On 3/12/2012 4:21 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/11/2012 11:47 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote:
On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about
3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the
perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*.
point of the exercise.
I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future
subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might
seem to entail
100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?
You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I
used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering
it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with
some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly
determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you
allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its
behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change,
as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If
the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the
lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one
world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable
experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise
experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white
noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does
not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or changes in
laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced
(such as the current statistically winning machines no longer
being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of
view of others).
However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could
at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we
comp is false?
This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the
regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if
it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence,
even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with
extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which
seems unlikely to me).
I do not understand how you think that "only worlds with
extremely consistent physics can support consciousness" is
unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of
consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist
multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with
each other (in the sense that they can "understand" each other)
then the physics of their common world will necessarily be
maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry
Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of
I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their
Oh, let's see. If we could upload ourselves into artificial
hardware then we are by definition "arbitrarily extending our
experiences"... If we go with the "reincarnation" theories we get
arbitrary extensions as well...
How would magical events prevent anything.
An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the
Nether plane! A "magical act", if real and just part of a story, is
an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else
would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would
introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and
measures, so they have to be banished.
"Have to be"? To satisfy you...or what?
To satisfy the requirements of arbitrarily long extensions. My
point is that Harry Potterisms are pathological because they can
introduce arbitrary cul-de-sacs, therefore, they are a serious problem.
Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these
pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and
disjoint observers and not just "shared" 1p as such implicitly assume
an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation
laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP?
That's an open question.
We have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific
places and times and they don't seem to prevent anything. We tend
to not believe them because they violate the physics which we
suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke
that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious
That is my point. We do not see such violations, not ever!
Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to
have conservation laws.
But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws are
arguably human selections. We pay attention to and build 'laws' on
what does not depend on particular time/place/orientation; so may
conservation of momentum and energy are (at least approximately)
How so? It is one thing to have symbolic representations of
experiences and so forth, it is another to have explanations that
must be built for each and every situation with no possibility of
symmetries and isomorphisms that would relate them into frame
independent forms. Physics, as in what physicist study and experiment
about, cannot be considered as mere instrumentalism of the moment! So
the case that conservation laws are necessary of a "real world" seems
But which ones? We used to think Gallilean ones. Now we think
Lorentzian - except in General Relativity where energy conservation is
only locally defined - or in QM where it's unitarity - or...
If we cannot define the Hamiltonians (or equivalent) we don't have
any physics. Conservations laws and the Hamiltonians are inseparable, no?
The question settles into one of two possible vacua: 1) laws are
imposed by fiat from some underlying "reality" or 2) laws are the
maximally consistent relations possible for a large but finite
collections of communicating Minds. I am betting on the latter.
What 'relations...for minds'? Can't minds agree on everything except
maybe "X and not-X"?
How do you model interactions between minds? So far no one has
answered my questions about this save a ambiguous reference to shared
plural 1p. There is no curiosity in the concurrency problem and I find
that very odd as it is the biggest practical problem in computer science.
There is also the problem that according to current theories are
many possible kinds of physics even if you limit them to just those
consistent with string theory, much less Classical physics.
Classical physics is a long decayed corpse. Strings are already
dull and flat. Check out Nima Arkani-Hamed's latest talk :
But my main point was conditional. IF consciousness is strongly
dependent on physics then Bruno's program of replacing physics with
arithmetic isn't going anywhere because arithmetic will produce too
many kinds of worlds and only by studying physics will we be able to
learn about our world.
I agree and that is why I am focusing on situations that involve
multiple observers interacting with each other as a way to overcome
It is because of this line of reasoning that I resist the Platonic
interpretation of COMP as it puts pathological universes on the
same level of likelihood as non-pathological ones.
That's the question. Is there some canonical measure that makes the
non-pathological ones overwhelmingly likely?
I do not think so.
That's what I said.
For one reason, there are structures that simply cannot be reduced to
Unary or Boolean algebras and thus cannot be described in terms of
single or [0,1] valued functions. This tells us that if we are to get
non-pathological worlds as not only likely but highly probable there
has to exist irreducible aspects to the physical "stuff". In
classical physics we can always just use the least action principle,
but that requires infinite computations for each and every pair of
Observer moments to find the answer to the simple question: Is there
a smooth diffeomorphism between these spaces? In QFT things are not
But in practice we calculate these things as exactly as we want by
digital computer approximations of the continuous functions. So what
difference would it make if the world were discrete at the Planck scale?
Umm, we have some decent evidence that the world is not discrete at
the Plank scale. What is discrete is any emission or absorption event.
You might wish to read up on the infrared divergence problems.
Nevertheless, our conservation laws require smooth functions, so I am
not so sanguine about digital computer approximations.
One thing that I have found in the last few days is that it is
impossible to define the computational operations of deleting,
copying and pasting onto/into topological manifolds unless one is
willing to give up the invariance of genus and Betti numbering.
Cutting and pasting seem to be absolutely necessary operations of
Why do you say that? Quantum computers don't duplicate and don't erase.
Oh, so now all computations are quantum? what happened to all the
demands that computations are classical? But it is not that quantum
computers do not duplicate or erase, it is that we can't clone quantum
states.. Frankly, this response is puzzling to me.
so if physical worlds are topologically invariant (modulo Ricci
flows, etc.) then they are cannot be used as primitives in the
computational sense. This seems to add support to Bruno's result, but
does not quite meet the Platonic expectations that he is assuming,
since it also shows that we cannot construct spaces from mere
arithmetic operations, we also need some form of infinitesimal
calculus (to parametrize Ricci flows, homotopies and so forth). We
need the non-standard stuff.
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