On 13 Mar 2012, at 06:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/12/2012 9:29 PM, John Clark wrote:
> Indeed, but this makes my point. The 1-view at this stage is
unique. We might fuse them, and nothing would have happened.
I'm glad you agree, but then what are we arguing about?
> note that if the reconstitution boxes are different from inside,
in W and in M, then
Then symmetry is broken, the 2 see different things, and are no
longer identical and become different people, I've already said
that many times before.
I think you've both lost the thread of the argument. As I see it
Bruno's argument is just that the uncertainty of QM can be modeled
by hypothesizing that each possible outcome is experienced by the
potential observer, who becomes a different actual observer for each
Hmm... That's partially true but not with the correct nuance-modality.
My argument is that if mechanism is assumed this as to be obligatory.
And the QM uncertainty is not modeled by hypothesizing that each
possible outcome is experienced, for the UD or Robi,son Arithmetic
defined precisely the domain on which the uncertainty bears. The
iterated self-duplication experience is NOT equivalent with the UD
situations. It will be the difference between white noise and
This is consistent with John Clark's position that a person's name
is an adjective and so the hypothetical observers are different but
have equal claim to the adjective. This is all just another
explication of Everett's relative state.
Then Bruno further supposes that consciousness is just a certain
kind of computation (which John Clark agrees with - it's one that
I don't say much on consciousness, except that it is invariant for a
(usually conceived physical) functional digital substitution. Given
the special relation existing between the first person and its vast
indeterminacy domain, this is weaker that saying consciousness is a
certain kind of computation. It is still an association, something
like the correct belief by a machine about some reality making her
capable to manifest herself in that reality. It is an higher order
logical concept than the computation concept, even if it can be
supported relatively through computations.
So if all possible computations are made they will include the
conscious experiences of an observer of a quantum event.
Trivially for an atom of time.
But for a longer time, it becomes non trivial at all.
Quantum event have to be recovered from the Löbian machines (also
called "rich theories") when looking below they sharable first person
plural substitution level. So it is testable. My feeling is that
Everett QM confirms comp. The quantum might be the digital as it seems
from inside. Like I think that the continuum might be the discrete as
it seems from inside.
The uncertainity of the experienced event is accounted for by noting
that the same computation up to a given point may have different
From the first person perspective it makes sense to say we are in a
continuum of computations, and they just differentiate, or fuse.
These will realize the different conscious experiences of the
observer who was, before the observation, an undifferentiated
That makes sense.
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