On 3/11/2012 5:43 PM, acw wrote:
On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the
3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the
perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*.
point of the exercise.
I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of
subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to
100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?
You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I used to
wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further,
it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular
However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be
at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that
comp is false?
This identification, I think, is the identification that exists
between a collection of bisimilar computations and a given "Virtual
reality simulation" as the content of a first person experience.
- that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or
quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes
persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level,
anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented
correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the
machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our
mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply
reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not
white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience
white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does
not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or changes in
laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced
(such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being
able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others).
Also, one possible way of showing COMP false is to show that such
stable implementations are impossible, however this seems not obvious
to me. A more practical concern would be to consider the case of what
would happen if the substitution level is chosen slightly wrong or too
high - would it lead to too unstable 1p or merely just allow the
SIM(Substrate Independent Mind) to more easily pick which lower-level
machines implement it (there's another thought experiment which shows
how this could be done, if a machine can find one of its own
I agree with ACW. The difficulty in understanding all of this is
that we are effectively abstrating out all references to the physical
world via a Platonic interpretation of the Church-Turing Theorem. Any
time we talk of a "machine", we are really talking about an equivalence
set of bisimilar computations in the sense that all of the computations
in the set are equivalent in that they all act to generate the same output.
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