On 7 March 2012 17:40, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which >> > the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can >> > attribute to each reconstituted person. > > > And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus "the > 1-view from its own perspective" is no longer singular but has become > plural.
"The 1-view from its own perspective" can NEVER be plural. After duplication there are two people, each of whom must possess a singular perspective. Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he would end up after duplication in Washington and Moscow. Do you dissent from this?. David > On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> > In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other city? You >> > told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance. He will tell you >> > that you were wrong. > > > I was not wrong. When discussing the nature of identity care must be taken > when using personal pronouns or confusion will run riot; I did not tell > "him" that "he" will find "himself" in Moscow with a 100% chance, I said > there is a 100% chance Bruno Marchal will be in Moscow and events proved I > was 100% correct. The fact that Bruno Marchal is in Washington and knows > nothing about Moscow is irrelevant and makes no difference to Bruno in > Moscow whatsoever. Why do I say this? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. > > >> > Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has been >> > duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1-view >> > perspective has not been duplicated. > > > Then when I said "you have been duplicated" there is something very > important about "you", the most important part in fact, that is missing > because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated. What can it be, what > is lacking in the copy that the original has? let's think, it can't be > information because that can certainly be duplicated and it can't be matter > because atoms are generic and we constantly replace our atoms with new ones > anyway; so I think we both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm > not yet ready to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace > irrationality. > > I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a > copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you > are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room, thus the > two of you are receiving identical sensory input and thus act identically. I > now use a Star Trek brand transporter to instantly exchange your position > with the original, or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just > exchange the two brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original > Bruno Marchal would notice that anything had happened, and objective outside > observers would not notice anything had happened either. There would not > even be a way to tell if the machine was actually working, I could even be > lying about having a transporter. Who knows who cares? > > Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there > was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things > would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they > would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and > objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't > sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very > reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there > are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one > intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. > > >> > Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split. > > > It's against my better judgment but I know you like the word so yes, > subjectively you do not feel a Everett style split, but God sees it; but in > my example above if the 2 are really identical and if the exchange is really > instantaneous then even God Himself doesn't know (or care) if things really > got swapped or not. > >> > You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which >> > the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can >> > attribute to each reconstituted person. > > > And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus "the > 1-view from its own perspective" is no longer singular but has become > plural. > >> >In Helsinki he does not know where he will feel to be after pushing the >> reading/annihilating button. > > > So after pushing the button the Helsinki man knows his sensory information > will no longer come from Helsinki, fine I have no trouble with that, and for > the sake of argument let's say that after he pushes that button the Helsinki > man does not know if his external stimuli will now come from Washington or > Moscow (he does know of course, he always knows but never mind). And now > what? There are after all lots of things about our environment we can't > predict so even if what you say were true (it's not) how can you derive any > profound philosophical insight from this trivial mundane observation? > >> > Let us take again the "multiplication-movie" experience. But instead of >> > multiplying only John Clark, into the 2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24, >> > we have to multiply the couple [John Clark + a banker], and John, at the >> > start, when still unique, is asked to choose the between the following bet: >> >> "I bet a billion$ that I will see the movie "Monty Python Flying circus" " >> or "I bet a billion$ that I will see white noise." The bet is done with the >> banker, which is multiplied together with John. (it is the comp first person >> plural case). > > > You should rephrase that without using so many personal pronouns because as > stated it isn't clear who gets the money if the bet is won. If John K Clark > thought the banker really had enough money to pay off a colossal losing bet, > that is to say if the banker had 2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24 x (a > billion dollars) then the following bet would be instantly accepted: "if > John K Clark sees Monty Python Flying circus then John K Clark will receive > one billion dollars" and I (personal pronoun is OK in this case) would know > with certainty that in just 90 minutes I (personal pronoun also OK in this > case) would be very rich. On the other hand if the bet was "only the fellow > who saw Monty Python Flying circus will get the money" then John K Clark > would not bother planning how John K Clark was going to spend John K Clark's > newfound riches because it is very unlikely that the screen in John K > Clark's environment would produce that particular pattern of pixels, > although that pattern is as likely a pattern as any other pattern; and as > always there is much in John K Clark's environment that John K Clark cannot > predict, but that has nothing to do with the nature of personal identity > that we were discussing. > > I know the above prose was clunky and may even have sounded narcissistic but > it's very easy to write gibberish if extreme care is not taken and personal > pronouns are a minefield in philosophy. > >> > But the one in W cannot explains why he is the one in W. > > > Certainly the Washington guy can explain it, he's the Washington guy because > he received sensory information from Washington not Moscow, if he had not he > would not be the Washington guy. > > >>> >> the one and only one place you will feel to be after the experiment is >>> >> Moscow and Washington and there is nothing paradoxical about that. >> >> >> > This is plainly false. I will not FEEL to be in M and W. I will feel to >> > be in M or W. > > > This is plainly false because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, Bruno > Marchal's perspective has been duplicated his memory has been duplicated his > personality has been duplicated his intelligence has been duplicated his > consciousness has been duplicated, EVERYTHING about Bruno Marchal has been > duplicated, and yet you continue to insist that "I" is singular when very > clearly it is not. After the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal > feels like Bruno Marchal is in Washington and only Washington and after the > experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal feels like Bruno Marchal is > in Moscow and only Moscow, and Bruno Marchal is correct because Bruno > Marchal has been duplicated. > > >> In fact my body has been duplicated, and for an outsider my 1-view have >> been duplicated, but the Nagel-Everett subjective view on the 1-view are >> not. You confuse 3p discourses on 1-views with 1-p discourse on its 1-view. > > I believe it is you that is confused and that is not surprising considering > that your implicit or explicit assumption at the start of all your thought > experiments is "everything about you is duplicated and something about you > has not been duplicated", it's no wonder you end up with confusing self > contradictory nonsense. My thought experiments start with "if something is > identical then it's identical" and my starting point causes much less > confusion than yours. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.