John, I hope you will not think me impertinent, but you're expending a great deal of time and energy arguing with an elaborate series of straw men. No doubt this is great fun and highly entertaining, but would you consider the alternative of requesting clarification of the real point at issue? It's painful to see you repeatedly arguing past it.
David On 11 March 2012 05:33, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Sat, Mar 10, 2012 at 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> > and it is just very simple, for all people up to now, that the 1-views >> > on their own 1-view is not duplicated. > > > Well, if you haven't before considered the possibility that this "obvious" > common sense assumption could be dead wrong it is certainly high time you > did! Yes, the assumption that the 1-views on their own 1-view can not be > duplicated is indeed simple, very very very simple, but not simple in a good > way. Theories should be as simple as possible, but not simpler, because then > they just become stupid. I insist that in my symmetrical room experiment > there can be (or at least should not be) any doubt that the person's 1-views > on their own 1-view HAS IN FACT BEEN DUPLICATED. > > >> > but they feel like not having been duplicated > > > Yes that is the entire point, you could be a copy of Bruno Marchal, you > could be only 5 minutes old, I could have used generic atoms and information > on how to assemble them from the original Bruno Marchal, so now you feel > just like Bruno Marchal and your memories of being a child are just as vivid > as the memories the original Bruno Marchal has. > > >> > they know only intellectually the possible existence of the other > > > That is quite untrue, both you (the copy) and you (the original Bruno > Marchal) are in that symmetrical room and can see each other plain as day, > and until random quantum fluctuations become significant it will be as if > you're looking in a mirror for both of "you", the two of "you" will both see > somebody who looks just like Bruno Marchal who is moving and speaking in > synchronization with the way "you" move and speak. > > >>> >> and in my symmetrical room thought experiment I make it crystal clear >>> >> that the first person personal subjective perspective CAN be duplicated >>> >> just >>> >> like everything else can be. >> >> >> > Crystal clear? > > > Yes crystal clear, as clear as the azure sky of deepest summer. > > >> > It only shows that the 1-view is duplicated from a 3-view pov, not from >> > the 1-view perspective. > > > Explain to me how the 1-view perspective of anybody has changed from any > perspective you care to name, any at all. Before the switch you, from your > first person perspective, consciously feel like you are looking at somebody > who looks, moves, acts, and speaks exactly like you do, it's as if you're > looking into a mirror; and after the switch you, from your first person > perspective consciously feel like you are looking at somebody who looks, > moves, acts, and speaks exactly like you do, it's as if you're looking into > a mirror. What has changed from the original's point of view, what has > changed from the copy's point of view, what has changed from a third person > observer's point of view, what has changed from the universe's point of > view? Absolutely positively nothing. To win this argument all you have to do > is explain to me how instantly changing the position of 2 identical objects > changes anything from anyone's or anything's point of view. You can't. > >> > The 1-view attributed by an outsider, not the 1-view from its own pov. >> > You continue to talk like if that was the same thing. > > > That's because it IS the same thing, you are no better at determining when > you and your double exchange positions than a outside third party observer > is. Objectively or subjectively and first second third or ANY point of view, > no person, no God, no thing, NOTHING can tell that anything has happened > when 2 identical things instantly exchange positions. A person's 1-views on > their own 1-view CAN IN FACT BE DUPLICATED. And why should this fact really > be so surprising, information can be duplicated and there is no difference > between one hydrogen atom and another, so where's the problem? But of course > I know what the problem is, the conclusion is odd, not illogical, not self > contradictory, just odd. Well there is no law of physics or logic that says > reality can't be odd. > > >>> >> Information was not annihilated, matter was not annihilated, energy >>> >> was not annihilated, so just what was "annihilated" in Helsinki? >> >> >> > Its body. > > > But the Helsinki man's body still exists, only now it's in Moscow and > Washington, but people travel all the time without apparent loss of personal > identity. > > >> > If your prefer, the local information which was available in Helsinki is >> > erased after having been read and sent to W and to M. > > > No it has not, both the Washington and Moscow man remember being the > Helsinki man just fine, no information has been lost; true neither of them > continues to receive sensory information from Helsinki, but the same would > be true if the Helsinki man had just gotten on a jet for Moscow. > > >>> >> you don't need elaborate thought experiments involving duplicating >>> >> chambers to realize that you can never know for sure what you will see >>> >> when >>> >> you open a door, surprises are always possible. >> >> >> > We are in the course of a reasoning. As you illustrate, nothing is >> > obvious > > > Agreed. > > >> > so in this case we have to explain why this particular form of >> > "surprise" is guarantied by the comp hypothesis. > > > But there is nothing unique about comp in that, the existence of surprise is > guarantied by ANY hypothesis including the God hypothesis. > >> > If the prediction is "I will see Flying Circus", then [...] > > > Then the entire thought experiment is pointless. You're supposed to be > illustrating the subtle and non-obvious nature of "I", but when you throw > around that personal pronoun with abandon as if its meaning was already > perfectly clear and even use it right at the start as a premise in the > thought experiment then there is no way you can learn anything about the > nature of "I" from it; it's like a definition that includes the word you > want defined, it's circular and not helpful. > >>> >> If his brain was in Washington but all his external stimuli came from >>> >> Moscow then he'd be identical to the Moscow guy, that is to say he'd be >>> >> the >>> >> Moscow guy. Except when things are very far apart and signal transmission >>> >> time becomes a factor the position of the brain is not important. >> >> >> >You add something which is just not relevant for the point into >> > consideration. We assume the protocol is given to the guy in Helsinki, and >> > that he trust the protocol and that the protocol is rigorously followed. >> > You >> > are changing the experiment. > > > I am changing nothing. This experiment is supposed to tell us something > about consciousness not about Helsinki, the ONLY difference between the > Helsinki man and the Moscow man is that the Moscow man now gets his external > stimuli from Moscow instead of Helsinki, that's it, nothing more; and that > could have happened through your duplicating chamber scenario or through a > virtual reality telepresence setup, or the Helsinki man could have simply > gotten on a jet for Moscow, it all amounts to the same thing as far as > consciousness is concerned. So all this "first person indeterminacy" stuff > really means is "you never know what you will see next", and I didn't need a > exotic duplicating chamber to figure that out. > >> > The point is that they were not able to predict in advance the precise >> > localization where they feel now (after the duplication and opening the >> > door). > > > Or to say the exact same thing with different words, you never know what you > will see when you open a door. Well it's true but I just don't see how it's > very profound. > > >> > the probability question bears on the self-localization result after >> > they open the door. > > > If the question "where is your consciousness located?" has any meaning at > all (and it probably does not) then the answer is the location of your eyes > ears nose tongue and hands, the location of your brain is irrelevant unless > its so far away that signal transmission time becomes significant. Actually > although I would not like it myself a consciousness could exist with no > external stimuli whatsoever, in which case asking where it is located would > be like asking where the number eleven is located. > > >> > You were just not answering the question asked. > > > I've tried, I promise you I've really really tried, but its hard because > most of the questions make no damn sense. > > >> > In the W-M duplication experience, you can predict with certainty >> > (assuming comp) that >> 1) you will feel to survive, and you will survive as one integral, entire, >> non duplicated person, > > > And that is obviously false, you can be duplicated and for all you know you > already are a duplicated person, and if your point one is false there is no > point in reading your other 4 points that build on that. > > >> OK? Can we move on to step 4? > > Not if its foundation is built on the assumption that this silly 1-view > indeterminacy and n-person perspective stuff is true or even coherent; a > proof is only as strong as its weakest link and that link is not only weak > its nonexistent. > > John K Clark > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.