On 7 March 2012 17:40, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> > You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which
>> > the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can
>> > attribute to each reconstituted person.
>
>
> And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus "the
> 1-view from its own perspective" is no longer singular but has become
> plural.

"The 1-view from its own perspective" can NEVER be plural.  After
duplication there are two people, each of whom must possess a singular
perspective.  Both of these persons would recall being unsure in
Helsinki where he would end up after duplication in Washington and
Moscow.  Do you dissent from this?.

David


> On Tue, Mar 6, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>> > In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other city? You
>> > told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance. He will tell you
>> > that you were wrong.
>
>
> I was not wrong. When discussing the nature of identity care must be taken
> when using personal pronouns or confusion will run riot; I did not tell
> "him" that "he" will find "himself" in Moscow with a 100% chance, I said
> there is a 100% chance Bruno Marchal will be in Moscow and events proved I
> was 100% correct. The fact that Bruno Marchal is in Washington and knows
> nothing about Moscow is irrelevant and makes no difference to Bruno in
> Moscow whatsoever. Why do I say this? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
>
>
>> > Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has been
>> > duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1-view
>> > perspective has not been duplicated.
>
>
> Then when I said "you have been duplicated" there is something very
> important about "you", the most important part in fact, that is missing
> because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated. What can it be, what
> is lacking in the copy that the original has? let's think, it can't be
> information because that can certainly be duplicated and it can't be matter
> because atoms are generic and we constantly replace our atoms with new ones
> anyway; so I think we both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm
> not yet ready to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace
> irrationality.
>
> I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a
> copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you
> are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room, thus the
> two of you are receiving identical sensory input and thus act identically. I
> now use a Star Trek brand transporter to instantly exchange your position
> with the original, or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just
> exchange the two brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original
> Bruno Marchal would notice that anything had happened, and objective outside
> observers would not notice anything had happened either. There would not
> even be a way to tell if the machine was actually working, I could even be
> lying about having a transporter. Who knows who cares?
>
> Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there
> was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things
> would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they
> would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and
> objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't
> sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very
> reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there
> are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one
> intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view.
>
>
>> > Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split.
>
>
> It's against my better judgment but I know you like the word so yes,
> subjectively you do not feel a Everett style split, but God sees it; but in
> my example above if the 2 are really identical and if the exchange is really
> instantaneous then even God Himself doesn't know (or care) if things really
> got swapped or not.
>
>> > You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which
>> > the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can
>> > attribute to each reconstituted person.
>
>
> And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus "the
> 1-view from its own perspective" is no longer singular but has become
> plural.
>
>>  >In Helsinki he does not know where he will feel to be after pushing the
>> reading/annihilating button.
>
>
> So after pushing the button the Helsinki man knows his sensory information
> will no longer come from Helsinki, fine I have no trouble with that, and for
> the sake of argument let's say that after he pushes that button the Helsinki
> man does not know if his external stimuli will now come from Washington or
> Moscow (he does know of course, he always knows but never mind). And now
> what? There are after all lots of things about our environment we can't
> predict so even if what you say were true (it's not) how can you derive any
> profound philosophical insight from this trivial mundane observation?
>
>> > Let us take again the "multiplication-movie" experience. But instead of
>> > multiplying only John Clark, into the 2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24,
>> > we have to multiply the couple [John Clark + a banker], and John, at the
>> > start, when still unique, is asked to choose the between the following bet:
>>
>> "I bet a billion$ that I will see the movie "Monty Python Flying circus" "
>> or "I bet a billion$ that I will see white noise." The bet is done with the
>> banker, which is multiplied together with John. (it is the comp first person
>> plural case).
>
>
> You should rephrase that without using so many personal pronouns because as
> stated it isn't clear who gets the money if the bet is won. If John K Clark
> thought the banker really had enough money to pay off a colossal losing bet,
> that is to say if the banker had 2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24 x (a
> billion dollars) then the following bet would be instantly accepted: "if
> John K Clark sees Monty Python Flying circus then John K Clark will receive
> one billion dollars" and I (personal pronoun is OK in this case) would know
> with certainty that in just 90 minutes I (personal pronoun also OK in this
> case) would be very rich. On the other hand if the bet was "only the fellow
> who saw Monty Python Flying circus will get the money" then John K Clark
> would not bother planning how John K Clark was going to spend John K Clark's
> newfound riches because it is very unlikely that the screen in John K
> Clark's environment would produce that particular pattern of pixels,
> although that pattern is as likely a pattern as any other pattern; and as
> always there is much in John K Clark's environment that John K Clark cannot
> predict, but that has nothing to do with the nature of personal identity
> that we were discussing.
>
> I know the above prose was clunky and may even have sounded narcissistic but
> it's very easy to write gibberish if extreme care is not taken and personal
> pronouns are a minefield in philosophy.
>
>>  > But the one in W cannot explains why he is the one in W.
>
>
> Certainly the Washington guy can explain it, he's the Washington guy because
> he received sensory information from Washington not Moscow, if he had not he
> would not be the Washington guy.
>
>
>>> >> the one and only one place you will feel to be after the experiment is
>>> >> Moscow and Washington and there is nothing paradoxical about that.
>>
>>
>> > This is plainly false. I will not FEEL to be in M and W.  I will feel to
>> > be in M or W.
>
>
> This is plainly false because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, Bruno
> Marchal's perspective has been duplicated his memory has been duplicated his
> personality has been duplicated his intelligence has been duplicated his
> consciousness has been duplicated, EVERYTHING about Bruno Marchal has been
> duplicated, and yet you continue to insist that "I" is singular when very
> clearly it is not. After the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal
> feels like Bruno Marchal is in Washington and only Washington and after the
> experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal feels like Bruno Marchal is
> in Moscow and only Moscow, and Bruno Marchal is correct because Bruno
> Marchal has been duplicated.
>
>
>> In fact my body has been duplicated, and for an outsider my 1-view have
>> been duplicated, but the Nagel-Everett subjective view on the 1-view are
>> not. You confuse 3p discourses on 1-views with 1-p discourse on its 1-view.
>
> I believe it is you that is confused and that is not surprising considering
> that your implicit or explicit assumption at the start of all your thought
> experiments is "everything about you is duplicated and something about you
> has not been duplicated", it's no wonder you end up with confusing self
> contradictory nonsense. My thought experiments start with "if something is
> identical then it's identical" and my starting point causes much less
> confusion than yours.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
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