would not bother planning how John K Clark was going to spend John K
Clark's newfound riches because it is very unlikely that the screen in John
K Clark's environment would produce that particular pattern of pixels,
although that pattern is as likely a pattern as any other pattern; and as
always there is much in John K Clark's environment that John K Clark cannot
predict, but that has nothing to do with the nature of personal identity
that we were discussing.

I know the above prose was clunky and may even have sounded narcissistic
but it's very easy to write gibberish if extreme care is not taken and
personal pronouns are a minefield in philosophy.

 > But the one in W cannot explains why he is the one in W.

Certainly the Washington guy can explain it, he's the Washington guy
because he received sensory information from Washington not Moscow, if he
had not he would not be the Washington guy.

>> the one and only one place you will feel to be after the experiment is
>> Moscow and Washington and there is nothing paradoxical about that.
> > This is plainly false. I will not FEEL to be in M and W.  I will feel to
> be in M or W.

This is plainly false because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, Bruno
Marchal's perspective has been duplicated his memory has been duplicated
his personality has been duplicated his intelligence has been duplicated
his consciousness has been duplicated, EVERYTHING about Bruno Marchal has
been duplicated, and yet you continue to insist that "I" is singular when
very clearly it is not. After the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno
Marchal feels like Bruno Marchal is in Washington and only Washington and
after the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal feels like Bruno
Marchal is in Moscow and only Moscow, and Bruno Marchal is correct because
Bruno Marchal has been duplicated.

> In fact my body has been duplicated, and for an outsider my 1-view have
been duplicated, but the Nagel-Everett subjective view on the 1-view are
not. You confuse 3p discourses on 1-views with 1-p discourse on its 1-view.

I believe it is you that is confused and that is not surprising considering
that your implicit or explicit assumption at the start of all your thought
experiments is "everything about you is duplicated and something about you
has not been duplicated", it's no wonder you end up with confusing self
contradictory nonsense. My thought experiments start with "if something is
identical then it's identical" and my starting point causes much less
confusion than yours.

  John K Clark

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